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 i 
Abstract 
 
This research investigates whether The Christian story or The Public story is most 
appropriate for moral formation under democratic rule.   
 
The research draws from six well-known theologians who make valuable contributions to 
the enquiry. Each of the writings of William John Everett, Rosemary Radford Ruether, 
Geoffrey Wainwright, Stanley Hauerwas, Robin Gill and Desmond Tutu represents an 
approach for moral formation. 
 
In all the approaches there are major contributions that are pointed out. However, the first 
five approaches neglect the consistent relationship between the Christian story and the 
Public story, the inclusiveness of community and the role of God for moral formation. 
 
After careful analysis of the six approaches it is found that Desmond Tutu's theology and 
Ubuntu is the most appropriate approach for moral formation under democratic rule. 
 
Tutu's approach gives meaning to the fundamentals of the Public story, namely, reason, 
individual freedom, universal principles and laws, in Ubuntu community. He also draws 
from Genesis and the biblical description of the cross event to illustrate how God gives 
meaning to humanity through creation and redemption. 
 
This research finally concludes that Tutu's approach presents an interplay between the 
Christian story and the Public for moral formation under democratic rule.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
Opsomming 
 
Hierdie navorsingstuk ondersoek watter een van die Christelike storie of die Publieke 
storie meer toepaslik is vir die morele vorming onder 'n demokratiese regeringstelsel.       
 
Die navorsing maak staat op inligting van ses welbekende teoloë wat waardevolle 
bydraes lewer tot die ondersoek. Elk van die bydraes van William John Everett, 
Rosemary Radford Ruether, Geoffrey Wainwright, Stanley Hauerwas, Robin Gill en 
Desmond Tutu verteenwoordig  'n spesifieke benadering tot morele vorming.   
 
In al hierdie benaderings word daar belangrike bydraes uitgewys. Dit nieteenstaande, is 
dit opmerklik dat die eerste vyf benaderinge die konstante verhouding tussen die 
Christelike storie en die Publieke storie, die inklusiwiteit van gemeenskap en die rol van 
God in morele vorming onderwaardeer.      
 
Na versigtige analise van die ses benaderinge is die bevinding dat Desmond Tutu se 
teologie en Ubuntu die mees toepaslike benadering is vir morele vorming onder 'n 
demokratiese regeringstelsel. 
 
Tutu se benadering gee betekenis aan die fundamentele beginsels van die Publieke storie, 
naamlik, rede, individuele vryheid, universele begrippe en wette, in Ubuntu gemeenskap. 
Hy gebruik ook die Genesis storie van die menslike skepping en die kruis gebeurtenisse 
om te illustreer hoe God aan menselike lewe betekenis gee deur skepping en verlossing.  
 
Hierdie navorsing lei uiteindelik tot die gevolgtrekking dat Tutu se benadering 
verteenwoordigend is van 'n tussenspel tussen die Christelike storie en die Publieke storie 
vir die morele vorming onder 'n demokratiese regeringstelsel.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
 Acknowledgements 
 
Many people have contributed to the success of this research. I will not be able to thank 
everyone by name, but the following institutions, groups and persons represent all who 
contributed to this research. 
 
To my family, Melaney, Catherine and Adam who supported me in many ways. This 
research has been done with them always in my heart and mind. They have helped to 
make things clearer and meaningful. 
 
To my promoters, Professors Dirkie Smit and Nico Koopman who over the years have 
treated me and my work with integrity and respect. The secretarial staff and the librarians 
of The University of Stellenbosch and The University of the Western Cape I hold in high 
esteem. 
 
To the three worshipping communities where I served as priest while doing this research, 
St. Cyprians Retreat, St. Albans Wellington and Good Shepherd, Kensington, I wish to 
express my deep appreciation. 
 
To the following persons and institutions for their financial contributions: Bishop, 
Raphael Hess and The Anglican Diocese of Saldanha Bay, The Beyers Naude Centre for 
Public theology, Stellenbosch and the NRF. 
 
To God be the glory. This study has given me insights into who God is for me and those 
around me. With these new insights I will serve God with a greater sense of gratitude. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
 
 
Key Words 
 
Everett, J W 
 
Ruether, R R 
 
Wainwright, G 
 
Hauerwas, S 
 
Gill, R 
 
Tutu, D 
 
Moral formation 
 
Christian ethics 
 
Ubuntu 
 
Community 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
 vi 
 
Contents 
 
Page 
 
 
 
Introduction   1 
 
 
Chapter One 15 
 
William Johnson Everett: Democracy and moral formation 
 
 
Chapter Two 54 
 
Rosemary Radford Ruether: Feminist theology and moral formation  
 
 
Chapter Three 92 
 
Geoffrey Wainwright: Ecumenical worship and moral formation    
 
 
Chapter Four 123 
 
Stanley Hauerwas: The Christian community and moral formation 
 
 
Chapter Five 155 
 
Robin Gill and Stephen Sykes: Moral communities and moral 
 
Chapter Six 181 
 
Desmond Tutu: Ubuntu and moral formation 
 
 
Bibliography  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
1. The research problem 
In this research I discuss the significance and relevance of the Christian story and the 
Public story for moral formation under democratic rule. With the ever-increasing 
emphasis on the South African constitution and its accompanying laws and regulations, 
the citizens of the country are faced with a theological dilemma. The constitution, 
through the government, presents a Public story that is formed by the principles and 
guidelines of democracy. The principles of the constitution as a major moral agent, is a 
new phenomenon for most of the citizens of South Africa. The Christian Church must 
now also interpret its values in view of the constitution. As citizens of South Africa and 
subscribers to its constitution the Church is expected to uphold the values which the 
constitution seeks to outline. In the same way the Christian story has been influential 
through its worship, doctrine and practice in the moral formation of the people. The 
dilemma is which story should form morality or what should the relationship be to one 
another? 
 
This research investigates whether or to what extent The Christian story or The Public 
story should form morality for a South African society under democratic rule. Over the 
last couple of decades Christian theologians have attempted different ways of using The 
Christian story and The Public story for moral formation. Three such positions can be 
identified. 
 
Firstly there are those who conclude that The Christian story must rely on the form and 
content of The Public story to form morality for a society under democratic rule. The 
Christian story on its own cannot form morality but must interpret morality in view of 
The Public story. By implication this position claims that morality that is formed by The 
Public story is the accepted morality. In the case of democracy the values of democracy 
are the accepted values and The Church becomes a moral agent when it helps to shape 
these values. This position claims that morality can be formed through the rationality of 
individuals.  
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Secondly some would conclude that The Christian story is the story for moral formation. 
Those who hold this view are very critical of influential and important social theories. 
The Enlightenment Era and the global spread of democracy in particular are regarded 
with suspicion and in some cases discarded for moral formation. Some theologians who 
use the Christian story as the only one for moral formation treat the Public story as in 
opposition to the Christian story. 
 
A third position claims that more than one story serves a society on different levels for 
moral formation. Those who make this claim suggest that at different times and in 
different circumstances a different story dominates in moral decisions and conduct. For 
example a household situation, an academic situation and a spiritual situation will not 
necessarily draw from the same story for moral decision making and conduct. Those who 
claim this position will also claim different communities for moral formation. 
 
In view of these three positions I seek to find the most appropriate story for morality for a 
South African society under democratic rule. For a changing society such as South Africa 
many factors impacted on the kind of people we are being formed into. The constitution 
of South Africa, which is regarded as one of the most democratic constitutions in the 
world, has a tremendous impact on the formation of a moral society. The church on the 
other hand has always had an impact on the moral formation of the South African society. 
In view of this I will focus on moral formation in light of the birth and subsequent 
establishment of democracy in South Africa.        
 
2. The method of research  
In this literature research I will select the work of prominent Christian theologians in each 
of six approaches to describe and evaluate the approaches for moral formation for a 
society under democratic rule.  
 
I have found that the work of all the theologians makes valuable contributions to my 
study. Lots of research has been done in this area and many theologians have provided 
appropriate findings and literature for the study of moral formation. The theologians that 
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I have chosen for my focus in particular have written major work in the field of study. It 
is for this reason that I have chosen them and their work forms the foundation for my 
research. 
 
3. The use of story 
Story in this research is used as an interactive process through which moral formation 
takes place. This process is open-ended and the participants are actively involved in the 
re-telling of the story. 
 
The Christian story is in essence that of Jesus Christ, but also those who participate in 
one way or another in the re-telling of the story of the birth, ministry, death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ. The content of the story has specifically to do with the life of 
Jesus and is demonstrated in the sacrament of The Holy Eucharist. This story is re-told in 
the context of worship and those who form part of it do so through worship and the 
confession of the story as central to their morality. 
 
The Public story on the other hand refers to the interaction between individuals and the 
four principles of The Enlightenment Era. The four principles are reason, individuality, 
universal principles and individual freedom. I use this era as a story because of the impact 
it has over a long period in large parts of the world. 
 
The Public story is closely related to democracy and when used in this thesis, The Public 
story refers to both democracy and The Enlightenment Era. For this reason I use the 
Public story in relation to its effects on individuals and how it forms morality. 
 
My use of story is closely related to the way in which Stephen Sykes1 uses story. Sykes 
claims that two stories exist, that influence each other. In describing his view of story 
Sykes suggests that sacrifice is a good way of demonstrating the function of story. 
Referring to the life and death of Christ, Sykes says that the death of Jesus is seen as both 
                                                          
1 Sykes is former Bishop of Ely, England, in the Church of England. He is now Professor of Religion at 
The University of Durham, England. 
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a sacrifice in terms of the Old Testament understanding as well as the New Testament 
understanding of the ultimate sacrifice. In this sense two stories can be distinct but they 
can also influence each other (1991:294-297).   
 
My use of story also finds resonance in the way in which Richard Niebuhr’s used the 
notions of history and story. Using revelation in a creative way Niebuhr suggests that two 
histories exist which are in relationship. He calls these two histories “history as lived and 
history as seen”. History as lived is about the selves in community who interact on a 
personal basis. History as seen consists of ideas and movements among things. The 
relations in history as lived is of a “I-thou” nature and in history as seen of a “I-it nature”. 
 
Using internal history, Christianity uses the events of the past not as gone, but they 
remain part of our memory. Niebuhr rightly states that “So for the later church, history 
was always the story of 'our fathers,' of 'our Lord,' and of the actions of 'our God'” 
(1941:53). This is possible because Christians can now look with the fathers and so 
participate in their history. 
 
External history or history as seen is not foreign for the church because the church 
responds to it. In this way the external history becomes part of the inner history. Using 
the doctrine of the sovereignty of God, Niebuhr points out that by looking at the internal 
history of Jesus new insights can be discovered for interaction in economic and cultural 
settings. In the same way he states that Christians must also look beyond internal history 
to discover the revelation of God in people beyond their history. To this effect he rightly 
states; “To be a self is to have a God, to have a God is to have history, that is, events 
connected in a meaningful pattern, to have one God is to have one history. God and 
history in community belong together in inseparable union” (1941:59). 
 
In using the doctrine of the sovereignty of God with revelation Niebuhr points out that, 
for Christians the unity of the life story is in the revelation of the personal, living, one 
God in the Christ event. Revelation puts forward God who is beyond the relative objects 
or values that determine values in an isolated external history.  Revelation helps in our 
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search for a united story, universal God, continuing values and meanings that are found in 
the continuum of the internal and external history.     
 
In both Sykes and Niebuhr’s view of story, it is used as an interactive form of the reality 
out of which a morality grows. In this research story is used as inclusive and interactive. 
In both The Christian story and The Public story moral formation refers to the formation 
of morally responsible people. This includes both decision-making and conduct. Moral 
formation is not about decision making only or good conduct only as certain theologians 
would claim. 
 
4. The six approaches for moral formation 
The following six approaches used by Christian theologians have valuable contributions 
to make to our subject of enquiry. I will give a description of the approach in each 
chapter, point out the major contributions for my research and then evaluate the 
approach. Finally I will present an approach that has drawn from the other approaches as 
the most appropriate approach of the six researched, for moral formation for a South 
African nation under democratic rule. 
 
a. William Johnson Everett: Democracy and moral formation 
William Johnson Everett is retired Herbert Gezork professor of Christian social ethics at 
Andover Newton theological school Newton Centre in Massachusetts. He has made 
numerous visits to South Africa and has shown a keen interest in the developments of a 
Post-Apartheid South Africa. I notice a shift in his in the work of Everett, which make his 
position interesting relevant for this research. This shift needs careful analysis. His 
represents the kind of theologians who has made a major shift to the extent that The 
Christian story is important for moral formation only in so far as it promotes the values of 
democracy. The Christian story seems to have lost its measure of influence it has on 
moral formation independently of the Public story. 
 
Everett uses the Old Testament more than any of the other theologians of the other five 
approaches. He surveys the Old Testament to relate politics and Christianity in a way that 
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shows that Christianity can be most appropriately used for a democratic society in 
relation to The Public story. He uses images and ideas from the Old Testament that 
substantiate his claim that politics is the neglected partner of moral formation 
 
Everett builds on the four principles of democracy, that of individual freedom, reason, 
universal principles and law for moral formation. These principles are imperative for the 
morality of both Christians and people from other persuasions. Everett has done studies 
in South African and his conclusions need to be taken seriously. 
 
The narrative that Everett suggests must be a continuation between The Christian story 
and The Public story in so far as Christians are Christians living under democratic rule. 
There must a narrative that stretches over the divide of "Sunday monarchists and Monday 
citizens". Everett would argue that The Public story and public language have a long 
history of moral formation and for a society under democratic rule this is the narrative 
that should form the basis for any moral society. 
 
Everett introduces terms foreign for Christian worshippers, such as "assembly" for the 
worship community and "republic" for God's Kingdom. These terms are reflective of his 
definition of community and worship. 
 
Everett also uses symbol, as an important tool for moral formation, but does not restrict 
this kind of symbols to religious symbols. Secular symbols fulfil that same role. The one 
symbol that has received the most attention from Everett is covenant. This symbol is 
given careful attention so that Everett's creative approach for moral formation is 
appropriated. 
 
The value of Everett's approach and use of narrative is important for our South African 
society under democratic rule and this is evaluated against the principles of democracy 
and the South African constitution. Also of importance are the context that Everett writes 
from and the compatibility of that context with the South African context. 
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Everett's attempt to use The Public story for moral formation is careful analysed as the 
content and relation of both The Public story and The Christian story are not necessarily 
the same.  
 
b. Rosemary Radford Ruether: Feminist theology and moral formation 
Rosemary Radford Ruether is Georgia Harkness professor of theology at Garrett-
Evangelical theological seminary, Evanston, Illinois. Amongst her important work are 
Faith and Fratricide (1974), Sexism and God-talk (1983) and Women and redemption 
(1998). I also use the work of other feminists who interacts with Radford Ruether and the 
two paradigms of feminist approaches to moral formation that she uses. In her earliest 
writings she places lots of emphasise on the liberal paradigm with its roots in The 
Enlightenment Era. She aligns herself with the principles of reason, universal principles, 
individual freedom and individuality that is characteristic of this age. This paradigm 
criticised patriarchy, hierarchy and exclusivism. 
 
The second paradigm, the social constructionist paradigm, on the other hand criticised the 
structural oppression that women in particular experience. Radford Ruether and those 
who follow this paradigm were more militant, revolutionary and conscious of the 
oppression of women in the social sphere. Radford Ruether accepts the social 
construction of values. 
 
Radford Ruether, unlike Feminists such as Mary Daly, remained in the church and 
engaged in moral formation from the perspective of community. She concludes that 
community is important for moral formation and defines community more selectively. 
For her the community is characterised by women who are usually excluded in the 
history of the church and in the present social sphere.       
 
These two paradigms gave rise to specific changes in worship and the interpretation of 
scripture. The Christian story or at least the re-telling of the story is given a new shape 
and as a result the values of the worshippers change. Some of the changes can be cited as 
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the ordination of women, authority or at least ecclesiastical authority, language, ministry, 
power and doctrine. These are some of the areas that have been criticised constructively. 
 
Changes in liturgy and worship are the major areas, which changed since the rise of 
Feminist theology and particularly with the formulation of the two paradigms. Radford 
Ruether attempts to relate The Christian story with the Public story in such a way that 
The Public story causes changes in The Christian story. This is important, but it needs 
careful analysis for moral formation of a society under democratic rule. 
 
c. Geoffrey Wainwright: Ecumenical worship and moral formation 
Geoffrey Wainwright is Cushman professor of Christian theology at Duke University, 
Durham, North Carolina. Wainwright draws from different traditions in his approach for 
moral formation. In his all-important work Doxology: A Systematic Theology, The 
worship of God in Worship, Doctrine and Life (Epworth Press, London, 1980). 
Wainwright presents an ecumenical approach. In this work in particular, Wainwright 
draws from different church traditions to put forward a position that is rich in both 
Catholic and Protestant history. 
 
Like most of the other attempts Wainwright also concludes that morality is formed in 
community. His description of community is grounded in specific ritual movements of 
the liturgy. The theologian, he suggests, is reliant on the community for its own spiritual 
and ethical formation and is in turn duty bound to contribute to the community. 
 
Wainwright uses the liturgy and The Eucharist in particular to describe worship. For 
Wainwright worship is done in the context of The Eucharist. This is an important point 
for the research as Wainwright relies on non-theological and liturgical sources to define 
worship. He uses the writings of Ninian Smart on the philosophy of religion and other 
sociological and anthropological sources when defining worship. 
 
Another important is the consistency that an ecumenical approach can make to the moral 
formation of a society. There are major contributions that such an approach can make 
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with regard to inclusivity and diversity, but the consistency in the argument needs some 
attention. 
 
Wainwright also seems to be putting the Protestant principle of doctrine ahead of the 
liturgical tradition. This can be easily assumed if we look at the structure of his book that 
the first part of the book reflects doctrinal principles and the second part the liturgical 
tradition. This is not necessarily the case as Wainwright does suggest that worship forms 
the locus for doctrine and life.        
 
In this major work Wainwright makes an attempt to reverse "Lex Orandi" and "Lex 
Credendi". By doing so Wainwright suggests that doctrine can influence liturgy. What 
needs careful consideration is to what extent doctrine is used in worship and whether it is 
used cognitively or in forms of rituals. What is also important to consider is the semantic 
value of the verb "statuat" in the saying "Lex supplicandi legem statuat credendi". 
 
Wainwright has also made other attempts to use narrative for moral formation that are 
considered. In these attempts he has used liturgy and ethics inter changeably for moral 
formation. 
 
There is much value in using the controlling principle of "worship, doctrine and life" to 
show how morality is formed in community and the importance of ritual in worship. 
Language usage is important in such an attempt and I evaluate Wainwright's attempt in 
light of his language usage and consistency. Wainwright makes valuable contributions in 
his use of The Christian story for moral formation by drawing form various Christian 
traditions. 
 
d. Stanley Hauerwas: The Christian community and moral formation 
Hauerwas is one of the most influential North American theologians and his teaching 
experience includes the distinguished Lutheran Augusta College in Rock Island, Illinois, 
the Methodist Duke school at the university of Duke in Durham. Hauerwas brings an 
important dimension to the study as he uses The Christian story extensively for his 
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description of moral formation. Hauerwas stands in the tradition of important 
Philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre who show the primary importance of 
community over individuality for moral formation. In North America Hauerwas is 
regarded amongst many Christian ethicists as one of the most important theologians in 
his field of study. 
 
In his use of narrative for moral formation Hauerwas has concluded from his earliest 
writings2 that The Christian story is primary for the formation of good moral people. 
Hauerwas's approach for moral formation is characterised by his use of community, 
worship, socialisation, and character and to a lesser extent symbols. Of community he 
concludes that the Christian community is where good people are formed through the 
rehearsing of a truthful story. These good morals are formed in worship and the 
worshippers become participants and so part of the re-enactment of good morals. 
 
Symbols help the worshippers to enter in a deeper understanding of the properties and 
rituals of worship. The worshippers have a deeper understanding of what is presented and 
so a clearer sense of the morals that are transmitted. These morals and its deeper 
understanding become part of the worshippers' nature of their conduct and morality. 
Moral formation in this sense is more than decisions or rationalisation. It has to do with 
the formation of persons in relation to other people. 
 
Hauerwas's use of narrative brings major contributions to the way moral formation is 
formed for a society under democratic rule. One of his valuable contributions is his 
constructive criticism of the liberal approach to morality. He criticises the almost 
exclusive use of reason and individuality of the liberal approach for moral formation. 
Another important contribution is his use of community and its importance for good 
morals and good moral people. Some of the questions that I have of Hauerwas relate to 
how he uses community and his description of community. Another important question to 
ask is how the narrative nature of his approach can be applied to its full potential for a 
society under democratic rule.  
                                                          
2 Particularly since his writing of The Peaceable Kingdom, University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1983. 
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 e. Robin Gill and Stephen Sykes: Moral communities and moral formation  
Robin Gill is the former William Leech research professor of Applied theology at the 
University of Newcastle and has been Michael Ramsey chair of modern theology at the 
university of Kent at Canterbury since 1992. Gill's approach also brings valuable 
contributions. Gill's work has striking similarities with Hauerwas and many points of 
contact can be found. He, like Hauerwas, claims that moral formation happens in 
community and that The Christian story is important for this formation to take place. 
 
The community where moral formation takes place is the church community and Gill 
defines the church community as the primary community where morality takes place. 
Speaking from a specifically Anglican tradition Gill defines the community primarily as a 
form of identification. When referring to a worshipping community, he includes those 
worshipping regularly and seasonal worshippers.  
 
The church he defines as those who are active, but more the institution as a hierarchical 
structure. The church is the institution and its doctrine, canons and constitutions. The 
church has well defined boundaries and its identity is to be found in these boundaries.  
 
However, unlike Hauerwas, Gill concludes that more than one community exists and 
communities other than the church are important for moral formation. Drawing from his 
post-graduate studies in sociology Gill further concludes that people belong to different 
communities and different communities compete against other in the human sphere.  
 
One of the major contributions that Gill makes is the importance of other communities 
for moral formation. He also suggests a less hostile relationship between The Christian 
story and The Public story for moral formation. Gill gives great value to the liberal 
approach for morality and reason forms part of his approach for moral formation. 
 
Gill's description of community seems less personal and more structural, making it more 
difficult to fully appreciate community for moral formation.      
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 Another Anglican theologian, Stephen Sykes, draws on Gill's work to further point out 
some valuable points with regard to the importance of narrative for moral formation. 
Sykes suggests that more than one narrative exist within The Christian story alone. He 
further suggests that symbols are important for moral formation. His particular 
contribution lies in his distinction between symbols and signs. Like Gill, Sykes also 
speaks out of a particular Anglican tradition and therefore their work as a whole forms an 
approach for moral formation 
 
Gill's inter-disciplinary approach for morality is another area of importance and this 
needs careful consideration. Gill has also used statistical data for his position and I draw 
from these studies.         
 
I find the points of contact between Gill and Sykes to adequately evaluate Gill's approach 
of using The Christian story and The Public story for moral formation. I also compare 
Gill's approach with that of Hauerwas. Although Gill and Hauerwas have many points of 
contact there are differences that stand out in their approaches.  
 
Attention is given to Gill's idea of community in relation to the worshipping community 
and how he uses the liberal principles for morality. Also important is his value of worship 
and the place that worship has for moral formation. 
 
f. Desmond Tutu: Ubuntu theology and moral formation 
Ubuntu theology is a tradition that is practised amongst most African communities but is 
a fairly new concept in academia. This concept has captured the academic world after the 
historic event in 1994. Since 1994 both African and Western theologians have taken this 
as a serious academic concept. Desmond Tutu is one of the theologians who have used 
the concept to describe moral behaviour in his very first comprehensive book. Desmond 
Tutu is one of the most influential South Africans of all time. Apart from a few books, he 
has also written many academic articles and speeches for assemblies all over the world. 
He is the former Chairman of the Truth and reconciliation commission in South Africa. 
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He has also served as Anglican Archbishop of Southern Africa from 1986 to 1996. Tutu 
is now Archbishop Emeritus and patron to many charities and societies. 
 
Other South African theologians such as John de Gruchy and Augustine Shutte 
compliments Tutu’s work, but it also provides important criticisms such his use of liturgy 
and democracy for moral formation. This research seeks to finds the points of contact 
between these South African theologians as well to point out the limitations of Tutu’s 
Ubuntu theology. 
 
Ubuntu as a cultural practice is unique to South Africa and is translated in its popular 
form as "a human is human through interaction with other human beings". Tutu uses the 
concept in a similar way as Western moral theologians use the communitarian approach. 
 
As a theologian, Tutu's usage of the concept Ubuntu seems the most appropriate 
approach for moral formation for a South African society under democratic rule. Tutu's 
use of Ubuntu seems inclusive.    
 
Tutu's description of the human community is more inclusive than the other approaches' 
attempt to describe community. He is well known in the international world for his 
attempts to be inclusive in his description of community. In view of this I relate his use of 
community in light of the recent developments in liberation theology. Tutu is also known 
as a respected liberation theologian and I draw on such assumptions to critique his 
description of community in light of the concept of Ubuntu. 
 
Tutu is first and foremost a priest and worship is central to his description of community 
and morality. Both personal worship in form of prayer and meditation, and communal 
worship, in The Holy Eucharist, are indispensable to moral formation. 
 
Regular celebration of The Eucharist forms the centre of Tutu's worship. The Eucharist 
reconciles people to each other and more importantly to God.  
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As an anti-Apartheid activist Tutu's work includes the principles of The Public story. 
From his earliest writings Tutu's argument for social change is found in the principles of 
The Public story.  
 
How is Tutu able to keep a consistency when The Public story and The Christian story 
are used in the way that he does?  
 
Conclusion 
This research deals with the question which story is most appropriate for the formation of 
morality for a South African society under democratic rule. I have chosen six approaches 
by prominent theologians from different traditions and contexts. I will explain, analyse 
and evaluated the six different approaches. Renowned theologians such as Hauerwas, Gill 
and Wainwright have used the Christian story in creative ways. Everett and Ruether have 
used the Public story as primary for moral formation in particular. Tutu brings an unique 
contribution with his approach as he uses both stories consistently. These six approaches 
need careful outlining and evaluation for moral formation. 
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Chapter One 
William Johnson Everett: Democracy and moral formation 
Introduction 
Everett makes major contributions to moral formation by introducing a fresh model for 
the formation of morality. He introduces a neglected partner for ethics, that of politics. 
 
In his description and application of politics there is a definite pattern of development. 
This pattern develops from a Christian dominance in his earlier writings to a position 
where Christianity has almost no role in moral formation apart from forming democratic 
values and methods. 
 
It is in the context of this progression/regression that I seek to outline and describe, and 
evaluate The Public story for moral formation. Everett's approach has three stages, which 
is that of his earlier, later and present stages. After discussing these three stages I will 
give a critical evaluation of his approach in light of the South African society. 
 
1. Everett's earlier approach to moral formation 
In his early work3 Everett points out that the formation of morality finds place in the 
context of Christianity. In this work Everett uses marriage to show the important role that 
the Christian story has for moral formation. In using marriage he shows that Christianity, 
and the church in particular, must preserve the original understanding of marriage in light 
of the social changes of marriage. This he claims can be done when the church recognises 
that the subjects of marriage have changed and that the values associated with marriage 
must be understood in light of societal changes. This early stage is characterised by: a. 
the four subjects of marriage, b. the role of social forces on marriage, c. the role of 
Christianity on marriage, d. Communion and grace as a symbol of marriage and e. the 
values that are formed by marriage.     
 
 
                                                          
3 Everett, W J, Blessed be the Bond: Christian perspectives on marriage and family, Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1985.  
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a. The four subjects of marriage  
He identifies the four subjects of marriage as person, couple, family and household. 
When referring to a person he refers to an individual with rights, duties, powers and 
status independently from spouse, family, children and household. A couple is a union 
between two persons. By family he means the network of relationships formed through 
birth, marriage and adoption. A household includes all those part of a domestic 
organisation occupying a specific space (Everett 1985:2-5). 
 
These four subjects have undergone changes that are significant for our understanding of 
values that is normally associated with marriage.  The medieval European family is such 
an example. In this case the family was regarded as a unit. When referring to a family it 
was assumed that the couple is married with children and the family would be understood 
as motherhood.  
 
When a prelate blessed a marriage he was also blessing a family (matrimonium) 
and a household (patrimonium). He was legitimating the formation of an 
enterprise central to the economic, social and governmental welfare of the people 
as a whole. To this day the nuptial blessing bears its marks as a prayer for the 
bride's faithfulness and fertility (Everett 1985:6).   
 
Everett also points out that the household of the medieval manor was an attempt to 
maintain economic gain. Land could be acquired or maintained through matrimony. 
Through marriage the church's concern was both theological and economical. Persons 
became actors in the public life through marriage (Everett 1985:6).     
 
b. The role of social forces on marriage 
Three social forces have played a major part in the shift from an understanding of 
marriage as a unity between the four subjects to a distinction between the four. Medicine, 
economics and religion had an impact on marriage because of migrations, displacement 
of wars and disease (Everett 1985:7). 
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The shift from agriculture to an industrial economy brought about a demand for workers 
outside the family. Individual members of the family provided specific skills for the 
market. This brought a differentiation between household and the economy, which in turn 
gave rise to the distinction between the individual and the family. An industrial economy 
also gave rise to migration, which brought a greater distance between individual and 
household. Capital intensive production brought about a decline in procreation, which 
gave another dimension to the change of the medieval family (Everett 1985:7). 
 
Everett points out that it is only in 1827 that the human ovum has been identified. Birth 
rates have declined steadily and this has given women more independence. Medical 
advances also increased longevity. This resulted in a shift from marriage being a 
prerequisite for procreation to being a long-term friendship. Contraceptives have also 
resulted in smaller families with more educational opportunities for children. This has 
given a greater independence to children (Everett 1985:8). 
 
Christianity has tried to keep the traditional understanding of marriage, which is the unity 
of person, couple, family and household. Christianity has managed this by keeping the 
two pronged understanding of marriage together. Everett describes this two-pronged 
approach as,  
 
The ethic of ascetic indifference and even hostility was institutionalised in the 
monastery while the ethic of family obligation and honour was developed into a 
natural law of family life. By the twelve-century we find not only a lofty 
affirmation of ascetic flight from the world but also a towering edifice of 
matrimonial sacramentality. The poles of ambivalence had been isolated into twin 
pillars of the church (Everett 1985:10).               
 
This two-pronged approach by Christianity has demanded societal changes. Enduring 
values must be kept in the face of societal changes. Even during the late twelve century 
when the society was going through many changes the church controlled society by 
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means of its approach to marriage. It was during this time that the powerful symbol of 
sacrament occurred.   
 
c. The role of Christianity on marriage 
Like societal changes have an influence on marriage so too resources of faith changes 
have an influence on marriage changes. The church has used symbols to relate faith to 
marriage and the values that derive from marriage. Sacrament, vocation, covenant and 
communion are the four major symbols that have been used by the church.  
 
These symbols find meaning in its reciprocal approach. On the one hand the symbol of 
marriage depicts faith's mysteries and at the same time out of marriage develops the 
image that becomes metaphors for these mysteries of faith. Everett demonstrates this 
when he says, "On the one hand, the church has sought to make marriage and family 
mirror transcendent realities such as God's love, Christ's relation to the church, or God's 
covenant with Israel. It has sought to impose faith realities on marriage. On the other 
hand, marital experience yields up some of our most powerful symbols, which then help 
us, express the meaning of the ineffable transcendent"(Everett 1985:16)4.        
 
The reciprocal movement that is found in these symbols also reflects the practical and 
institutional dimensions of the relationship between faith and marriage. When marriage is 
shaped through ecclesiastical discipline or civil legislation, faith concepts are brought to 
have a bearing on marriage. Christian marriage must be a symbol of marriage and it must 
manifest the faith of the church. The values that this movement represents are dependent 
on the conception of faith. Monogamy, procreation, intimacy, love and indissoluble are 
some of the values that are associated with such movement (Everett 1985:17).  
 
The Christian values of marriage are challenged by the actual experiences of marriage by 
families. Families are bringing their natural experiences of brokenness and growth in 
                                                          
4 "This reciprocal exchange has occurred throughout biblical and church history. The Song of Songs vividly 
employs marital experience in order to form our relationship of faith with God. The story of Hosea uses the 
vicissitudes of a marriage to proclaim the reality of Yahweh's faithfulness toward Israel. In the first case an 
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light of the church's conception of marriage. One of such examples is the status of a 
divorced person in the Eucharist and in the leadership structures of the church5. 
  
d. Communion as Christian symbol of marriage 
Of the four traditional symbols that have been used by the church to give expression of 
Christian marriage communion best represents the actual faith of persons in the actual 
experience of contemporary marriages. 
 
He defines communion as "the resonance of two natures, the mutual participation in 
what is common to the persons involved. This is not merely a participation in some world 
they hold in common. It is participation in the qualities they each have as persons. 
Marriage is not so much a product of their moral wills and intentions, as it is the 
manifestation of their inherent likeness" (Everett 1985:50).     
 
Marriage is natural in that it comes from the very things that make up human beings 
such as affections, activity, reason and socialisation. Marriage is an expression of who 
                                                                                                                                                                             
unabashed articulation of fervent love condenses into an image of faith. In the second, a clear image of God 
finds expression of through one person's perseverance in marital fidelity" (Everett:1985:16). 
5 Everett gives an appropriate exposition of Ephesians 5:21-23 to illustrate this reciprocal movement. "One 
of the most momentous scriptural passages exhibiting this reciprocity is the Pauline reflection on marriage 
and the mystery of faith in Eph. 5:21-33. Here the sacrificial relationship of Christ to the church is first 
lifted up as a symbol to be expressed in marriage. The relationship of husband and wife is to be a symbol of 
Christ's relationship to the church. The woman is to be subjected to the man. The man is to sacrifice himself 
for the woman, protecting and guiding her. On this basis many Christians have defended a paternalistic 
model of marriage as a matter of faith, not merely of social custom”. 
 
Two other currents are also at work in this passage, however. First, it is clear that a certain conception of 
marital relationships has already informed the conception of church and of Christ. Just as the woman is the 
body of the man, so the church is the body of Christ. Just as women are unclean (reflecting taboos around 
menstruation and childbirth) so Christians are unclean until sanctified by Christ. Here we see, more 
explicitly, cultural conceptions of sexuality and marriage informing the proclamation of faith. 
 
Second, Paul points to the hallowed observation that 'a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined 
to his wife, and the two shall become one'. He then says, 'This mystery (Greek:mysterion) is a profound 
one, and I am saying that it refers to Christ and the church'. At this point two things are going on. First, 
Paul is taking a marital reality of union and using it as a symbol for faith. The sense of both 'metaphor for 
faith' and 'symbol of faith' are operative with the choice of the word mysterion, however. On the one hand, 
it can mean simply that the marital union is awesome, or that the fact of leaving the parents, 
psychologically and physically, in order truly to marry someone is a great truth. In this case, it is a truth (a 
metaphor) for faith. As it worked out, however, mysterion was translated into the Latin as sacramentum, 
which already was coming to mean a definite symbol of faith. When that happened marriage was construed 
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humans are and it has been with humanity throughout history. From a theological 
perspective it means that marriage must be understood in the actual context and situations 
of who we are and not from our ethical and religious ideals (Everett 1985:92).  
 
Everett acknowledges the change that human nature has undergone from a static role to a 
set of rational and emotive capacities to pursue purposes in a dynamic world. Marriage is 
not a static legal form but part of a common history and story that is part of a wider story. 
People are essentially actors in the public and marriage is the centre from which public 
lives are rehearsed.      
 
Marriage as grace 
The characteristics, emotion correspondence and the contexts of the persons inform the 
faith experience of the couple in marriage. 
 
As a symbol of faith marriage is an expression of God's graciousness towards the creator 
order. We experience God's blessing and divine purpose in marriage as well as God's 
correction of our faults in marriage.  
 
Everett uses the symbol of empowerment to explain grace. He states that, 
Communion is an excitation to higher levels of energy-psychological equivalent 
of a cyclotron in which magnetic fields accelerate electrons for the purpose of 
splitting atoms. Communion is the way this cosmic creative power emerges in our 
life as actors in a field of human relationships. It is the divine power lifting us up 
out of torpor, fear, withdrawal, and death (Everett 1985:95). 
 
Communion lifts up the natural dynamics of birth, initiative, change, vitality and growth. 
It brings peace and springs from a sense of depth rather than a promise of endurance. It 
brings about change and growth rather than relies on permanence. It intensifies 
                                                                                                                                                                             
as a specific medium of grace, as much as preaching or baptizing. Over the centuries it was this notion of 
marriage as sacrament that shaped the Western church's approach" (1985:17-18).    
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attractions rather than rejection. It means responsiveness to partner rather than control 
over the will (Everett 1985:95). 
 
Entrance into such a union is one of discernment rather than decision. It is a process of 
identification of the person before it becomes a commitment to membership. Such 
commitment is making public a union that has been discerned to be existing between 
persons. Communion is rooted in the emotional bond before that of the will and reason 
(Everett 1985:95-96).  
 
The religious origin of communion is found in mystical experience. It has its roots in 
the immediate experience of God or the godhead instead of biblical history (covenant), 
church order (sacrament) or divine mission (vocation). In communion grace finds 
manifestation through nature and natural sources. 
 
To this effect Everett claims that,  
Marriage is, first, a matter of nature, second a matter of grace. As a natural 
experience it can be a metaphor for faith in that it gives us vivid images from 
speaking about God's action. As a mine of rich metaphors for faith, marital and 
family experience helps us grasp and express the meaning of grace as redemptive-
as the power of liberation and fulfilment. Our acceptance by the beloved betokens 
God's acceptance. Our parents' devotion to us mirrors God's faithfulness. The joy 
of sexual play anticipates the happiness of paradise (Everett 1985:92). 
 
e. The values that are formed by marriage. 
When faith is viewed from the actual experiences (marriage), The Christian story forms 
values. Communion as symbol of marriage forms values such as equality, love, sex and 
sacrifice.    
 
Equality. 
Equality is based on emotional bonds between the couple. Communion makes both 
partners equal because of the reciprocity between the partners and their power that is 
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formed by emotions rather than who is subordinate. The emotional bond is based on the 
agreements made possible by their personal similarities. Characteristics of such 
emotional bond are negotiation, discernment, communication, personal responsibility, 
confrontation, and co-operation (Everett 1985:66).   
 
In such equality communication occurs through the two partners and not through the 
children or household. Our imaginations are expressed in explicit words, gestures and 
symbols. The personal development and consciousness of the one is formed through 
expression and companionship. The one is needed for the growth of the other. If such 
growth is taking place then loneliness and lack of friendship can result in divorce. If such 
growth takes place then the two partners confirm the world created by their marriage. 
 
Accurate and complete communication result in negotiation by the two who are equal. 
The two must communicate on different levels without being fearful of misconception or 
rejection. Everett claims that "This communicative union finds its first social expression 
in both partners' participation in the public spheres around them. Their life performs its 
symphony in the rhythm between intimacy and publicity. Indeed, the skills of intimacy-
negotiation and communication-are all skills necessary for the public life" (Everett 
1985:94). 
 
In this kind of equality identity plays a big role. The identity of the one has a bearing on 
the identity of the other in so far as the two are honest, trustworthy, open and sharing. 
Intimacy becomes paramount because the one needs the other immediate resonance with 
the other to confirm the other. In this form of identity the one mirrors the other rather 
than imitate a hierarchical chain or cosmos of functions (Everett 1985:67).    
 
This kind of identity finds expression in friendship. Everett claims that, "The resonant 
mutuality, intercourse and reciprocal confirmation between equals identify them as 
unique selves and create a world of mutual confirmation between them. Their identity is 
worked out in their relationship as equals in power" (Everett 1985:68). 
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 Love, sex and sacrifice 
Unlike the hierarchical model, which defines love as paternal care or the organic model's 
care for the whole, love means emotional attachment to the other as friend. Both partners 
initiate and respond to this friendship. The persons love each other as equals. It is like 
love between a brother and sister rather than a parent and child (Everett 1985:69). 
 
Sex is not merely for reproduction or security, but it is for mutual freedom, intimate 
affection and friendly intercourse. Sexual relations are an intense bodily and physical 
communication to confirm the love between the partners. It is not selfish or superficial 
but affirms the emotional connection between the two partners. It is also an expression of 
the love that the two partners have for each rather instead of the one being subordinate to 
the other (Everett 1985:69-70). 
 
Sacrifice is also an important element in love from the perspective of communion. Not 
every sacrifice is attributed to the marital structure. Integrity, creativity and development 
for example are not to be sacrificed, but are reasons why people would sacrifice other 
values. Sacrifice is not necessarily the means to an end, but the ends of sacrifice receive 
new meaning and content (Everett 1985:70). 
 
Sacrifice, as part of this kind of love is not selfish in a negative sense nor the role of one 
partner. It is also not effective as a tool for exploitation of one partner by the other. 
Rather sacrifice is for the growth and development of both partners in this equal 
relationship of equal powers. 
 
These values love, sex and sacrifice are related to equality that is characterised by the 
emotional bond between the two partners. When we are able to view it from the actual 
experiences of the partners these values of love, sex and sacrifice press us to wider social 
and religious values (Everett 1985:71).  
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Central to the equality of the partners is the communication that happens between them. 
The communication is reciprocal confirmation in which neither party can determine what 
is truthful or right for the other. It is this communication that is described as God's 
presence and God determines the rightfulness or truthfulness for the partners. 
 
This equality is nourished by the powers the partners acquire in the public life of which 
the church is a great part. Knowledge and the skill to communicate are central to the 
intimate life the partners share. This is rehearsed in the church and then partners and their 
actions are moulded by the broader story in which their story fits. 
 
These values find meaning in the Christian faith. The Christian faith acknowledges the 
sociological changes that the relevant subjects of discourse have undergone. These 
changes are taken seriously together with the changes of the traditional symbols for these 
subjects of discourse. When Christian symbols undergo transformation, the same values 
find expression in differing social and psychological contexts.  
 
The values of equality, love, sex and sacrifice find meaning through the Christian Story 
when faith takes seriously the actual experiences of persons. Everett uses marriage as an 
example of how this is done. He shows that communion is the most meaningful symbol 
of marriage and other traditional symbols such as covenant, sacrament and vocation take 
a secondary position. These symbols are not irrelevant but they are meaningful in so far 
as it is used in conjunction with communion. 
 
The symbol of communion puts at the centre of moral formation the presence of God as 
the means towards truth and right. The church is one of the publics in which the power of 
the partners is nourished for growth and development.      
 
2. Everett's later writings 
There is a definite shift in the writings of Everett as oppose to his earlier writings. 
Everett's early approach, which he demonstrates through Christian marriage, he shows 
the major role that the Christian plays in moral formation. In these later writings however 
 24 
the role of the Christian story becomes takes on a minor role and it is to this approach of 
his writings that I now turn to.  
 
In this approach of Everett different symbols replace the transforming symbols. For 
example, the symbol of Republic replaces the important Christian symbol of Kingdom. 
This indicates that Everett's approach for moral formation has undergone a major shift. 
 
This shift is evident from his major work6 towards the end of the twentieth century. In 
this work Everett claims that the traditional symbols do not necessary transmit the values 
that are appropriate in new sociological and psychological contexts. He claims that new 
symbols need to replace the old symbols despite their ability to survive beyond their 
relevance. 
 
To understand and engage with public life and public discourse, Christianity must place a 
new symbol at the centre of the Christian faith. At the centre of the Christian faith must 
be the symbol of God's Federal Republic. This symbol relates to contemporary life and 
morality in a far more meaningful way. 
 
Everett relates this new symbol to resurgence in three countries, India, South Africa and 
Germany, which represent two of the most significant phenomena in public life. The two 
changes are that of racism and feminism.  
 
This transition in Everett's approach is characterised by his attempt to: a. merge the 
sacred and secular, b. put symbols at the centre of moral formation, c. shift to covenant as 
the dominant symbol and d. use a contemporary symbol, God's federal republic, as the 
faith expression of covenant.   
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Everett, W J, God's federal republic: Reconstructing our governing symbols, New York: Paulist Press, 
1988.  
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a. The merger of the sacred and the secular  
A definite pattern of development in the writings of Everett shows that Christianity plays 
less of a dominant role in the formation of values. There is more of interplay between 
Christianity and other sciences for moral formation.  
 
He states: 
Religious convictions also demand social changes, however. Enduring values 
must be retrieved and revitalized, though in new societal forms. Even these brief 
remarks indicate that the relation of religion and society has always been 
reciprocal. In affecting societal notions of contract, person, or vocation, the 
church has been conditioned in turn. The meaning of Christianity's’ key symbols 
can only be worked out with the cultural tools people have at hand. This is a 
dynamic process of reciprocal transformation (Everett 1985:12).  
 
The role of Christianity is now less dominant. Everett shows this largely by replacing 
traditional symbols with more contemporary ones. 
 
b. Symbols and the Public story  
Everett uses symbols extensively in his writings. From his earliest work the use of 
symbols is evident and only increases in his later work. In one of his earliest works he 
writes, “We focus on symbols in this discussion because they are indispensable to the 
maintenance of any institutional pattern. Symbols are vivid images that condense many 
mental and emotional patterns into a unified perception. Symbols may be visual or aural. 
They often include taste, touch, and smell, as in the symbols of water, wine, and kiss. 
They bring together a publicly manifested value with deep personal bonds" (Everett 
1985:25).    
 
Symbols bring people together because of their dynamism. Symbols, or rather symbolic 
models, motivate us and form patterns of behavior. Everett states for example that “The 
symbol ‘Body of Christ’ not only calls on our loyalty to Jesus but also legitimates an 
organization in which our activities are functions to be coordinated by a head. ‘Free 
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enterprise’ not only exhorts us to exercise individual initiative but to do so in a 
marketplace constrained by the forces of supply and demand” (Everett 1985:26).    
 
The four most important Christian symbols that Everett uses throughout his writings are 
sacrament, covenant, communion and vocation. Of the sacrament he says that it draws us 
to the life of worship. Covenant presents more an ethical task than a ritual celebration. 
Communion is a combination of the two and vocation draws on the biblical elements to 
focus us on the future and our role in it. Whereas communion has occupied Everett's 
attention in the early stage of his work, he now turns his attention to covenant.  
 
c. Covenant and Covenantal Publicity 
Covenant: in the Hebrew, “bayith” means a relationship between God and a whole 
household. The Greek word “oikos” has the same meaning. Covenant has to be viewed 
from a wholistic view and includes persons and possessions. Later the original meaning 
of covenant became distorted to emphasizing the individual. It is to the former meaning 
that Everett turns in his understanding of covenant (Everett 1988:121).   
 
Public: is a discourse to which everyone has potential access. Its common concerns and 
outcomes are based on reason and persuasion and not force or deception. Everett 
furthermore states that public demands a common world of basic cultural reference points 
and material bases and geographical space. In this world lives a group in a pattern of 
relationships (1988:129-130). 
 
Everett now combines covenant with public to form covenant publicity. Covenant 
publicity becomes for Everett the most important symbol for moral formation. 
  
The term, covenant publicity is a bridge between the religious and public, the religious 
and political. It seeks to give direction to behavioral patterns, ethical choices and moral 
formation. The aim of covenanted publicity is making the individual free. This is 
Everett’s response to the ethical and moral dilemma of the twentieth century. His concern 
is the move away from ”the deprivation of our individual isolation” (1988:129).    
 27 
  
The four main features of covenant publicity are participation, commonality, 
persuasion and worldliness.  
Participation 
Everett places participation as central in describing the meaning of public in the 
framework of covenant. Participation must be seen as a basic right that underlines other 
rights such as property, privacy, individual rights and freedom. These rights are 
instrumental in so far as it is subordinate to the right of participation (Everett 1988:130). 
 
Active participation is also characterized by equal access to power, science and 
information. The existence of power cannot exist apart from actual participation. Power 
lies in relationships, participative decision making, and the conflict of opposition and 
exchanging of arguments from an equal basis.  
 
This engagement of actual participation is by no means a possession by human beings 
only. Everett concludes that it is also part of God’s divine plan. The right to publicity is 
embedded in the covenant that God made with the people (Everett 1988:131). 
 
Everett equates participation (secular) with salvation (religious). He describes the 
activities of the person by means of two leading religious sacraments, namely profession 
and confirmation. With regard to profession, it refers to proclaiming the salvation or the 
perfect public. It is our entry into salvation and we proclaim our salvation in public. 
Profession is the first step out of our negative imaginations and perceptions into the 
covenanted republic, which is given by grace to humanity. This symbol of federal 
republic is to be made public and not kept secret. This is the one leg of participation in 
public (Everett 1988:159-166).  
 
The other leg has to do with the confirmation of the perfect public and the past, which 
disqualifies the present as the ultimate public. In this present world however people need 
to confirm each other and the past through profession. Profession is only possible in some 
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kind of public world. In this public world God’s federal republic is confirmed and people 
are confirmed to each other (Everett 1988:166). 
 
In other words people’s participation as equal individuals and their rights to participate is 
enhanced. God’s federal republic is where salvation is experienced in a world of equal 
individuals. These individuals have the same access to that which makes them equal, 
namely education, information, economics, rights and power.  
 
Commonality 
Everett clearly differs from Communitarian ethicists and Liberation theologians such as 
Hauerwas, MacIntyre and Leonardo Boff on commonality. For Everett commonality in a 
public is about what is common between the people. It is about what is culturally 
common in the relationships of people. Everett gives attention to the context of different 
publics. However Everett is closer to Liberal ethicists as he is to Communitarian ethicists, 
for his writings in the later stages become more identifiable with a liberal paradigm and 
the freedom of the individual. 
     
His public is also different to community in the sense that the object of the public is 
exclusively people, their possessions and their interaction. Community is a much broader 
symbol with more interactions and kinds of relationships. In a public even amongst the 
living beings there is a distinction on the basis of age. The public is also measurable in 
terms of space and time. The public is a visible arena and has no continuity with the 
traditional understanding of a universal timeless community (1988:132). 
 
 
Persuasion 
Giving more attention to culture rather than a timeless community, Everett claims, that 
the character of the public as well as its persuasion is to be found in culture. Persuasion 
he states is a “kind of communication pattern in which the behavior of others is affected 
by appeals to the implications of commonly held convictions about the history, their life 
 29 
together, their hopes, the facts at hand, and the nature of reality in general” (Everett 
1988:133). 
 
The public assumes that all major influences on the public are commonly held and that no 
strong disagreements exist. Persuasion by means of both reason and symbol makes it 
even easier for the participants to engage effectively and justly. Scientific advancement, 
logic, cognition is as important as clothing and speech and other symbols. The mind is as 
important as the ear and eye. The importance of both reason and symbol makes discourse 
effective and persuasion a strong medium of communications. 
 
Persuasion ultimately leads to a commonly held truth, which serves as the measure by 
which people live. From a philosophical point of it is through reason that this truth 
emerges. From a theological point of view truth emerges through “covenanted reason”, 
out of the public argumentation within a “covenantal framework”. Apart from consensus 
among participants, it (truth) also stands in continual judgement and revision through the 
insistence of God leading the public to larger covenants with the larger community and 
eventually the whole creation (Everett 1988:134). 
 
Worldliness 
This fourth characteristic of a public suggests that a public exists in some common 
reference, be it stories, history or laws. Stories for examples hold together common 
symbols and signs that make persuasion possible. In the same way laws are applicable in 
all circumstances and situations, and history is accepted by all. Everett speaks of such 
commonalties as “the reality of a public takes form in a republica-particular constellation 
of public things. This array of public things is known to all. It has publicity. It is not 
hidden, but is open to everyone” (1988:134).  
 
Narrative is an influential and effective form of persuasion. The symbols and 
commonality of narrative possess modes of communication to translate, deliberate and 
movement into practical application. These modes provide analysis, security and 
meaning. 
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 The public world that narrative creates results in a stable republic. Such a republic is 
recognized in recent paradigm shifts such as moving from patriarchy, hierarchy and 
kingship to inclusivity, democracy and covenant. In America it can translate into a 
federal republic with a president and constitution as the highest ruling factors. Such a 
world is not political, but social and theological. This world determines our recreation, 
work, rest and worship.  
 
d. God's federal public: The faith expression of covenanted publicity 
The theological rationale for covenanted publicity is a move away from the traditional 
understanding of God's Kingdom to God's federal republic, according to Everett. God's 
federal republic transforms the traditional themes of theological language, salvation, sin, 
God, Jesus Christ and the Church. These themes take on new meanings. 
 
Theological language is no longer seen "as a kind of scientific describer of some object, 
which we contemplate…. It is exhortative, dramatic, performative language of symbolic 
action. It comes from worship and prayer. Religious language is the professing and 
confessing of people pressing for a more complete publicity" (Everett 1988:162). 
 
Theological language is not abstract, nor is the experience of a single person, but it comes 
from active religious experience and participation. Theological language is liturgical, 
symbolic and active. The objective of theological language is to point us to the perfection 
of God's federal republic. 
 
Theological language is also the language of this particular public, which is not foreign to 
the participants. The language is about the drama that is unfolding in the history of the 
participants.       
 
Salvation is both the ultimate perfection as well as the gradual entry into it. It is God's 
graciousness for us to enter into the perfect covenant public and which we appropriate in 
the publicising of our lives. "Salvation points to God's preparation of that public. It also 
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points to the acts of profession by which we come into the light of public reception. We 
do not experience salvation and profess it in public. The very act of profession begins the 
process of our salvation-it is entry into grace" (Everett 1988:163). 
 
Sin is exclusion from the publicity. Everett states that sin “is therefore the loss of a 
proper public for the publication of our lives. It is the loss of a plurality which requires 
that we covenant in trust with others” (Everett 1988:166). He further says that sin comes 
in many forms. He cites absolutes such as race, gender, and rule as some of the ways in 
which deprivation can take place. 
 
Furthermore sin is being deprived of a public. He makes it clear that this “privatonal” 
theory of sin is far from the idea of privation in the neo-platonic tradition through to the 
Augustinian tradition. Whereas in the latter idea the human has its drive towards union 
with God, Everett’s concern is the participation of humans, adults, in a perfect public. 
Everett’s view of sin moves us away from contemplative modes of faith to the 
investigation of the suppressing of profession, confirmation and confessing modes of 
faith (Everett 1988:166-167). 
 
Everett realizes that sin is a complex reality with many dimensions. He describes three 
forms of sin as disconfirmation, contradictions and evil (Everett 1988 167-168). 
Disconfirmation refers to the inability to confirm own intended meanings in a perfect 
public. Sin in this sense occurs as lies, confusions and failed promises. He sites distorted 
communications for such sin. People either use unfamiliar terms or paradigms from 
foreign publics to relate meanings. In a perfect public such variety can be used to get to 
the truth through contradictions.  
 
Contradictions can also result in isolation, alienation, silence, and divisions that form a 
severe form of deprivation. In such case confession, confirmation and profession in 
certain publics exclude certain persons from the public. The result of such contradictions 
is racism and sexism. Such contradictions are not the kind that results in acceptance and 
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commonality but rather in suppression of the confirmations of publicists (Everett 
1988:167). 
 
Evil refers to the sin that is characterized by the actions of those in authority. Authority is 
misused for own gain and not the benefit of all those in the public. These are active 
participation of the publicists in violence, unethical conduct, and overt wrongdoing in 
order to prevent the formation of the perfect public. It is the kind of sin that demands 
silence as a response (Everett 1988:167).    
  
The covenanting God 
God of the public has two particular characteristics. Firstly, the God as publisher enters 
our discourse and leads us to new speech, professions and a more perfect public that we 
can share with others. Through our participation we take on the language and habits 
publicised in the historic turning points where God creates a new and wider public. 
Secondly, "God as president directs us to the legitimating of God by which our fuller 
publicity can be grounded in an active reasonableness….In fact, as many students of 
management have seen, organisational leadership finally must rest on the capacity to 
elicit loyalty through self sacrifice, publish guiding values, co-ordinate and harmonise 
people's actions, and act as an exemplar of everyone's capacity for presidency" (Everett 
1988:173). 
 
The church as a public transmits the vision of God's federal republic through informal 
interaction between members rather than formal worship and liturgy. The church is also a 
representative assembly of its members and God. The church is also a rehearsal for the 
greater publicity through its own mission, self-governance and symbolic action (Everett 
1988:183). 
 
In this later stage of Everett's writings there is a definite move away from the dominant 
role that Christianity play in the formation of morality. In changing the traditional symbol 
of Kingdom of God to God's federal republic, Everett displays the importance of the 
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current political structures for faith experience. The replacing of the symbol Kingdom of 
God is also an attempt to place the existing experience at the core of moral formation.     
 
3. Everett's present approach to moral formation 
In his most recent work, The politics of worship: Reforming the language and symbols of 
liturgy,7 Everett moves even further from his earlier approach. He now claims that 
Christianity can only have a meaningful engagement in public life by fostering 
democratic values. He bases this claim on two changes that must take place in worship. 
 
Firstly, worship must be transformed so that it fosters the values of democracy. He claims 
that authentic worship must come from the experiences of the public and the participants 
should reflect and exercise the values that are found in a democratic society.     
 
Secondly, Everett also suggests that worship must take on a new look by changing the 
longstanding traditional symbols so that it reflects the values and morals of the present 
day society. For example the symbol of Jesus as King must now become President Jesus.  
 
With regard to the first claim, that worship must be transformed, Everett suggests that 
worship becomes the rehearsal of God's right order. In describing such worship he 
provides: a. a definition of worship, b. the political imagery of worship as publics and the 
relation with constitution that is made possible through covenant, c. the kind of 
governance that such worship must rehearse.    
 
a. Definition of worship.  
Everett defines worship as:  
symbolic drama encompassing the whole argument of words, music, arts, 
movement, space, and dramatic sequence, The word worship, of course, 
indicates that this symbolic action points us to something that is worthy 
and especially what is worthy of our praise and devotion. That is, it lifts up 
this symbolic activity as an ethical action that vivifies and inculcates 
                                                          
7 Ohio: United Church Press, 1999.  
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values to direct our lives. It is our paradigm of service. It rehearses the 
goals, powers, and patterns we are to serve in our lives (Everett 1999:32).   
 
This definition assumes that in worship there is already something that is worthy of our 
praise. In worship the perfect public of God is being rehearsed and we are socialised as 
active participants into people that can perform such service. This is for Everett the most 
important characteristic of worship. It is a drama that has as its story that of democracy 
and all symbolic action must direct the participants towards that story. 
 
Worship as rehearsal is firstly an enactment of what we already have learned and 
know. Worship is about memory and representing that in a way that will make us actors 
in the story. It is about participation in a familiar role, but practising it to perfection. The 
participants rehearse the story in such a way that they can do it with authority. Those who 
have more authority than others are priests and ministers (Everett 1999:34). 
 
Such worship allows people to reinterpret the drama and reshape the drama so that the 
drama is easy to participate in. Even strangers can now be drawn into the drama with ease 
because it is something that they can identify with and in which they can participate. This 
is possible because rehearsals are public activities that create publics. 
 
Out of such worship general cultures are developed. The more the drama is rehearsed and 
the more participants engage in it, the more the divide between ecclesial cult and societal 
culture is narrowed down. This close connectedness between ecclesial cult and societal 
culture can develop the root values and agreements, history, character types and proper 
relationships that allow strangers to share a common enterprise (Everett 1999:35).       
 
Worship as rehearsal is secondly an activity that anticipates the final event. 
Worship reflects our life of faith in light in the coming of God. It is about the "eschaton". 
The participants anticipate that which is yet to come even though it is a world that is 
beyond our space, time, life and death. "It is a matter of story more than of idea, of 
narrative more than of proposition, of creative action rather than imitation of an eternal 
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form. Worship is always a preparatory activity in light of this coming fullness of God's 
creative work" (Everett 1999:34). 
 
b. Public as political image of worship 
The images used in worship must be of a political nature. Publics which occupied most of 
Everett's attention in this present stage of his writings is the most important image to 
reflect this kind of worship. He claims that publics (which are assemblies gathered 
around a common desire to live together and share common land) are united by a sense of 
justice expressed in a sense of love and not loyalty to any hierarchy. The public is a group 
of people arguing openly to get a greater understanding of things common and things not 
yet experienced. This is rather like the broader understanding of common wealth suggests 
(Everett 1999:55). 
 
The public is also about a citizenship with public virtues. Virtues refer to the strengths 
needed for public life. The most common virtues are not only about courage, temperance, 
prudence and justice, but its relationship with theological virtues such as love, hope and 
faith. The central value of the public is equality amongst the participants (Everett 
1999:56). 
 
Public and Covenant 
In worship the public needs the covenant as a partner. Covenant is a concept of 
relationship rather than biological descendants; it is also rooted in promise rather than 
paternity. It is about relationships and not patriarchy. To this effect Everett writes that;  
 
While the abiding power of kingship almost swallowed up this principle of 
promise, Israel managed to steer away from a sense of kingship with the Divine. 
The people of Israel were not sons of Yahweh but servants or partners in promise. 
If anything, in those patriarchal, they were 'sons of the covenant'. They were not 
descended from God, but chosen and elected by the Holy One. They stood in a 
relation of political promise rather than biological necessity (Everett 1999:58).   
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Everett also claims that covenant is "democratized". He quotes the example of the 
covenant between Jonathan and David as a negotiated agreement. He also quotes John's 
presentation of Jesus' statement to his disciples that they should not merely be servants 
but friends (John15:15). This is an example of freedom that is rooted in persuasion, 
consent and promise (Everett 1999:59). 
 
Covenant and the constitution. 
Covenant form the symbolic bridge between religious traditions of ethics and worship 
and current political language. In the present democratic world constitutions fill this same 
purpose as people seek to govern themselves. The constitution defines the membership, 
allocation of power, authority and election of officers. In the same way as the Torah plays 
a role in the covenant so law has a central role in democratic constitutions (Everett 
1999:61).       
   
c. The kind of governance that grows out of such a relationship between covenant 
and the constitution occurs through communication processes central to the life of public 
deliberation. Governance is not through domination, hierarchical or autocratic rule. 
Worship that is rehearsal of God's right order puts such governance at the centre of the 
drama and the participants partake in such governance. 
 
Everett uses the idea of "cybernetics", to describe the governance expressed through 
communication. He says that such governance is characterised by presiding in processes 
of communication rather than domination by individuals. Such forms of governance, by 
domination is expressed in monarchical devotion to a person or kingship systems of 
personal bonds between master or slave or governance through a network of personal 
loyalty sealed through an oath or covenants (Everett 1999:63).   
 
Rituals such as kneeling, the laying on of hands, bowing and clasping of hands in prayer 
are expressions of governance by domination. Ordination to the priesthood or any other 
calling such as Bishop became institutional versions of personal rule. For example The 
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Pope who takes his name from the "papa" is above all the father of the church (Everett 
1999:63/4).  
 
According Everett these rituals and forms of governance must be reformed in such a way 
that worship brings about ways of governance of God's law. He suggests that we draw on 
the tradition of Wisdom, which finds expression in Christ as logos and the spirit and mind 
of Christ. 
 
This tradition has found renewed interests from feminists who revisited the traditional 
view that wisdom are personified as a woman through whom everything is created. In 
this respect Jesus as the logos is the feminine expression of God. He further states that the 
role of Wisdom is to administer; "justice that takes into account the complex of system of 
relationships in culture, technology, ecology and politics. In cybernetic terms, wisdom is 
the software of existence - the basic program for governance" (1999:66). 
 
Therefore according to him the role of worship is to rehearse our participation in the 
wisdom of God through engaging, learning and collectivity. The participants share a 
common culture, vision, set of values and a comprehensive orientation of their world and 
the larger historic drama in which they participate (Everett 1999:66). 
   
Engaging, learning and collectivity find expression in dialogue, silence and other forms 
of communal worship. These mark the divine ordering of our lives into coherence with 
divine purposes. 
 
Such a deeper understanding of Christ's mind and spirit that takes seriously law and 
wisdom, leads to the reshaping of us being governed by constitution rather than personal 
command. Through worship we are constituted as citizens of God's republic living 
according to the wisdom of God. In the same way as Yahweh was present to Israel in the 
assembly around the reciting of the Torah, so Christians know that God is present in 
worship. It is in such worship that dialogue, conferring and counselling takes place 
(Everett 1999:67).  
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 The second claim by Everett with regard to worship reform is that of the replacing of 
longstanding traditional symbols. Reform of symbols relates particularly to the officers of 
governance and the principles of symbolic use in worship. 
 
Symbols that are used in the offices of governance. 
The symbol that takes much of Everett's attention is that of Jesus as Monarch. In the 
monarchical culture king, judge, prince, lord and judge are some of the symbolic 
expressions of the monarchical rule. Everett points out various limitations in the use of 
these officers throughout his work. 
 
Everett suggests that the use of president as symbol for Jesus as God is a far more 
relevant one. President as worship leaders and priests is sometimes referred to imply the 
convening or co-ordinating of worship according to the constitution of the assembly. 
When we use president in the verb form to preside, we refer to the action that the 
president performs. This action is characterised by the facilitating of worship in the same 
way as presidency function in a constitutional order. When Christ presides at the 
assembly, he does it through The Holy Spirit that "animates our dialogue" (Everett 
1999:68). 
 
The task of presidency is to draw in and encourage participation amongst all its members. 
The focus of the discussion must be around the vision, purpose, covenants and missions 
of the assembly. The president does not enforce rules and laws, but help the assembly to 
pursue its purpose through inspiring and persuading them towards the ultimate aims of 
the assembly. The president also sets the example in pursuing the aims of the assembly 
(Everett 1999:68). 
 
This kind of presidency is found in the historic term of bishop, the episkopos. The 
episkopos was an overseer or a supervisor. Everett rightly states that,  
In this religious reworking of the idea of presidency we can already see some of 
the reciprocal relationships between political order and worship…. The churches 
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ought not only take up the language of republican democracy and federalism, they 
should recast it in terms of their own theological reflection so they can provide in 
their worship mirror of judgement for the practices and aspirations of the 
republics around them (Everett 1999:69).   
 
Election of office governors. 
Everett adds the term “election”, that is closely associated to democracy, to that of 
presidency. While he notes that election is a difficult term to use in conjunction with the 
election of God, he points out that kingship poses equally difficult challenges.  
 
Everett states that while election, like kingship is metaphorical, by the very least it is a 
revealing one. He claims that the idea of divinity in ancient Israel is political as it entails 
electing one's principle of governance. Everett points out a few examples of election. 
Firstly Yahweh asked Israel to follow him. Secondly Israel saw them elected by God and 
also decides to elect Yahweh as their god. Thirdly in the Pauline tradition Jesus is viewed 
as being elected by God to be the Messiah. Fourthly all people are called to elect Jesus as 
the Messiah (Everett 1999:69-70). 
 
Election is therefore a reciprocal process in the context of call and covenant. 
God calls us to elect the divine way, pleading, persuading, hounding and 
sacrificing this end. In the process of this mutual election we are drawn into 
covenant with the Divine. We choose, commit, pledge and promise to pursue this 
particular pattern of relationship with the Divine. We enter into covenant (Everett 
1999:70).       
 
Principles for reformed worship with political symbols 
Participatory Assembly 
Worship must create the space for the participants to be fully part of the public, argues 
Everett. The participants must not be passive listeners, but active citizens in making the 
mind and spirit of Christ represented. The citizens also take an active part in the 
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formation and realisation of the vision. Worship must be structured and performed in 
such a way that it is inviting, persuading and also that is pressing to greater publicity. 
 
The ecclesia or republic of God becomes a "proto-public" for the broader society, 
according to him. When the citizens rehearse God's republic, then worship becomes the 
vehicle through which the citizens are nourished for wider publicity. In this way the 
church makes a meaningful impact in culture and politics (Everett 1999:74). This kind of 
assembly is open to the views of its broader scope of citizens and it ensures that equality 
 
Covenant renewal 
Worship must be grounded in the covenantal tradition of the Israelites with God. Everett 
explains the importance of the covenant with God and the Israelites for worship. The 
worship of Israel originated in the celebration and renewal of God's covenant with them. 
"First with the travelling ark of the covenant and then in the Temple in Jerusalem. God's 
steadfast fidelity to the covenant Israel's backsliding, God's persistent acts of redemption, 
and Israel's joy in God's forgiveness were crucial components of this worship life" 
(Everett 1999:75). God's covenant with the citizens and the covenants that the citizens 
have with each other, whether it is through marriage, family, work, city or nation must be 
rehearsed in worship. Covenants amongst the citizens must find meaning in the divine 
covenant that God has with the citizens.   
 
The rehearsal of covenants in worship builds trust, hope, care and peace amongst the 
citizens and the rest of creation and the participants, God and the land are bound together 
in the promise of mutual flourishing.   
 
Eschatological Anticipation 
Worship, for Everett therefore, is acts of remembering and rehearsing the past and 
anticipating the future. The self-sacrifice of Jesus, which is unique, as shown in the 
Eucharistic feast, is a demonstration of celebrating the past order and inaugurating the 
new order that is yet to be fulfilled. In the Eucharistic feast Jesus' acts of persuasion, 
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moral judgement, healing and public proclamation are remembered in anticipation of the 
perfection of the public life (Everett 1999:76). 
 
The rehearsal of the past without anticipation of the perfect public can reduce us to fear, 
revenge and hopelessness. The anticipation of the new order also affirms the patterns of 
public life already existent in our presence. Ritual, symbols, songs and sermons help us 
participate in these patterns of public life. As participants of songs, ritual and symbols we 
also create a drama into which this narrative already begins to enact.  In worship the "not 
yet" is experienced through the world that is created through the rehearsal of drama 
(Everett 1999:77). 
 
Critical cultural engagement 
This fourth principle is about the way the society and its values engage with the symbols 
of worship. Worship must be rehearsal of the past and future through the rituals and 
symbols of the church and culture. Both the symbols of the church and culture must be 
open to be informed and transformed in worship.  
 
Everett explains this relationship of the cultural symbols and the worship symbols as 
having a "assonance" with each other. The worship symbols "resonate in some ways and 
clash dissonantly in others". He explains how the symbol of Pentecost resonates the 
international assemblies' important role necessary for global governance and unification. 
Having a country's flag with a Christian flag in the sanctuary can do this he explains. This 
can raise the question of how the symbolism of God's federal republic relates concretely 
to the various civil religions (Everett 1999:78). 
 
Worship is also an enactment of a moral conversation between who we are and who we 
ought to become. Everett uses the symbol of the Passion Week to explain how one model 
of governance is celebrated on Psalm Sunday. During Holy Week up to Good Friday the 
governance is characterised by reversal, betrayal and death. From Easter to Pentecost the 
model is reconstructed from the assumptions of liberation to communication, sharing and 
mutual care (Everett 1999:79). 
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 The diverse way in which symbols are used in different cultures and societies is another 
factor to consider. No symbol must be treated as absolute but it represents the language 
and grammar that is used to understand God's work amongst people. 
 
Psychological Depth         
Everett claims that democratisation and the rise of republican models of governance 
challenge the way monarchical worship enabled people to relate trustworthy relationships 
of parent and child with methods of governance (Everett 1999:80-81).   
 
In light of these models of governance worship must take on new approaches to relate our 
innermost psychological depth with the broadest relationships of God's creation. The 
monarchical model of governance and the kingship worship model do not do this 
adequately. 
 
Democracy challenged the paternalistic value system that the monarchical model 
supports. In family relationships and other civil relationships, civil rights, contractual 
thinking in negotiation of rules and activities and the promotion of conciliar approaches 
to decisions are some of the prominent ways in which the new model of governance finds 
expression on a psychological level 
 
Worship that takes these relationships seriously will lead to listen to other publics and 
enter into covenants of trust with others and the natural world. We also allow others to 
listen to our public and so doing receive confirmation in the wider publicity. 
 
These are characteristic of a psychology that is shaped by our nature as covenantal actors 
and not as the monarchical psychology that focus on, self-control and self-knowledge. 
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Sensory Holism    
Instead of focussing on the hearing and talking, all sensors must be involved in worship. 
Vision, motion, smell, touch and taste are all-important senses that help with the affective 
dramatisation and communication the divine right order.   
 
Using all the sensors helps us to legitimate and critique our publics. We are able to go 
beyond imitation of models, obedience to commands and rote responses to fixed rituals. 
This new aesthetics must be congruent with the political paradigms to be rehearsed in 
worship and one that is beyond Christendom (Everett 1999:83). 
 
A consistent grammar 
Worship must form a whole of which each act is linked to each other. This is done not 
through changing individual words or phrases, but the whole political paradigm in which 
these words find their origins. Such grammar goes beyond vocabulary (1999:85). 
 
Everett claims that consistent grammar in worship is shown most effectively in the 
Catholic concern with incarnate presence rather than Protestant concern with idolatry. 
 
4. A critical evaluation 
Everett attempts to apply his approach of moral formation to a society under democratic 
rule. In doing so he implies that Christianity plays an important role in moral formation 
when it forms morals associated with democracy. He implies that this is Christianity's 
primary role and therefore the longstanding Christian symbols must be replaced with 
symbols that will help in formation of values formed in a democratic society. This is 
evident in his four main features of covenant publicity as participation, commonality, 
persuasion and worldliness. His first contribution to the interplay between the Christian 
story and the Public story is his use of story. Story is the rehearsal of God's republic 
where values of the Public story are evident and form the core of the story. The interplay 
between the Christian story and the Public story is explicit in the strong correlation 
between the four features of covenant publicity and the four characteristics of democracy. 
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Participation and the rule of law 
The rule of law is closely related to participation because it insures that persons have the 
right to freedom. The rule of law determines behavior and evaluates its legitimacy. For 
ages and most certainly since The Enlightenment the Rule of Law has been used for 
moral and ethical judgement. Some authors claim that the Rule of Law has been used as 
early as a few hundred B.C. and others claim that The Rule of Law has been formally 
introduced as the determining factor in moral judgement and formation with the 
Enlightenment. 
 
Shutte, a South African theologian and philosopher, rightly states that the law in the 
period before and years after Christ has centred around either God’s Law (the Ten 
Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount) or in the Greek sense that which centred 
on the discovery of reason (Shutte 2001:33-50).  
 
With the spread and advancement of democracy the Rule of Law has been one of the 
most important principles in moral and ethical formation. 
 
In the South African constitution the Rule of Law is used as the determining factor for 
moral formation. To put it another way is to say that The Rule of Law measures the moral 
judgement of good and bad, just and unjust, right or wrong and legitimate and 
illegitimate.  
 
The law of the land is the total legal system operative in the political sphere of the 
country. No one law is regarded as above or presupposes individual laws or a collective 
of laws. The legal system consists of statutes enacted by the legislative body, court 
decisions regarded as legal precedents, customs and principles accepted as legally 
binding by the courts, and other legal institutions that determine and apply legal 
principles (Wellman 1986:179).  
 
The South African constitution represents the law by which all other laws are judged. It is 
the highest authoritative component and the determining factor for the moral formation of 
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the South African society. The constitution stands above all the laws of the country. To 
use the phrase of Wellman is to say, “this law is to be judged in terms of the law” 
(Wellman 1986:179).   
 
Participation in covenant publicity and behavior and decisions under rule of law are the 
same in so far as both seek individual freedom in the context of the public or the 
community. Both the rules of law and participation create a context for equality of 
individuals. Everett's description and use of participation in covenantal publicity can 
easily be identified with the rule of law as used in The Public story.  
 
Everett places participation as central in describing the meaning of public in the 
framework of covenant. Participation must be seen as a basic right that underlines other 
rights such as property, privacy, individual rights and freedom. These rights are 
instrumental in so far as it is subordinate to the right of participation (Everett 1988:130). 
 
Active participation is also characterized by equal access to power, science and 
information. The existence of power cannot exist apart from actual participation. Power 
lies in relationships, participative decision making, and the conflict of opposition and 
exchanging of arguments from an equal basis.  
 
This engagement of actual participation is by no means a possession by human beings 
only. Everett concludes that it is also part of God’s divine plan. The right to publicity is 
embedded in the covenant that God made with the people. 
 
Covenant and participation 
Everett equates participation (secular) with salvation (religious). He describes the 
activities of the person by means of two leading religious sacraments, namely profession 
and confirmation. With regard to profession, it refers to proclaiming the salvation or the 
perfect public. It is our entry into salvation and we proclaim our salvation in public. 
Profession is the first step out of our negative imaginations and perceptions into the 
covenanted republic, which is given by grace to humanity. This symbol of federal 
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republic is to be made public and not kept secret. This is the one leg of participation in 
public (Everett 1988:159:166).  
 
The other leg has to do with the confirmation of the perfect public and the past, which 
disqualifies the present as the ultimate public. In this present world however people need 
to confirm each other and the past through profession. Profession is only possible in some 
kind of public world. In this public world God’s federal republic is confirmed and people 
are confirmed to each other. 
 
In other words people’s participation as equal individuals and their rights to participate 
are enhanced. God’s federal republic is where salvation is experienced in a world of 
equal individuals. These individuals have the same access to that which makes them 
equal, namely education, information, economics, rights and power.  
 
Commonality and Reason 
Of this second characteristic there are similarities with reason as a characteristic of The 
Public story. The one commonality that persons have is the ability to reason about aspects 
that affect the lives of people. 
 
This principle flows directly out of the Rule of Law. Its origins can be traced back to the 
same time of that of the Rule of Law. During the time of colonisation by the Greeks it 
was realised that different people live by different rules and they questioned the absolute 
claim that rules are given by gods. According to Shutte this was the basis for the 
discovery of reason as the essence of our humanity. 
 
Shutte claims that; “Deciding that reason was the essential thing in human nature had 
important consequences for how we think of human life and how we ought to live. The 
definition of human beings as rational animals was the foundation of the most highly 
developed ethical system Greek philosophy produced namely that of Aristotle, Plato’s 
student” (Shutte 2001:38-39). 
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Ethics, for Aristotle, was the study of how to develop our human nature to the full so as 
to be able to live the most truly fulfilling and satisfying life. The aim of ethics was to 
ensure that every aspect of our being was formed and moved by reason. In this way all 
our powers would be developed in a thorough and integrated way” (Shutte 2001:39). 
 
The Medieval synthesis is associated with Aquinas who refused to admit that faith and 
reason is an ultimate contradiction. The much-used theory of natural law is an attempt to 
combine the Greek idea of nature and the Biblical one of law. Although the church 
accepted Aquinas's idea of human beings as free and rational individuals some problems 
remained. Part of the difficulty with Aquinas’s theory was his usage of Greek 
terminology, which gave to dualism. This misrepresentation of Aquinas's theory paved 
the way for The Enlightenment or what is commonly as the modern period. 
 
With the rise of science and secularisation reason and faith was the basis for human 
freedom. Science (including physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology and 
economics) provided extensive and varied knowledge and secularisation put the human at 
the centre of human freedom and sacred powers as was believed to be case. It was the 
advancement of science and secularisation that grounded reason as a product of the 
Enlightenment Era and subsequently as the centre of human freedom.  
 
Like commonalties in the public, reason is basic in the make-up of individuals. 
Reason is at the center of freedom and any lack of opportunities to develop the ability to 
reason, through equal education is unethical. Reason then binds equally free individuals 
in a cultural or religious group.      
 
Through human reason principles and more importantly universal principles are 
discovered for decision making and proper actions. For example natural rights are known 
by reason and discovered through choices. Once discovered the principles form the 
foundation for moral considerations and justification for moral behaviour. An expression 
of these principles is the Kantian demonstration of the moral within human beings. Moral 
law is formulated as a desire to do that, which can be fulfilled through obedience to that 
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which is universal law, and without self-contradiction. The moral law place upon the 
person to test each action and then decide upon an action. Hence Kant concluded that 
human beings are ends in themselves and not means to an end (Parsons 1996:24).   
 
Persuasion and Universal principles  
Persuasion serves the same purpose as that of universal principles. Universal principles 
are the norm by which measurement of behavior or decisions is determined. It gives rise 
to commonly held values. Both persuasion and universal principles lead to truth that is 
accepted by all participants. Digression from such truths results in disordered behavior 
and from a religious point, sinfulness.    
 
Worldliness and Individualism  
In such a public as Everett's the individual becomes an end in itself8 and this is the 
commonness that exist between individuals that make up the society. Shutte says that 
because every person has the capacity to self-determination they have an absolute value. 
He says that,  
 
We are obliged to always treat them as persons, as free beings, and never simply 
as things we can use for our own purposes. And because all persons have this 
absolute value they are all equally valuable. Their value has nothing to do with 
what they have achieved or their social position or their power. It comes simply 
from there being persons. It is not permitted to sacrifice one innocent life to save a 
thousand others (Shutte 2001:49).   
 
                                                          
8 This principle has its origins in modernity. Modernity here refers to the period in which science and 
secularisation advanced to such extent that the move was away from a sacred worldview and traditional 
authority. The supernatural and religion as a whole was put on the periphery and the individual was the 
centre of the natural. During period up and till the Middle Ages authority was synonymous with religious 
authorities such as the Bible or the Pope or philosophical authorities such as Plato or Aristotle. During the 
modern age Galileo and Copernicus made other observations and their theories was authoritative. On the 
religious front the reformers Luther and Calvin were responsible for the most significant break from the 
authority of the Pope and the Church. Individuals themselves should be responsible for what they believed 
in. Individual autonomy made inroads in the Church faster than expected. In the political realm too there 
was a movement away from centralised authority, the Empire, to an individualistic outlook. This was 
consistent with the developments that nature consists of separate, autonomous atoms. 
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Each individual has access to the same education, rights and other means to form 
capacity for reason. Although story, law and history can be common, individual 
conscience in a democratic society is most common in the public. 
 
Individuals became centres of freedom and through conscious decision-making they 
exercise that freedom. The Enlightenment period and the nineteenth century period are 
marked by the climax of individual freedom. This humanistic expression of individualism 
has been evident in the religious practices and doctrines of the period. In Protestant 
circles this was the most obvious. Protestant ethics emphasises personal responsibilities 
before God. God holds each individual personally accountable for their actions, decisions 
and motives. 
 
Theologically this means that each person is confronted by the Word of God, the 
preaching of sermons, the reading of the Bible and other forms of religious observance to 
be challenged to examine their own heart and respond with obedience to God’s call. The 
paradox we find in the teachings of Luther that human beings are most free in obedience 
to God, most powerful in owning up to one’s own human weakness and most dignified in 
living unto Christ and not the self (Parsons 1996:25).   
 
Shutte summarises the idea of individual freedom in the European sense as it having 
many sides to it.  
There is the high prestige given to creativity of any kind, to originality and 
uniqueness. Values like authenticity, sincerity, single mindedness and spontaneity 
are the most typical. There is also the aspect of power, the power of control over 
one’s environment and also of self-control. Self-determination gives humanity an 
almost god-like status in the world. At the same time the transcendence of 
humanity over all the causal mechanisms of nature gives it a kind of life that 
surpasses the ordinary forms of scientific knowledge and technological control. 
Each of us has an inner life that embodies our unique individuality. And this is 
what is most important, not only to us. It represents the source of all that we can 
offer of value to others (Shutte 2001:49).       
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Everett's interplay between the Christian story and the Public story has the following 
strengths. Firstly, he presents a historical development of his position. In doing this he 
presents the different stages of development of his position in particular contexts. He 
shows an appreciation for the different contexts over different periods of history. For 
example of the transition of the models of symbols, he writes, “In citing these transitions 
we must always keep in mind that they have had a certain appropriateness for different 
socioeconomic settings” (Everett 1985:57). 
 
Secondly, Everett appeals to both theory and practice. In his writings he appeals to the 
rational mind and to the creative imagination of the heart. His concepts and ideas find 
expression in ecclesiastical and societal praxis. Worship, although of minimal importance 
in his later stages, has the role of transmitting the values of the culture and society. 
Values are in the covenant publicity and a rehearsal of the covenant publicity form 
persons into free individuals.     
 
Thirdly, although not an African scholar he has been in dialogue with South African 
scholars and South African practices of worship. He has also shown a keen interest in the 
cultural practices, the political development and social factors in South Africa and other 
similar countries in the world. In various articles he attempts to make his approach 
relevant to a South African society under democratic rule.  
 
The weaknesses of Everett's approach are: a. his lack of appreciation for the Ubuntu 
nature of the South African society, b. his uncritical use of the covenant public as the 
community for moral formation, c. the limited role that creative worship plays in moral 
formation and d. the extend of his shift from his earlier stage to his present stage.   
 
a. For the South African society the formation of morality must take the communitarian 
nature of the society seriously. Within such a society some moral consensus is necessary. 
Such moral consensus is formed in community and through socialisation persons are 
formed in communion with others who become part of the story. Such partakers are 
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active and not passive as is the case with The Public story and the formulation of the 
constitution. 
 
The self cannot be understood apart from its social roles and attachments. A fulfilled life 
is one in which the self is committed to goods that are social in nature. The self is not 
reduced to community, but the self is to choose which roles and which communities it 
wants to be part of. The idea is not to reject all social roles, but to provide the space 
within which the self can exercise rationality and choice in order to revise, endorse or 
reject commitments. 
 
In the last two decades communitarian ethics has become a fundamental way of doing 
ethics. Coupled with this is the unique role that respected Christian ethicists played in this 
development. 
 
b. A further weakness in Everett's approach is the uncritical way in which other 
communities can be suppressed by the state. In South Africa the church community has 
suffered significantly in many areas of ministry as a result of the superiority claimed by 
the state with its democratic policy, constitution and values at the expense of Christianity.  
 
c. The Public story also neglects the creative role that worship plays as critique of moral 
practices, by neglecting the Christian story, the liturgical changes over the last decade or 
so and the role of Christian feminists. This form of community is oppressive as it 
suppresses dissidents. It selects one community, that formed by democracy, and argues 
that its tradition, history, practices, texts, story and values are to be learnt and 
appropriated. Only under these conditions can a virtuous life be lived.  
 
d. In the present stage of Everett's approach he becomes too closely aligned with the 
Public Story. His approach leaves no role for Christianity other than to form the morals of 
democracy with the symbols and principles of democracy. This is evident in his four 
principles of his main symbol, that if God's Federal Republic. His four principles, 
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participation, commonality, persuasion and worldliness, can be correlated to the four 
principles of democracy.    
 
These four weaknesses make the approach of Everett too weak as the most appropriate 
interplay between the Christian story and the Public story. For a community-orientated 
society who ascribes largely to Christianity, the creative tension between faith and culture 
needs a greater appreciation. Rosemary Radford Ruether and her feminist approach to 
moral formation uses community and the Christian story as much more serious 
phenomena. It is to her two paradigms of liberalism and social constructionism that we 
turn to in the next chapter. 
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 Chapter Two 
Rosemary Radford Ruether: Feminist Theology and Moral formation 
Introduction 
Feminism presents us with an example of how The Christian story undergoes changes 
that bring about changes in moral formation. In view of this example this chapter will 
describe Rosemary Radford Ruether's paradigm(s) and how it influences moral 
formation. I will interplay between Radford Ruther and other feminists of which some 
have the same views and others differ with her. 
 
Radford Ruether presents a paradigm in her earlier writings and then makes a shift in her 
recent writings from Liberalism to Social constructionism. In her writings she attempts 
not to break away from the liberal paradigm but instead tries to forge interplay between 
the two paradigms. In her writings we find that the relationship between The Christian 
story and The Public story for moral formation brings about broad spectrum of changes in 
The Christian story. These changes derive from the way in which feminist theology 
interprets ordination, authority, ministry, liturgy, doctrine, the Bible and Christology. 
These issues undergo changes as a result of the engagement that feminist theology has 
with the traditional theologies of the patriarchal nature of theology. These issues result in 
changes of worship and it furthermore illustrates how moral formation happens as a result 
of these changes. 
 
To illustrate how Radford Ruether's feminist theology uses the Christian story for moral 
formation I will (1) describe the two paradigms that Radford Ruether uses, (2) discuss the 
changes that important Christian practices have undergone and its influence on moral 
formation and (3) give an evaluation of Radford Ruether's approach of moral formation. 
 
1. The liberal paradigm and The Social constructionist paradigm 
In her work during the period of the seventies up and till the mid-eighties Radford 
Ruether used the liberal paradigm extensively. Of liberalism she states, 
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But liberalism also broke down the naturalised orders of traditional hierarchical 
society that divided people into priests, lords, and serfs: head-people and body-
people. An abstract equalitarianism, based on the possession by all 'men' of 
practical rationality, united the human essence in a single definition. 
Theoretically, now, neither class division, race division, nor sex division could be 
justified on the grounds of differences of 'nature', representing the split between 
spirit and body. All social revolutionary movements that seek to overthrow the 
rule of the feudal and then the bourgeois classes, white domination and male 
domination, draw on this tradition of democratic, universal human 'nature' 
(Radford Ruether 1975:192). 
 
The liberal paradigm appeals to reason, individualism and universal principles as the 
principles for the emancipation of women.  
 
Reason is the most important expression of our uniqueness as humans, the discovery of 
universal principles for moral conduct and decisions through reason, and the importance 
of individuality, according to this paradigm9. Firstly, through reason we realise dignity 
and truth because it draws us out of the mundane into the ultimate, from the particular 
into universality, out of the contingent into the free, and out of the body into the spiritual. 
Theologically this means that out of such reason God is worshipped and realities such as 
freedom, universal principles, ultimate truth and the spiritual are expressions of faith. 
 
The second assumption, regarding moral principles, is expressed through natural rights 
that are written into human existence by the Creator. Reason can discover these rights 
which form the basis for moral behavior and decision-making. Feminists argue that these 
rights are equally relevant to women as to men, as they are inherent within the structure 
of our humanity. The Kantian view of universal law is another of such expressions. 
Obedience to universal law places the responsibility on the moral agent to test each action 
against the basic principle of how we would will humans to behave towards one another 
without contradiction. For Kant each person is an end in him/herself and not a means to 
                                                          
9 Parsons, S Feminism and Christian Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, Pp23-25. 
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an end. The imperative is well expressed in the commandment to love the neighbour as 
oneself. 
 
The third assumption, regarding individuality, is about personal responsibility. With the 
Enlightenment came freedom from the establishment. For the individual, freedom of the 
will and spirit became imperative.  How this freedom is used depends on the individual 
conscience that assesses alternatives and possibilities. The Protestant ethic of personal 
responsibility before God is one of such expressions. Personhood is formed through 
decision-making with regard to the Word of God, which challenges each person to 
respond with obedience. Liberal feminists argue that the description of a person’s sex is 
irrelevant. 
 
Feminist Theology and The Liberal paradigm 
Radford Ruether's liberal paradigm is appropriated in such a way that feminist theology 
provides a principle for continuous socio-political criticism in the hope of liberation for 
all creation in the presence of God. A re-evaluation of patterns of behaviour and 
institutions which alienate women needs to be declared as inadequate and limited moral 
guides. These institutions take oppression as the truth and morality becomes a matter of 
doing what is the case instead of what ought to be the case. Religious faith provides what 
ought to be the case. The great Biblical theme of grace provides the individual with the 
power and motivation to stand against the status quo. Freedom from this perspective is to 
be one’s own self, and it is this freedom of being a person in one’s own right, what 
liberation is meant to be. 
 
Radford Ruether suggests that liberation entails exorcism, which begins within the church 
and spills over into the transforming of all kinds of alienation and domination. The 
church has also absorbed cultural assumptions, and that which is temporal and 
conditional. Radford Ruether argues that according to the teaching of Jesus, obedience is 
to one teacher and one Father in heaven. Women then experience full humanity outside 
the cultural and religious alienation. The affirmation of the full humanity of women 
became the basis of cultural criticism, of Biblical interpretation and of theological truth. 
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Radford Ruether sees a correlation between feminism and Biblical interpretation when 
those things that affirm the humanity of women be viewed as divine will and those things 
that deter their humanity as not redemptive10. 
 
The Social Constructionist paradigm.  
In her well-known work Sexism and God-Talk: Towards a feminist theology11 she makes 
a shift to the Social constructionist paradigm and considers socialization, relationships 
and community as the principles for liberation of women, men and the ecology. 
 
Parallel with liberal feminism developed this second paradigm which focussed more on 
political vision and action, the consequences of working conditions, differences between 
class and race, family members, and discrepancies between men and women. The subject 
of inquiry included analysis of the existing society and the proposal of drastic steps 
towards the full humanity of women. 
 
Radford Ruether accepts the social construction of values as opposed to economical, 
biological or psychological construction. This paradigm maintains that the pattern of 
women’s lives is a social necessity, which imposes itself in both overt and covert ways, 
thereby shaping behaviour and decision-making.  
 
Feminist theology and The Social constructionist paradigm 
The recent work of Rosemary Radford Ruether and Rebecca Chopp (Ruether’s student) 
are the most prominent exponents of this paradigm. This paradigm uses the notion of 
“praxis”, in a way where one can discover that all theologies are socially constructed 
communications of and reflections upon living experiences with God. Because these 
encounters always take place in the midst of practical situations and human needs, 
theology is rooted in history. Social constructionists enquire about the theological 
framework that facilitates such encounters and enables communities to live out their 
everyday lives in light of their faith. Theologies which seek the foundation outside the 
                                                          
10 See Introduction of Letty Russell's’ Feminist Interpretation of the Bible. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985, 
11 SCM Press, London: 1983. 
 57 
parameters of history, the privilege of the powerful, so that the supposed search for the 
truth becomes the means by which their authority and power is justified, suggests a deity 
which controls and commands. The primary focus of such a theological framework is to 
convince “non-persons” of this version of the truth and ensures obedience so that 
authority becomes a matter of orthodoxy. Moral knowledge becomes knowledge of 
universal principles and timeless norms, and morality that is lived in conformity with 
this. 
 
Reconstruction emerges from the “non-persons”. Feminist theology derives its 
importance from the new questions it asks: who its subjects are, who its objects are, and 
what its methods are. These questions, Solle, who is aligned with Radford Ruether and 
the social constructionist paradigm, suggests, highlight the rooting of theology in 
everyday life, as well as the responsibility for liberatory activities. Feminist theology 
seeks the alienated for which the Divine means hope. Solle recognises that realism, 
sexism and classism are far more basic ways of separation than questions of faith. We 
ought to seek out those hidden within social situations that are victims of its thinking and 
values, amongst which criticism of the status quo will engage new possibilities. From 
reflection on the experiences of the "non-persons" emerges a new practical principle, 
which becomes the basis for action and thought towards wholeness, freedom and well 
being. It also provides a partisan principle by which the Bible, the Christian tradition and 
contemporary Christian practise may be assessed (Parsons 1996:85-86). 
 
Such an approach of the social constructionist paradigm brings a particular approach to 
the Bible and to our language about God. This approach presupposes that the Bible is a 
product of a particular social and historical context, it contains the voices of the powerful 
and witnesses to the challenge that the powerless poses to them. The Bible then is a living 
document within which a living God may be encountered. It is not, as the liberal 
paradigm makes us to belief, a book of abstract principles, or a thesis to proclaim. 
Language about God is not about a disinterested inquiry regarding whether it is rational 
to believe or not, but about deeply personal and social concerns. To speak appropriately 
about God is to find the self who is formed in human inter-relatedness. Through the 
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finding of the new self, new dimensions of practical and spiritual living is discovered 
(Parsons 1996:86). 
 
Like Radford Ruether, Rebecca Chopp picks up the theme of liberation in her analysis of 
the Word of God. She links the Word of God with language in order to construct 
discourses. Chopp’s analysis of the social construction of values centers around her 
understanding of language serving; “…as both the material and the frame for structural 
and cultural debates about the role of women, affirmative action, and issues such as birth 
control, adoption, and child care” (Chopp 1989:12)12. Yet language is also the site of 
politics - the place and experiences of women and men, and subjectivity – and is then the 
locus of human life and thought (Chopp 1989:13-15). 
 
Chopp is well aware of the dualism implicit in thought and language. She writes,  
 
The basic patterning, organising, ordering principle of thought and language, and 
thus that of social and symbolic order as the dominant practices and principles in 
language, subjectivity, and politics, is the opposition of two terms, an opposition 
that forces and re-enforces the basic couple of man/woman (Chopp 1989:2).  
 
The power of language is essential to the shaping of human life in two ways, in the task 
of moral analysis and in the effective proclamation of new life, which is embodied in the 
recovery of the “power to speak”. An analysis of the systems and consciousness reveals 
that holes in the framework suggest possibilities for change and transformation. 
Transformation occurs from outside these boundaries where the power to speak is 
revitalised, a power which lies at the heart of proclamation, “and of the personal and 
communal experience of the emancipatory work of the divine” (Parsons 1996:89). 
 
Unlike the liberal paradigm, such transformation does not depend on any of women’s 
subjectivity or the quest for women’s identity as a universal singular. Such claims share 
in the crisis of modernity. The social constuctionist paradigm strives to transform the 
                                                          
12 Chopp, R The Power to Speak, Feminism, Language, God, Crossroad, New York, 1989, p12. 
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social symbolic order that has been dominated by terms such as “identity”, “autonomy”, 
“representationality”, “self-preservation” and “presence”. Transformation lies with that 
which is outside this perception of equality and autonomy. Its expression is unique to the 
oppression of women. The situation of women becomes the locus to creating a new 
subjectivity and new politics that will be divine, unpredictable and multi-vocal. Here 
women will express through “the power to speak” options that are prior and beyond the 
social symbolic order of modernity. The Spirit and not reason will enable this work to be 
done, which is already present in the margins and ambiguities of language, subjectivity 
and politics (Parsons 1996:90). 
 
Christian feminists, (like the early feminists) apply the themes of this paradigm to 
challenge the principles of freedom and equality that serve as an ideological cover-up for 
unjust economic practices of advanced capitalism. The basis of these challenges lies in 
the notion of what belongs authentically to human nature as social beings, for which 
relationships ought to be fulfilling and creative. For Christian feminists the source of this 
nature is God and any alternative social structure ought to be in accordance to God’s will. 
The Creator is actively involved in the challenging of unjust structures, not through 
applying a set of principles, but in asking unasked questions.  
 
As this paradigm becomes closely identified with post-modernism it contains more far-
reaching philosophical challenges to both human nature and any understanding of a 
transcendent authority for morality;  
 
... it questions the grounding of moral sentiment and purpose in an understanding 
of the essence, structures and end of human beings. These notions themselves are 
deconstructed as the necessary rationalisations of the powerful, by which their 
right to this place is justified and fixed…Christian feminists seek to disengage the 
authentic purpose and will of the divine from human projections and distortions, 
which are forms of idolatry, making the divine in the image of the human. The 
social construction of values is a challenge to belief in the untouched delivery of 
moral principles and values from God, since this paradigm presumes that it is in 
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and through the social dimension, not least through the use of a common 
language, that the divine is apprehended at all (Parsons 1996:91).  
 
This paradigm precludes that any one understanding of God is absolute. A critical 
appraisal of the language and images of God in society brings to the fore the recognition 
that our understanding of God is limited and not without inadequacies. The image of God 
can change as our inadequacies are taken seriously. 
 
Hope for reconstruction is grounded in a looser definition of who and what we are as 
humans to avoid the oppression of being defined, as well as the experience of being 
“fixed” as “the other”. The yearning from within, the shared suffering, is the source for 
critique, challenge and renewal. Social reconstruction aims for diversity, plurality and 
openness. Furthermore the Divine becomes dynamic rather than static, moving amongst 
the marginalised and creating possibilities for the transformation of the world (Parsons 
1996:92). 
 
On Diversity of paradigms 
These two paradigms formed and nurtured contemporary feminism and feminist 
theology. Although it is no easy task to identify any one form of moral reasoning as 
exclusively informing specific feminists and feminist theology, the characteristics of a 
certain form of moral reasoning can be identified as being consistent in the writings of 
certain feminists. With regard to the former, the writings of Radford Ruether are the most 
significant example of the overlapping of ideas and characteristics. Although she uses the 
liberal paradigm in her earlier writings she criticizes the followers of the liberal paradigm 
for secularising nature;  
 
Nature begins to be secularised, instead of a small circle of grace controlled by 
the Church; universal reason pervades nature, making the whole orderly, rational, 
and good. The rationality of the deist God, immanent in nature's laws, is 
analogous to human reason. Nature therefore, is eminently knowable and 
controlled by man. Her laws are reducible to mathematical formulas, the key to 
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both knowledge and mastery over nature……Early revolutionary liberalism is 
wont to universalize human consciousness and to suggest that various categories 
of dominated people might emerge into the human realm of consciousness and of 
control over nature. Some consistent liberals, such as Condorcet and John Stuart 
Mill, even suggest that women might be emancipated into the human (male) 
realm. Early feminists such as Mary Wollstonecraft and the Grimke sisters base 
their ideas on this liberal concept of universal human consciousness and 
transcendence over nature (Radford Ruether 1983:82-83). 
 
With regard to a feminist anthropology she says that liberalism presents an inadequate 
anthropology. Although she acknowledges that through equal education and political 
rights women's have been able to exercise the same capacities as men. She however 
claims that "…liberalism does not entirely recognise the more complex forms of women's 
psychological and economic marginalisation that result in only token integration of 
women into equal roles in the public sphere. Liberalism assumes the traditional male 
sphere as normative and believes it is wrong to deny access to it on the basis of gender. 
But once women are allowed to enter the public sphere, liberalism offers no critique of 
the modes of functioning within it" (Radford Ruether 1983:109-110). 
 
She further illustrates her appreciation of social constructionism by claiming that the 
capacities for rationality need to be develop to its full potential away from the false male 
dualisms of the psychic and sociology. Rationality must be integrated into society and in 
relation with others and God (Radford Ruether 1983:113-114). 
 
Contemporary Christian feminism clearly draws from the two paradigms in a way that 
the ideas and characteristics overlap. 
 
2. Changes in Christian practices that lead to moral formation 
The two feminist paradigms (liberal and social constructionist) gave rise to specific 
changes in the character of The Christian story. By using the two paradigms, Radford 
Ruether points out in a more comprehensible way the characteristics of the paradigms. 
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The characteristics are identifiable with the changes in worship and liturgy, which in 
turn form the morality of the worshippers.  
 
Women ordination. 
Women ordination and subsequent transformation of liturgies and models of ministry is 
largely attributed to liberalism or the Enlightenment. Closely connected with women’s 
ordination are the essential principles of individualism, universalism and education. 
Like women’s ordination, authority became a phenomenon to be critically analysed. 
Again liberal theology provides a substantial platform to challenge and transform the 
hierarchical and patriarchal structure of worship. The liberal paradigm also makes 
significant contributions with its emphasis on the discovery of the inner nature of men 
and women. Language usage, imagery for God and the discovery of the self amidst 
diversity is a natural consequence of the two natures. The social-constructionist 
paradigm provides important notions such as language and ideology as imperative for 
communication with the world, and interaction with and in structures.  Whereas the 
liberal paradigm sets the platform for women’s ordination, authority, and language 
usage the social-constructionist paradigm provides models for a critical evaluation of 
ministry and liturgy. Unlike the liberal paradigm, which emphasises the individual, in 
this paradigm the social precedes the individual.  
 
a. The Liberal paradigm and the ordination of women   
Since the start of the debate with regard to women’s ordination, both men and women 
supported the exclusion of women from the priesthood with theological and 
anthropological arguments. These arguments have been weakened to a considerable 
level since the application of liberal theology. Theological objections are weakened to 
the level where they can only be considered intelligible if used in conjunction with 
sociology, anthropology or psychology. Those who support women’s involvement in 
ministry align themselves with different attitudes. Some take a position of modest 
reform for laity to be involved in the development and leading of worship, but feel that 
the ordination of women is premature. This kind of attitude is often a result of projecting 
feelings of resistance within themselves and the belief that women’s ordination is a 
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peripheral and unimportant matter. The result of such an attitude is the limited 
involvement of women leading liturgy and worship. On the other hand, the attitude that 
the ordination of women is an instant cure to the patriarchal and hierarchical nature is an 
illusion. The Protestant churches that ordain women have not necessarily contributed 
more to women forming an equal partnership in the formulation of liturgy and worship 
models. It has not been proven to be more robust in fostering equality amongst 
worshippers. 
 
Weak theological justification for the exclusion of women from ordination, such as the 
maleness of Christ and the first disciples, remain the most used arguments. Those who 
use these theological arguments find themselves in a situation of inconsistency. Although 
they exclude women from the official ministry of the church on the basis of patriarchy; 
they adhere to cultural and social environments that support equality and non-sexism.  
 
This is contrary to the liberal premise of the unity between religion and culture. Religion 
must stand in a living tension with culture unless it wants to become obsolete to the 
society in which it operates. This tension between church and culture is evident in 
“Western Christianity” where false unity exists. Religion in such societies carries the risk 
of being identified with the practices, customs and laws of the bourgeois. 
 
The reason for a weak position for the exclusion of women to the ordained ministry is 
largely a consequence of the liberal paradigm. Liberalism broke the shackles that kept 
women imprisoned. Liberalism provides a platform, in the form of individualism and 
universalism, for the ordination of women. The humanity, intellectual honesty and 
comprehension which liberalism offers are principles that cannot be ignored by those 
who challenge the exclusion of women to the official ministry of the church. Liberalism 
rejects the classical tradition that equates the creation with patriarchy. It identifies order 
of creation with the original unfallen “imago dei” and affirms the equality of male or 
female in this creation. Moral conscience and reason is the basis for the common 
humanity shared by all human beings. Flowing from this common humanity are equal 
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rights in society. Women share equally with men in this common humanity and have the 
same equal rights. 
 
Liberal assumptions opened the way for women to the ordained ministry and 
subsequently to the symbols, hierarchical and patriarchal authority, the liturgy and the 
worship of the church. Although redemption from sexism and exclusion is “secularised”, 
liberalism contributed significantly to the church’s attitude towards women called to the 
ordained ministry. Rosemary Radford Ruether claims that although Protestants ordained 
a few women in the nineteenth century, and the American Protestant churches between 
1950 and 1970, the impact on worship reform was minimal. It was only by mid 1970s 
that sufficient women were ordained to make a significant impact on the worship and 
liturgy of the church (1983:199). 
 
It was also during this time that seminaries and universities opened their doors for 
women to be educated and trained for the ordained ministry. This is another example of 
the church’s failure to transform the world instead of being transformed by the world. 
Whereas universities allowed women access to other sciences as a result of liberalism, 
the seminaries remained an institution for the privileged male. The ordination of women 
meant access to seminaries and reform in theological thinking and training. This 
phenomenon has proven successful and fruitful in those traditions, which opened itself 
for reform. The Catholic tradition which offers theological education to women as laity, 
has not made significant progress in worship and liturgical reforms. Such traditions 
suffer the loss of intellectual and spiritual resources. Many women left the official 
Church because it became difficult for them to worship as free, equal and intelligent 
individuals. Individuals such as Mary Daly and groups such as the “Women Church” are 
examples of such resistance. 
 
Mary Daly warned the women of the Catholic Church for not challenging the resolutions 
made by Second Vatican on the personhood of women, 
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Because Catholic women and their organisations have been too timid in affirming 
their worth and their rights, because they have asked too little, they have in fact 
failed to make progress. Until they have the clear-sightedness and courage to 
reject discrimination totally, it is to be expected that women will be the losers on 
all levels. Only those who think and act with consistency can challenge the 
perverse consistency in the present trend toward third-class citizenship in the 
Church (Daly 1968:162-163).  
 
Despite the emphasis on the laity as the people of God and the importance of all those 
baptised, women have not made much progress compared to their male counterparts. It 
becomes obvious that the ordination of women by Protestants, and the resistance by the 
Catholics, is a decisive factor in worship reforms and liturgical renewal. Although both 
traditions draw from liberalism, women’s ordination remains an important element in 
challenging hierarchical, patriarchal and andro-centric symbols. 
 
In both Catholic and Protestant traditions the local parish priest remained the center of 
every aspect of the society: the moral, political, economical and social dimensions of life. 
This remained the norm long after the separation of Church and state, the rise in the 
awareness of compulsory education of the masses, or the age of specialisation. As a 
result the priest became the criterion for liturgical participation, canonical law making, 
administration of the sacraments, authority and pastoral ministry. Referring to Second 
Vatican and the call to the vocation of the laity, Sr. Joan Chittister rightly observes the 
difficulty that this control of liturgy by ordination has on the development of liturgy.  
 
These two poles - clerical control and non-clerical involvement - come to sharp 
focus when persons such as the women religious of this generation see one form 
of ministry shifting and others, though open in theory, closed in fact. The 
adjustment to those who come to claim their birthright is commonly difficult for 
everyone involved. In this case, it may obstruct the development of ministry 
completely (Radford Ruether 1983:45-46). 
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Feminists and others who are consistent in their quest for humanity have expressed a 
number of concerns. The major concern, which the ordination of women on the basis of 
liberal claims and principles brings about, is the failure to question the patriarchal basis 
of liberalism; a basis designed to exclude women. Despite the successful usage of liberal 
terms, which advocate the inclusion of women in worship and liturgy, it failed to 
challenge the core of inequality. Although there have been gains in getting women 
involved in the worship of the church, it has not been significant in order to dismantle the 
hierarchy, which exists to maintain inequality. The second concern that the ordination of 
women on the basis of the liberal paradigm brings out, is the role that female priests are 
expected to fulfil. Women who do enter this traditional male vocation are expected to 
operate as their male counterparts. They fail to bring their unique contributions and tend 
to follow the traditional forms and models of liturgy, which symbolised patriarchy. 
 
The ordination of women to the priesthood came about because of liberalism. The 
characteristics of individualism and universalism paved the way for equal rights and 
consequently the inclusion of women to the official ministry of the church. The stress on 
reason by liberalism, inclusion of women in seminaries and universities, paved the way 
for women to contribute on an academic level in matters of theology, doctrine and 
liturgy. Women’s experiences enabled them to express themselves as equal participants 
in worship. Liberalism’s equality, reason and universalism challenged the traditional 
patriarchal worship of Christianity through the ordination of women to the priesthood. 
This tool of reform has not gone without criticism. Although evidence of worship reform 
is evident in Protestant circles, there are those amongst feminists who raised some 
serious doubts of its significance for the expression of the full humanity of women. 
 
b. The Liberal paradigm and Authority  
One of the serious criticisms against the ordination of women is the extent to which it is 
mere tokenism. In other words: to what extent does the ordination of women impact on 
the hierarchical nature of the church? Even liberal feminists are divided over this issue. 
Influential feminists such as Mary Daly argue that because women are not ordained in 
significant numbers, the best they can do is to maintain the status quo. These feminists 
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argue that women’s ordination does not impact on hierarchy and patriarchy enough to 
make any major theological, doctrinal and liturgical reforms. Other feminists, like 
Radford Ruether, argue that liberalism with its emphasis on reason frees the person from 
institutional authority, tradition, patriarchy and hierarchy. Liberalism paved the way for 
democracy. It can be asked: in what way does liberalism challenge the patriarchal 
authority that has been part of Christianity since its conception? 
 
Liberal feminism challenges the hierarchical tradition in two ways. Firstly, it challenges 
the orthodox view of the Bible as “Sola Scriptura”. Secondly, it criticises 
institutionalised authority with regard to the first, liberal feminism’s relative and 
historical view of the Bible. Liberal feminism understands the Bible as “the word of 
God” spoken by human beings. It comes from historical individuals who were capable of 
error and abuse. The age of science and specialisation opens up possibilities for 
rectification and reform as the Bible is a living book in constant tension with the present 
and present experiences. Liberal feminism argues that traditional texts are a product of 
hierarchical and patriarchal authority. Liberal feminist theology uses scientific and 
historical facts to retell the Biblical story that is more faithful to the realisation of full 
humanity for the marginalised. Historicity challenges revelation. 
 
With regard to the second criticism, that of institutionalised authority, liberalism argues 
that direct approach to God and knowledge through faith frees the individual from the 
limited perceptions of the world and the hierarchical church. In liberalism the principles 
of democracy are identifiable, which allow individuals to make choices with a sense of 
authority. In the conscience of each individual is known the truth, which serves as 
motivation for challenging society and patriarchal authority. Traditional patriarchal, 
hierarchical authority is reduced to oppression, subordination and marginalisation of 
minorities, and women in particular. 
 
In the church, whether institutional or not, these challenges paved the way for the laity to 
exercise their gifts responsibly, without being limited to set ministries. Authority is now 
viewed as “shared ministries”, not hierarchical, but co-operative and equal. Laity have 
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now got the authority to contribute to all aspects of the Church’s ministry. Whether it is 
pastoral, social, liturgical, doctrinal or political, the laity makes an impact. Such a view 
of authority and Biblical interpretations has significant implications for worship reform. 
Bible readings are shared amongst clergy and laity, liturgical changes is a consequence of 
changes in society, and the form of service takes on a collective, communal nature 
instead of a “top-down” one. The sermon comes from the worshipping community, for 
the community. 
 
Authority coupled with the ordination of women challenges the patriarchal, andro-centric 
and hierarchical symbols of the church. Traditional symbols are experienced from the 
experiences of women and other marginalised groups. Symbols that have formerly been 
neglected are now revitalised to enhance the possibility of full humanity. 
 
The ordination of women and the challenge of authority, to which liberalism contributed, 
brought about worship and liturgical reform. The impact of such phenomena has not 
always been effective in any real significant way. Some theologians and laity that 
followed this paradigm became disillusioned with the lack of involvement of the church 
in the economic and political challenges facing the marginalised and the oppressed. The 
limitations of this paradigm paved the way for the social-constructionist paradigm. 
 
c. The Liberal paradigm and Language  
Religious language reflected in worship has gone almost unchallenged until the rise of 
feminist theology. Hymns, prayers, liturgy and Biblical interpretations are all andro-
centric in origin and production. Both men and women were socialised through language 
used in worship.  
 
Language usage is a form of liberation from the world that seems foreign to them. 
Language is a means of women creating a world of their own, away from hierarchy and 
patriarchy.  
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By creating this alternative world women hear and speak their own words, images and 
symbols. Women break out of the prevailing social roles and assume an active and 
creative role towards freedom. Such ethical reflection has influenced worship 
tremendously. Some women have found the need to worship together, separated from 
men. This is most evident in the spirituality associated with the Women Church. This 
movement has its origins in 1983, when 1400 Catholic women met at Grailville in the 
USA and declared themselves Woman Church, later to be known as Women Church. 
Rosemary Radford-Ruether views this exodus as a stand against patriarchy and not the 
institutionalised Church as such, unlike other theologians, in the likes of Mary Daly, 
Carol Christ and Daphne Hampton who left the church because according to them, the 
sexist tradition is irredeemable. These women choose to worship from a common 
experience. They created new liturgies and forms of worship based on language, rituals, 
images and symbols that are identifiable with their experiences. An example of such 
writings is Celebrating Women13 which has liturgies that reflect such experiences. 
 
Amongst feminist theologians this Women Church has received many descriptions. 
Elizabeth Schussler-Fiorenza understands the roots of this “ekklesia” of women to be 
planted in the origins of Christianity. It is a church of discipleship of equals. Mary Hunt 
defines Women Church as “Base communities of justice - coming together to share word 
and sacrament”14. A similar movement took root in the Netherlands called “Vrouw en 
Geloof” (Women and Faith) which focuses on ritual and symbol, and is more action 
based.                                                                                     
 
Although this way of worship is not an attempt to discredit the established church, it 
takes seriously the idea that women need to develop independently from patriarchal 
influence within the church. This ethical issue of equality led to women worshipping on 
their own. Such an approach needed independent liturgy. New liturgies do not mean new 
words as opposed to words used by those in power in existing societies.  
 
                                                          
13 Ward, H, Wild, J and Morley, J (eds.), SPCK, London, 1995.  
14 Mary Hunt and Daphne Neu run Water-Women’s association for theology, ethics and ritual. 
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This was the consequence of the response against inequality, injustice, sexism and 
subordination. For texts of new liturgies we can see extensive examples in Celebrating 
Women; Janet Morley and Hannah Ward (eds.), 1986, Psalms of a Laywoman; Edwina 
Gateley, 1986, and the writings of Rosemary Radford Ruether. New rituals and liturgies 
are becoming more important for women to engage actively in the forming of community 
and freedom. In her important book on affirming the equality of women and men, 
Elizabeth Schussler Fiorenza puts forward the following prayer that illustrates how The 
Christian story is shaped by a new set of values:  
 
Creative Darkness 
You have sent to us the Sun of Justice who reveals your truth to all your people. 
Liberating Strength 
You have made known through your messengers and prophets throughout the 
ages that you are the God of Life not of death 
The God of freedom and not of bondage 
The God of love and not domination 
The God of creativity and not of division 
 
Strengthen your people Holy Sustainer that we might struggle against exploitation 
and for happiness 
against injustice and for liberation 
against every deprivation of body and soul. 
 
And always may we know Your Strength and your Love. 
Nurture us, Gentle Wisdom 
Now and in the times 
Of our despair. Amen15.   
                     
                                                          
15 Discipleship of Equals: A critical feminist ekklesia-logy of Liberation. SCM Press, Ltd., London, 1993, 
Pp206-207. This prayer is part of a collection of liturgies edited by Susanne Kahl-Passoth, ed., Was meinst 
du dazu, Gott? Gebete von Frauen, GTB Siebenstern 485 (Gutersloh: Gert Mohn, 1984). 
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In this prayer we notice how words that are not alien to men take on a meaning that 
expresses different ethics than that created and supported by men to alienate and 
dominate women. Words such as God, Life, death, freedom, bondage, Holy Sustainer and 
happiness are not new words; they are new in new contexts. 
 
Whether such communities remain within the institutional Church or not, it is a reaction 
to the male dominance, inequality and sexism within and outside the church. Alternative 
worship through language change makes it possible for ethics to criticise worship.   
 
Women who remain in the institutional Church usually remain within the periphery or the 
margin of the official Church. Such women remain within the church and participate in 
the worship. The traditional symbolism of the church remains an important part of 
becoming whole, although not the only symbols. Women who choose to remain within 
the official church challenge the established Church through dialogue with other 
women’s groups, and the hierarchy of the church. Examples of such groups are those 
women’s groups in close conjunction with the World Council of Churches and “Women 
in Dialogue” founded in 1977 in Puebla. Other examples are found in the Catholic 
Church (St’ John’s International Alliance) and Anglican Church (Movement for the 
ordination of Women). The objective of these groups is to raise the problem of andro-
centricism and find a voice within the established Church. 
 
Although language usage is overwhelmingly male dominated, it is less sexist. In the 
liturgies, hymns and other worship material, sexist language is generally replaced by 
inclusive language. Even where the official printing is not changed, people will ignore 
exclusive language or simply refuse to participate in such sections of the liturgy. In many 
congregations the official liturgy will be used alongside alternative liturgies that are more 
inclusive. In this way the local church does not discard the past as unimportant, but opens 
itself up to new possibilities. A typical example of such an effort is “The New Century 
Hymnal”16. The traditional version of the well known hymn “All hail the power of Jesus 
name” reads; “All hail the power of Jesus name, let angels prostrate fall, bring forth the 
                                                          
16 Pilgrim Press, Cleveland, 1995. 
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royal diadem and crown Him Lord of all”. The inclusive version reads; “All the power of 
Jesus name, let angels prostrate fall; bring forth the royal diadem, and crown Christ 
servant of all. Attend the Saviour’s sovereign claim, and crown Christ servant of all”. We 
notice how Christ and “Servant” replace references such as “Him” and “Lord”. The same 
kind of change is found in “The Lord’s prayer”; which is in almost all the liturgies, both 
written and oral. “Parent” and “Kins-dom” replace references such as “Father” and 
“Kingdom”. 
 
Changes in worship, as demonstrated by the Women Church, are not always related to 
language that makes use of abstract concepts and systematised theological doctrine that is 
controlled by reason. Instead it is “religious language” which makes use of images and 
symbols that express emotions, feelings and imagination. Such changes come about 
because of careful and critical reflection on religious experiences. Changes in liturgies 
are closer to its experiential sources than doctrinal formulations. This makes change 
authentic, as women can find expression individually or collectively without or at least in 
dialogue with the creation of male directed worship17. However, changes in doctrinal 
formulations and faith statements have proven just as important for equality.   
 
Theological Language 
Feminist theology has gone a long way as an academic discipline. Although women 
theology students (Roman Catholic) have been admitted to seminaries and universities 
since World War 1, in North America it was not until 1960 that women gained access to 
theological institutions. In Africa and in South Africa in particular women were accepted 
much later. Only in the late eighties were women accepted in seminaries. In South Africa 
for example in 1996 (the first students who did their full term at the newly amalgamated 
college for Southern Africa) all the students were male. This college serves the Anglican 
Communion of the whole of Southern Africa. In other parts of the world where 
Christianity is established, a similar pattern is visible. However in the last twenty years or 
so feminist theology has not only broken through this pattern and enriched theology, but 
                                                          
17 Ursula King, Women and Spirituality: Voices of protest and promise. Macmillan Education Ltd., 
London, 1989, Pp.44-45. 
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also challenged andro-centric ways of theology and its paradigms. In both Catholic and 
Protestant traditions this is evident in the feminist approach to Biblical interpretations, 
doctrine and images of God. Moreover these new approaches found expression in 
liturgy and worship. 
 
d. The Social constructionist paradigm and Ministry 
Rosemary Radford Ruether finds in the social-constructionist paradigm possibilities for 
liturgical reforms. Ministry and institutional power are two areas to which this paradigm 
has contributed significantly through its characteristics of the social nature of humanity, 
social realities and the importance of language. 
 
Rosemary Radford Ruether criticises the liberal paradigm and those who follow its 
characteristics and customs for including women as tokens in a male dominated world. 
She observes in her important work, which marks her transition from liberal feminism to 
social-constuctionist feminism, 
 
We begin to see that the securing of women’s ordination through liberal 
assumptions contains the seeds of its own contradiction. Women are included in 
ministry through a concept of justice as equal opportunity. But this perspective 
neglects any critique of the public order beyond a demand for equal opportunity 
of all persons in it regardless of gender. The shaping of the form and symbols of 
ministry by patriarchal culture, to the exclusion of women, is not seen as making 
the historic form of ministry itself problematic. Women win inclusion in this 
same ministry without asking whether ministry itself needs to be redefined 
(Radford Ruether 1983:200). 
 
Although liberal theology has contributed to the ordination of women, its influence has 
been limited because of its reluctance to challenge ministry as such. Patriarchal, 
hierarchical and oppressive symbols remained a focus of worship and liturgical practices. 
Women priests became part of a ministry in which the cleric remained the criterion for 
liturgy and the laity the recipient of a male dominated ministry. It is this view of ministry 
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which universalism and individualism perpetuate, of which the social-contructionist is a 
critique. 
 
Ministry as community, not individuality 
The social nature of humanity confirms the church’s nature as community. In the social-
constructionist paradigm social precedes individual. In drawing from the characteristics, 
feminists understand the church as a liberating community in which liturgy, doctrine, 
ministry, and social involvement find true meaning. Ministry does not only mean 
providing equal education for individuals to achieve the knowledge to freedom, but it 
extends into the social and political field.  
 
Radford Ruether suggests that ministry in community means a change in traditional 
symbols of leadership. The change is from the princely and paternalistic modes to a 
dialogical relationship. In a dialogical mode leadership is viewed primarily as the skill to 
bring forth the gifts and creative skills of the whole community and not a select that 
makes the clerics. She further states that the word, sacramental grace and theologies are 
not restricted to a small minority, but it is self-reflection of the whole community and 
inspired by the work of The Holy Spirit on the community (Radford Ruether 1975:80).  
 
Ministry in community also demands critical reflection on the models of the relationship 
of God to creation and the Church. In these relationships God is not modeled around the 
traditional dominating, patriarchal and hierarchical father. Rather God is The Holy Spirit 
who is the 'Ground of Being' of creation and the new creation. The church is the locus, 
the root of the new creation. "Ministry is simply the self-articulation of the community's 
life together. By designating certain people to exercise these functions, the people do not 
lose these powers, but simply order and express the life, which is theirs. Ministry and 
community must be seen in a reciprocal relationship" (Radford Ruether 1975:81).   
 
Dorothy Solle describes such ministry as the threefold mission of “kerygma”, “diakonia” 
and “koinonia”. The Greek word “kerygma” refers to the proclamation of the word of 
God. This proclamation is a call to a new life in community. “Diakonia” means service to 
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all those in need. Service in this sense goes beyond the individual good to the offering of 
the self for the liberation of the community. Koinonia, communion with God and 
communion with others, finds expression in the liturgy: in praise, prayer, music and the 
celebration of the sacraments. These three together are the ministry of the church whose 
mission is the emancipation of all human beings (Solle 1990:141-142). 
 
Communities that take this threefold approach seriously and are able to keep the tension 
amongst the three elements (kerygma, diakonia and koinonia) do not take universalism as 
absolutes, but take praxis seriously. The reform of liturgy from clericalism to co-
operation becomes inevitable. A shared ministry that reflects the liberation of women 
replaces the monopolising of ministry by the ordained ministry. It also challenges 
androcentrism, and emphasises those on the periphery. 
 
e. The Social constructionist paradigm and power as individual in interaction  
The social-constructionist paradigm challenges the view of liberalism with regard to 
power. Instead of perpetuating reason, it attempts to perpetuate individual power, which 
results in division and competition. The social-constructionists respond to this weakness 
with the notion of human nature. This suggests that human beings are by nature social 
beings that are formed in social realities. It is these social practices which are challenged 
as unjust principles to further the aims of advanced capitalism. These unjust principles 
are found in the hierarchical structure of the institutional church. 
 
Rosemary Radford Ruether identifies the unjust principles in dualism such as 
male/female, and clergy/ laity.  These dualisms are used to distinguish between the 
powerful and powerless. Those who are given the power to speak, to define, construct 
and lead are the powerful; those who are the opposite are marginalised. In theological 
terms the powerful are the ordained clergy and the laity the subordinates. Using the 
characteristic of diakonia (which Solle suggests as one of the three characteristics of 
ministry), Radford Ruether challenges this dualism by calling for the dismantling of 
clericalism. She observes,  
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The clergy monopolise the instrument of mediation between God and the laity. 
The clergy alone have authorised theological training; they alone are authorised 
to preach, to teach, to administer the Church. They alone possess sacramental 
power….Women become the archetypal representatives of the passive recipients 
of clerical sacral power. Clericalism is built upon and presupposes patriarchy. 
The symbols of clerical power duplicate on the level of ecclesiastical hierarchy 
the symbols of patriarchal domination of men over women, fathers over 
children….Diakonia is kenotic or self-emptying of power as domination. Ministry 
transforms leadership from power over others to empowerment of others 
(Radford Ruether 1983:207). 
 
Social-constructionists and feminist theologians in particular, attempt to bring about such 
notions of power by rejecting liberal notions of power as unjust or sinful. For feminist 
theologians hierarchical power is sinful and in need of redemption. The social structures, 
which support such notions, need to be redeemed. Such change has brought about 
significant reform in liturgy, worship and administration of the church. Women became 
more visible on parish councils, at synods and committees. In some cases women formed 
their own worshipping communities separate from the institutional church. The Women-
Church, for which Radford Ruether published a book with suggestive liturgies, is one of 
such examples. The book is called Women-Church: Theology and practice, Harper and 
Row Publishers, San Francisco, 1985. Another such example is Die Vrouw en Geloof 
(Woman and Faith). These communities do not reject the institutional church completely. 
 
f. Biblical Interpretation  
In any Christian worship service Bible readings form an integral part of the liturgy. In the 
Anglican tradition it is so prominent that the first part of the Eucharist service is called 
“The liturgy of the Word”. This consists of the greeting, confession, three readings (O.T, 
N.T and Gospel), a Psalm, sermon and prayers. The sermon and prayers have a direct 
relation to the readings and is therefore influenced by the readings. The interpretation of 
these texts by the preacher and listeners is therefore important in the faith experience of 
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the worship community. The emergence of different interpretations by feminist 
theologians is an attempt to challenge the andro-centric nature of texts. 
 
Broadly speaking, three approaches became widely used by feminist theologians. Firstly, 
the literary-critical approach attempts to make those texts used for male-dominance, 
liberating for women. It strips the text from its andro-centrism. Although this is an 
effective approach, its influence is limited because it ignores the patriarchal and 
oppressive context in which the entire text was produced and formulated. The second 
approach, characteristic of Rosemary Radford-Ruether, Letty Russell and Carter 
Heyward, is called the “prophetic-messianic dimension”. This approach presupposes that 
the Bible critiques itself constantly against God’s purpose for humanity. The personhood 
of Christ calls us constantly to new forms of liberation in relation. The third approach, of 
which Elizabeth Schussler Fiorenza is an important theologian, assumes that the Bible is 
simply andro-centric in origin and production. Mary Daly, Carol Christ and others, who 
left the church, align themselves with this approach, which acknowledges both the 
oppressive and liberating ways in which the Bible can function in the lives of women. 
The approach suggests that the task of women is to restore their egalitarian position 
within the faith community and society through a four pronged method of a hermeneutic 
of suspicion, proclamation, remembrance and creative actualisation. 
 
These new ways of interpreting the Bible in its remoteness, complexity, diversity and the 
present context bring new opportunities for text, interpreter and listeners. New values and 
opportunities that these approaches bring enrich not only feminists, but also the whole 
worshipping community. Texts that are transformed from their oppressive nature now 
liberate both women and men. Women in particular are vindicated as they are given a 
prominent role in Ancient Israel. Not only are women vindicated who are neglected by 
patriarchal interpretations but texts used for subordination now liberates women when it 
is re-interpreted. A striking example is the familiar text of the creation story. Contrary to 
what tradition claims, the woman is not created as subordinate to man. Where the Hebrew 
word “ezer” (helper) is used elsewhere (Ps. 121.2, 124.8, 146.5; Exod.18.4; Deut.33.7, 
26, 290, it connotes superiority. This poses a different problem for traditional 
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interpretations of the creation story. The accompanying phrase ‘fit for’ or ‘corresponding 
to’ (‘a helper corresponding to’) suggests mutuality of women and men instead of 
superiority. Furthermore when the serpent speaks (Gen.3:1-5) he uses plural verb form, 
making the woman spokesperson. She states the case for obedience with authority, “God 
said, you shall not eat it and not touch it, lest you die”. The woman breaks through the 
hierarchy and restores values of equality and justice. 
 
Such biblical interpretations raise the consciousness of the worshippers when it 
influences the sermon and prayers as well as the kind of Bible used in the liturgy. 
Through interplay between this new set of values (justice and equality) and feminist 
hermeneutics, the liturgy is being shaped. For example the Jerusalem Bible neglects the 
female imagery in Deuteronomy 32:18 which reads; “You forgot the God who fathered 
you”. The Revised Standard Version is more inclusive as it puts the same text as; “The 
God who gave you birth”. When such texts are re-interpreted by feminist theologians this 
replaces old traditional values of domination and subordination in favour of a new set of 
values. Because of the varied interpretations of scripture the andro-centric nature of 
academic institutions, the traditional symbols and language, the Bible as it stands does 
not shape worship as effectively as when it is used as a tool of ethics. This is evident in 
the way feminists use the Bible in their quest for God’s purpose of full humanity. 
 
When the Bible is used as part of the liturgy, new interpretations acknowledge the 
patriarchal, oppressive and discriminative nature of the context in which the Bible was 
written. It exposes the narrowness with which the scriptures are approached. On the other 
hand feminist hermeneutics makes the Bible a tool of liberation for men and women, 
oppressor and oppressed, human and non-human. Using the Bible as part of the liturgy 
opens up new opportunities for redemption and eventually full humanity. Feminist 
hermeneutics fosters the relation between the scriptures and the worshipping community. 
The worshipping community becomes active participants in the new opportunities that 
are created. 
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Closely related to language and scripture is the challenge that this paradigm poses to the 
traditional male symbols for God. Arguing for integration, naturalist feminists evaluate 
the exclusive symbols of religion and revive both traditional and contemporary feminist 
symbols. Out of the experiences of women, symbols for God emerged which reflect these 
experiences independent of male dominance and patriarchal symbols.  
 
g. Doctrine 
We have already observed that the task of feminist theologians is twofold. On the one 
hand it is critical of male-dominance and its patriarchal dualistic categories of classical 
theology, and on the other hand it provides a movement based on non-dualism and 
liberating categories, which is related to the experiences of women. Symbols, concepts 
and ritual that are of a dualistic nature are replaced by liberating ones. The concern of 
feminists with regard to doctrine is particularly with God, Trinity and Christ. The symbol 
that receives the most attention and subsequently most severe criticism from feminists is 
that of “Father”.  
 
These vehicles of patriarchal, male dominance are threatened by feminists’ quest for full-
humanity. There are a number of ways that the transforming of oppressive symbols can 
be done. Firstly, tokenism can result in replacing old characters by maintaining old roles. 
The few women in male dominated structures take on a masculine role, as tokenism can 
never change stereotypes and social systems. On the contrary it maintains it because of its 
lack of power to influence. If anything at all, it reduces the revolutionary impulse. A 
second response is to re-interpret symbols and concepts that have been used to 
subordinate women. This response, although more effective than the former, neglect the 
patriarchal, exclusive and male-dominated context in which doctrine and dogmas were 
formulated, sustained and used in theology and worship. A third response suggests that 
new ones replace old symbols and old roles. Does this mean that religious symbols that 
have survived many centuries and form part of the understanding and experience of God 
must simply be replaced? The replacing of old symbols means that symbols need to be 
created out of new experiences. For women this means new symbols are consequences of 
the consciousness of women and the change that consequence brings about. Symbols that 
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are constructed and used by males are replaced with that which is a result of the 
experience of women. This does not mean those religious symbols such as “Father” and 
“Son” cannot be used. It does mean that it cannot be used in the semantic field of 
traditional patriarchy. “Father” and “Son” take on a new semantic field, which is known, 
to women. In this way feminists and not males name the symbol. This makes symbols 
more authentic.  
 
The ordination of women, co-opting of women on church structures and participation in 
the leading of worship, are some of the ways in which “tokenism” has maintained the 
status quo. Its effects and influence in the worship and liturgy are minimal if done in 
isolation. The second approach has become a well-known one amongst Catholic 
theologians, which is in dialogue with the institutional Church. Symbols such as “Lover” 
and “Mother” are commonly used in the liturgies of both those who claim to be liturgical 
and those who claim not to be. The third approach which is identified with radical 
feminism, and of which Mary Daly is renowned for, goes beyond the traditional symbols 
used to stifle change and maintain traditional beliefs and values in the existing dogmas 
and creeds. Symbols frequently associated with this approach are “Being” and “Eternal 
Thou”. Mary Daly suggests that these symbols which go beyond the traditional ones, 
must be understood in an “I-Thou” relation and not “I-It” relation. Feminism, she argues, 
creates new possibilities of the “I-Thou” relation when communal and creative refusal of 
victimisation by sexual stereotypes takes place. This creative refusal involves conscious 
and frequent efforts to develop new life-styles in which “Thou" becomes superior to the 
"It" which uses the other as object. God, the “Eternal Thou" opens up new opportunities 
for us (1979:33-40). 
 
These three responses have serious limitations for Christian doctrine if taken as absolute 
on their own. If the three are taken together it makes a strong case for new symbols out of 
new experiences. New symbols are important for the redemption of both women and 
men. Old symbols are important for the Christian story. Without them the Christian story 
will not be complete. The claim that old symbols become new in new semantic fields is a 
highly debatable one. Old symbols that reflect women’s experience are important even 
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for feminism. Furthermore it is not the old doctrines or symbols which are necessarily 
patriarchal or oppressive, but their interpretation is bias and sexist. These interpretations 
justify suffering and pain for women as they (women) find themselves at the bottom of 
society. Like the Bible, doctrine and statements of faith are influenced by ethics. 
 
The new paradigm of feminist theology is both transforming old symbols and forming 
new ones. In some doctrinal formulations, as reflected in certain liturgies, “Parent” for 
example replaces “Father”. In other formulations the relational image of God 
demonstrates the effectiveness of replacing old with new.  
 
h. Christology 
Radford Ruether does not attempt to replace the traditional doctrinal formulation of the 
Trinity in her writings but she responds by presenting some difficulties with the 
traditional formulation of Christology. 
 
Radford Ruether claims that the self-disclosure of God in history is seen in such a way 
that it excludes women from representing this divine redemptive action. This argument of 
the self-disclosure of God in a male form has been the argument in favor of male 
clericalism and limited disclosure of God (Radford Ruether 1981:46). 
 
Three alternative models of Christology are presented in the quest of more inclusivity in 
the Christ symbol. The imperial Christ of Nicene theology was constructed from 
Hebrew messianism and Greek philosophy. The messiah symbol is the warrior king who 
will restore Israel, the oppressed nation, as the new powerhouse. Added to this messianic 
symbol is the Greek concept of the divine Logos, or Nous of God. The Nous of God is 
constructed in hierarchical form by which the universe is governed. The free Greek male 
is seen as the mind and headship of society, which control the rest (Radford Ruether 
1981:48). 
 
During the fourth century these two heritages was combined. "Christ becomes the 
Pantocrator, the cosmic governor of a new Christianized universal empire. The Christian 
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emperor, with the Christian bishop at his right hand, becomes the New Vicar of Christ on 
earth, governing the Christian state of the new redeemed order of history. “In this vision 
patriarchy, hierarchy, slavery, and Graeco-Roman imperialism have all been taken over 
and baptized by the Christian church" (Radford Ruether 1981:48-49).    
 
Radford Ruether suggests that this Christology might have been constructed in a way of 
the Messiah as leveling all kinds of hierarchy and subjugation. The Hebrew counterpart 
of the Logos identifies God's creative Word as Holy Wisdom, which is represented as a 
female. These options were lost in the fourth century to patriarchy, hierarchy and Euro-
centered imperial control (Radford Ruether 1981:49)  
 
Androgynous Christologies  
In this alternative Christologies Christ is representing as unifying male and female. 
Gnostic Christologies such as mediaeval Jesus mysticism, such as Julian of Norwich, 
women Joachite leaders of the late Middle Ages, nineteenth-century Anglo-American 
sects, such as the Shakers, and Protestant pietism can be classified as these kind of 
alternatives. "Christ is seen as the restored androgene of the original creation before the 
separation of female and male. Women are seen as equal participants in this Gnostic 
redeemed humanity, but only by abolishing their role as sexual persons and mothers" 
(Radford Ruether 1981:49).  
  
These Christologies try to combine male and female in different ways. Some, such as 
Jacob Boehme, is androcentric. Male and female are two opposites brought together in a 
male-centered concept of the self. The tradition of Julian of Norwich declares Jesus as 
both male and female and since the tradition was established in mediaeval thought, the 
female qualities are taken into the male. The sectarian movement of Joachim of Fiore 
presents the most radical position of these Christologies. They believed that the Second 
Age of the Son, represented by the clerics, would be superceded by the a Third Age of 
the Spirit, which would bring redemption to perfection (Radford Ruether 1981:50).    
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The idea of the Joachimites took root in the eighteenth century in sects such the Shakers 
who took the idea even further. The founder of the Shakers, Mother Ann Lee, planted the 
seed for the need of a female form of the messiah. This idea took root in the nineteenth 
century groups such as the French utopian socialists, the St Simonians, the New England 
Transcendentalists and the Church of Christian Science (Rdford Ruether 1981:51-52). 
 
These Christologies represents a development of the inadequacies of the masculine 
Christ, to the importance of both and female, to the female as the redemptive half that 
represents the messiah that will transform the male world. This development has made 
important contributions to the woman's movement and the two paradigms of Radford 
Ruether. 
 
The prophetic iconoclastic Christ 
The liberation Christologies have been used by Radford Ruether in her later writings 
(Women and Redemption: A theological History, 1998, Introducing redemption in 
Christian Feminism 1998, Gender, Ethnicity, and Religion, 2002) and have occupied her 
the most. These Christologies are evident in her ecclesiologies and interpretations of the 
sacraments. 
 
Rooted in the nineteenth century movements of socialism Radford Ruether makes the 
connection between the gospel and the Left. The religious status and dominance of the 
pre-nineteenth century period is critiqued and the religious elite is challenged. "The 
gospel drama is one of prolonged conflict between Christ and those religious authorities 
who gain their social status from systems of ritualized righteousness. Jesus proclaims an 
iconoclastic reversal of this system of religious status" (Radford Ruether 1981:53). The 
reversal of the system is not to restore but to replace the existing system by Jesus opting 
for the poor and oppressed of the present system. The poor for Radford Ruether are 
women and therefore women become the focus in the system.      
 
Radford Ruether does not only use this view of Christology in the later work of 
ecclessiology and the sacraments, but she also points out the limitations of the Gnostic 
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and romantic traditions. "These Gnostic and romantic traditions abstract the human 
person as male and female into a dualism of opposite principles, masculinity and 
femininity. They give different valuations to each side and then try to set up a scheme to 
unite the two in a new whole. This sets up an insoluble problem for human personhood 
until these qualities labeled masculine and feminine are seen as the product of social 
power relations rather than 'nature'. 'Woman-as-body-sensuality' and 'woman-as-pure-
altruistic-love' are both abstractions of human potential created when one group of people 
in power is able to define other groups of people over against themselves. To abstract 
these definitions into eternal essences into miss the social context in which these 
definition arise" (Radford Ruether 1981:55). 
 
The prophetic iconoclastic Christ reversed the social human hierarchical system of the 
New Testament world. Christ puts the women at the center of the gospel for liberation 
and embodies the qualities of service and mutual empowerment. This Christologies 
liberate females from the categorising of humanity into oppressor and oppressed. Both 
male and female is now part of the new humanity that is described in terms that is non-
discriminating, rather it sets the whole of humanity free. 
 
i. Trinity 
The Trinity (Father, Son and Holy Ghost) is a doctrinal formulation for the Christian 
faith. It is an attempt to distinguish between orthodoxy and false belief. Yet, the Trinity is 
viewed by feminists as hierarchical. It is formed in traditional language that excludes and 
separates male and female, masculine and feminine. Although feminists disagree about 
the relevance of traditional language for the Trinity, all agree that the Trinity is relational 
and so new models and symbols are appropriate for expressing the Christian faith. 
 
Radford Ruether claims that, "Traditional theological images of God as father have been 
the sanctification of sexism and hierarchicalism precisely by defining this relationship of 
God as father to humanity in a domination-subordination model and by allowing ruling-
class males to identify themselves with this divine fatherhood in such a way as to 
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establish themselves in the same kind of hierarchical relationship to women and lower 
classes" (Radford Ruether 1975:65).  
 
Amongst the lower classes is the ecology, which has become a major concern across all 
sciences. Radford Ruether recognises that the ecological crisis has a theological basis. 
This she claims has to do the hierarchical model of certain theologies. She claims that, "It 
has been recognized that this ecological crisis which has caught up with Western 
civilization has a theological basis. Specifically it is said that the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition favored a theory of sub-ordination of nature and 'man's domination over it. 'Be 
fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of 
the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves on the face of 
the earth' (Gen.1:28). This the biblical command" (Radford Ruether 1981:59) 
 
Sallie McFague argues intelligibly that God as “Mother”, “Lover” and “Friend” is a 
relevant Trinitarian formulation for an ecological, nuclear age. God as “Mother, she 
argues, present to the whole creation justice based on a just order in which necessities are 
shared and full humanity strive for. At the heart of an ethic of justice implicit in God – 
the mother is a just social, political and economically orders, for both humans and non-
humans. The old model of “Father” is developed in patriarchal context and language that 
is mainly andro-centric. The model of “Mother” on the other hand assumes an inclusive 
view of justice. McFague observes,  
 
In most liberation theologies, the justice issue has not been joined with the 
ecological and nuclear age issue but has been dealt with largely as a human, 
historical, economical problem. Therefore Marxism has seemed adequate for 
analysing the situation and, with ancillary insights from the Christian tradition, for 
dealing with it. But one considers the justice issues in an ecological, nuclear 
context, there is no way to separate history from nature in the same way, and 
though one can rightly speak of liberation from oppressive structures, one must 
also speak of caring for the world that provides all the necessities that we would 
distribute justly (McFague 1987:257). 
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 McFague furthermore observes that whereas the traditional “Father” judges the guilty and 
punishes, the model of “Mother” neither condemns nor rescues the guilty, but the goal is 
just the ordering of the whole cosmos for the benefit of all. This ethic becomes tangible 
in our age when we care for the whole of creation. In Models for God: Theology for an 
Ecological Nuclear Age, McFague provides a discussion on an ethic of care (McFague 
1987:12-13). 
 
The second model in the relational God is God as “Lover”. Whereas the traditional 
formulation of the Trinity uses the Son or the story of Jesus of Nazareth (his teachings, 
death and resurrection) as the revelation of God’s love, this formulation uses God as 
“Lover”.  This model is consistent with feminism theology’s critique of the dualistic and 
individualistic nature of the patriarchal models for God. If the model “Lover” is used in 
the context of the world as God’s body, God is the “Lover”, and the loved is the world. 
God is then viewed as loving all creatures, body and spirit, here and now. And in turn we 
love God collectively as we love the world as God’s body, attractive, valuable and 
precious (McFague 1987:125-129). 
 
The ethics of such a model is that of healing. The characteristics of healing are numerous 
because healing is based on the physical and by extension the spiritual. It is holistic and 
has its roots in life and death. Like the emphasis of other models in liberation theology 
the basics for the human to survive is important. Related to the concern for the body is 
the rejection of the overemphasis of the andro-centrism of traditional Christian theories of 
redemption in favour of redemption for the whole creation. As we are body and spirit, 
non-humans are spirit and body. The second characteristic of healing is its appropriation 
for salvation in an ecological, evolutionary context. Healing in this context means 
redressing the imbalances that occurred because of the human desire to reject the whole. 
Healing for the body (not only our physical body) means acceptance of limits, sharing 
basic necessities and restoring order. A third characteristic is the emphasis of resisting 
disease, disorder and chaos and identification with the sufferers in their pain (McFague 
1987:147-150). 
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 God as “Friend” 
The three characteristics of this model are that of bonding occurs in a free relationship, an 
inclusive element is implied and interdependence becomes imperative. The bonding 
results in freedom to trust and formation of community instead of the individualistic 
nature of traditional models. The inclusive element lies in a common commitment that 
goes beyond two entities. Because the friendship is one of free choice, gender, race, age, 
class or creed does not play a determinative role. Because mutuality and reciprocity is 
imperative to friendship, it implies that each entity has a responsibility for the wellbeing 
of the “other” (McFague 1987:159-167). 
 
The ethic of God as “Friend” is companionship 
The “Eucharistic Feast” or “shared meal” as it developed in the Early Church and until 
the present day best illustrates this ethic. The “shared meal” is characterised by 
inclusively and non-hierarchy. Sallie McFague suggests that; “This is a specific vision of 
salvation, the characteristic notes of which suggest that an appropriate way to speak of 
those united by this vision is as a ‘community of friends’ or, more precisely a ‘fellowship 
of the friends of Jesus’. Such a community is obviously modeled not on the elitist, 
separatist view of friendship, as suggested by the church as the ‘communion of saints’, 
but on the solidarity view, as epitomised in Jesus “table fellowship” (McFague 
1987:175). To be part of this ‘shared meal’ and ‘friends of Jesus’ means to choose freely 
to love and be responsible to the whole of creation. This common vision means to have 
the world and not individuals as the focus of divine love. 
 
Companionship is effective in two ways. Firstly it is an alternative model to the intrinsic 
feeling of fear for the “other”. Exclusivity, hierarchy and dominance are a result of 
xenophobia, fear for the “other”. Which in this case is fear for women and their 
invaluable contribution to the spreading of the Christian Gospel. Companionship regards 
the other not so much as a cause for fear, rather as a cause for opportunity. The fear for 
the “other” is precisely the problem that needs to be overcome. In the “shared meal” 
differences become opportunities for growth and love instead of viewing the “other” as 
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the enemy. What is otherwise the enemy is now only a stranger. Participation in the 
“shared meal” at least helps all participants come to terms with their differences and 
creates new opportunities that will not be achieved by exclusion. 
 
The second way in which companionship is effective is complimentary to the reduction 
of fear for the other. A new kind of community is formed which is based on care for the 
“other”. Care for others involves advocacy and partnership, warmth and attachment, and 
foster justice between all humans and non-humans. Care for other is also both private and 
public.      
 
3. Evaluation 
Rosemary Radford Ruether's approach to moral formation is significant because she 
moves between two feminist paradigms. She points out the contributions that the liberal 
paradigm made to moral formation and how the social constructionist paradigm 
contributes through its critical reflection.  
 
The liberal paradigm points out that the individual, universal principles and reason help 
with a free and equal humanity. Women are liberated from the oppression of a male 
dominated society and become free individuals with equal abilities and rights. Individual 
freedom and equal rights are expressed in the church through the ordination of woman 
and authority. 
 
The movements for the ordination of women and the critical reflection of the authority of 
those in church structures are a direct result of the liberal paradigm. These two, 
ordination and authority, has contributed greatly to the use of different symbols in 
worship. It helped with the retelling and representing of the Christian story through the 
Eucharist in particular. It also contributed to the formation of a different form of 
community and ordering of such community. Through the ordination of women and the 
re-interpreting of authority in the official church the community uses a broader spectrum 
of symbols and is subsequently formed in moral persons.   
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These symbols and interpretations of authority form the reasoning of the worshippers. It 
also provides a new framework in which the individual becomes free. This individual 
freedom is seen in the community of the worshippers.   
 
The second paradigm, social construction, is significant in its interpretation of language, 
ministry, biblical interpretation, doctrine, trinity and Christologies. Radford Ruether's 
criticism of the liberal paradigm led her to an appreciation of the social constructionist 
paradigm. She claims that the inadequacies of the liberal paradigm are dealt with in this 
paradigm. The role of structure, community, worship and symbols is important in moral 
formation.  
     
These four, structure, community, worship and symbols form an integral part of Radford 
Ruether's paradigm. If taken together it makes an effective paradigm for moral formation. 
Worship takes on a prominent place in the liberal paradigm and the social constructionist 
paradigm of Ruether. Community replaces the individualistic nature of the liberal 
paradigm and structure becomes important in her later writings. Symbols are dealt with in 
the interpretation of trinity, Christology and ministry. 
 
Symbols are prominent because the social constructionist paradigm is effective for moral 
formation when formation is done through socialization and to a lesser extend through 
reason. The replacement of former exclusive symbols and new symbols born out of the 
experiences of women takes effect through the discovery of its deeper meaning. The 
symbol of father is the most criticised and is replaced by symbols more identifiable by 
women. Radford Ruether's ecclesiology, doctrine, worships and ministry tends to replace 
this symbol with others that is more inclusive.     
 
Notwithstanding the contributions that these paradigms make in moral formation, the 
narrative that Radford Ruether uses is selective. She uses the experiences of women and 
constructs a narrative that is exclusive. The narrative for moral formation is about the 
birth, ministry, death and resurrection for Jesus Christ. Any attempt to interpret this story 
must be done from an inclusive perspective. 
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 If the narrative is selective then the community is selective. Although Radford Ruether 
puts forward a narrative for the emancipation of humanity, the community for such 
emancipation is women.  
 
A major problem with Radford Ruether's approach for moral formation is her failure to 
complement the two paradigms (liberal and social constructionist). Radford Ruether's 
writings suggest a progression from the liberal paradigm to the social constructionist 
paradigm. In doing so she abandons the principles of the former. Her shift comes as a 
result of her criticisms of the one towards the other. 
 
Instead of interplay between the two paradigms Radford Ruether align herself with the 
social constructionist in her later writings. The result of the shift is the neglect of the idea 
that Feminist theology has its origins in Feminism and consequently that the selective 
narrative used by feminist theologians has its birth in the experience of women in the 
secular world as well as the religious establishment. 
 
Radford Ruether, like Everett, makes valuable contributions to the subject of inquiry. She 
demonstrates how changes in The Christian story bring changes in moral formation. She 
also uses the three important components of narrative, community and symbols. The 
problem lies with the way she uses these components. She does so inconsistently as a 
result of her move away from the liberal paradigm to the social constructionist paradigm. 
She criticises the individualistic nature of the liberal paradigm in favor of the more 
communitarian nature of the social constructionist one.      
 
This shift resulted in inconsistency of her approach for moral formation. She is selective 
in her use of story as well as her community where moral formation takes place. Geoffrey 
Wainwright attempts to bring the two stories together for moral formation in his use of 
The Eucharist. It is to this approach that we will turn now. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Geoffrey Wainwright: Ecumenical worship and Moral formation 
Introduction 
This is an attempt to investigate an ecumenical approach to our subject of inquiry. 
Geoffrey Wainwright presents an ecumenical in his important book Doxology: A 
Systematic theology, the worship of God in Worship, Doctrine and Life. .18 Wainwright 
draws from different traditions and shows how moral formation is done through the 
Christian story. He uses the sacrament of The Eucharist in particular to illustrate how 
moral formation comes about through the re-telling of the Christian story. He also shows 
how changes in the society influence the Christian story so that the Public story plays an 
ever increasing role in moral formation. 
 
This process is well demonstrated by the way Wainwright uses the interaction of worship, 
doctrine and life. He is the only theologian of those discussed who gives a major role to 
doctrine in moral formation. His use of doctrine, however, is not to draw barriers between 
the various traditions. Instead he uses it in such way that the interplay between worship, 
doctrine and life points out the way in which the Christian story is both the agent of 
formation as well as the recipient of influences from secular society. 
 
This chapter seeks to set out his controlling principle, worship, doctrine and life. I will 
conclude the chapter with a discussion of the contributions such an approach (worship, 
doctrine and life) has for the relationship between The Christian story and The Public 
story for moral formation.   
 
In this book Wainwright attempts to present a systematic analysis of the relationship 
between worship, doctrine and life. Worship is clearly the locus for doctrine and life, 
although a movement exists from doctrine to worship and life to worship. All three 
overlap but worship seems to be the symbolic focus for all our service of God. In 
                                                          
18 Geoffrey Wainwright, Doxology: A Systematic Theology, The worship of God in Worship, Doctrine and 
Life, Epworth Press, London, 1980. 
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summarising the first half of the book which deals with the verbal confession of the faith 
towards God Wainwright says,  
 
We can serve God because he first serves us. Understood first as God’s service to 
us, the liturgy becomes a locus in which God’s gracious self-giving promotes the 
interiorization of our faith, the articulation of our devotion, and the strengthening 
of our will for action (Wainwright 1980:219). 
  
The book is concluded in a similar manner, but this time the strands are brought closer 
together as Wainwright explains Christian ethical witness by means of worship, doctrine 
and life. 
 
Definition of worship, doctrine and life 
Worship is the point at which the whole Christian life comes to ritual focus. Ritual is to 
be seen from a descriptive sense of pattern of behaviour with symbolic significance and 
efficacy. Liturgy is used in the same sense as the function of worship into which the 
people bring their entire existence to praise and from which they depart with renewed 
vision of the values of the Kingdom of God, with the intention to glorify God in their 
whole life more effectively. 
 
Doctrine is used in a broad sense and sometimes faith, doctrine and theology are used 
inter-changeably.  If they are used in a specific sense then faith refers to the most 
fundamental and immediate belief, whether substance or the act. Doctrine or dogma 
refers to official formulations of faith. Theology is individual reflection on faith and 
doctrine from an intellectual perspective. These three overlap and make it possible for 
doctrine to be used in a comprehensive sense. Doctrine draws from worship. Worship is 
the focus for receiving and transmitting the vision, which is formulated and reflected. 
Doctrine also draws on and contributes to dealings between God and humanity.     
 
Life has a strong ethical component. Christian worship, doctrine and life is conjoined in a 
common “upwards and forwards” direction towards God and the achievement of God’s 
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purpose, including human salvation. The intention is praise. God’s glory is that he is 
present and within worship to enable our transformation into his likeness, participating in 
himself and his Kingdom. 
 
After a brief description of the implied epistemology and the structure of the book I will 
discuss one aspect of each of the three main parts of the book in conjunction with 
worship, doctrine and life.   
 
Implied epistemology 
A historical community (Christian church) can transmit a vision of reality, which helps in 
the interpretation of life and of the world. In one sense this is easy to explain, as many 
people will testify that the Christian vision has determined their deepest understanding of 
things. But in another sense it faces the challenges that natural sciences pose about 
statements that claim to be about reality but which are not subject to instrumental 
measurement. Religion is faced with this challenge as it refers to a transcendent 
dimension and asserts the ultimate of the values, which it claims to be grounded in the 
transcendent. As to Transcendence, the living experience of worship is evidence of the 
grounding of created reality in a creative reality. As with regard to the ultimate of values, 
the Christian vision includes a teleological tendency of reality towards “the Kingdom of 
God”. Christian values will be established as what is most ideal. Meanwhile the Christian 
must be challenged for indications that reality is in fact being transformed in this 
direction.   
 
The vision is set within Christian community 
The Christian community has a long history, and the existence is in varied forms. 
However, the Christian community is situated in human community. The theologian is set 
in both, and this communal location may be seen in respect of worship, doctrine and life. 
The Christian community transmits the vision that the theologian has seen and is 
committed to spread. In worship the vision comes to a sharp focus, a concentrated 
expression. The specific task of the theologian lies in doctrine. He examines liturgy from 
that angle, to learn and to contribute to the worshipping community, using both Christian 
 94 
language and secular language. The vision is tested in life to change the world of 
humanity.  
 
Structure of the book 
The book is arranged in three parts. Each part consists of four chapters. The first part, 
substantial matters, refers to the Christian vision as received at the time and place 
within the historic Christian community. The substance of Christianity is in its 
inheritance from the past and description of that accumulated inheritance, but it does not 
give much theoretical consideration to the means by which the vision has been 
transmitted. The substance of the Christian vision is described in accordance with the 
classical creeds: God the creator, Jesus Christ, The Holy Spirit, Church, and the last 
things. 
 
The topic in this first chapter of the first part is about the relationship intended 
between humanity and God. The divine purpose (image of God) of humanity is 
fundamental to the whole Christian vision. The second chapter focuses on Jesus who is 
the embodiment of the relationship and the purpose, summarised in the notion “image of 
God”. Jesus is the focus of worship, the mediator and pattern. In the third chapter the 
Spirit is discussed as the divine enabler of worship, the divine work of transformation 
necessary for humans if they want to enter into God’s purpose. The communal character 
of humanity in God’s purpose is discussed in the chapter on church (chapter four). 
Christian worship gives ritual expression to the eschatological tension, which marks the 
church on the way to achieving God’s purpose. This first part (is the first four chapters of 
the book) governed by the scriptural and traditional understanding of Christian worship. 
The church’s worship is through Christ in the Spirit. 
 
The second part of the book turns to the traditional means by which the vision is 
transmitted through time. The fifth chapter of the book describes the Bible as the 
primary document to be interpreted in the context of worship. The next chapter presents 
the creeds as summary confessions of faith and the hermeneutical key through which 
believers interpret their religious stance, witness of scripture and the church. The two 
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remaining chapters of this section deal with the dialectical relationship between scripture 
and the continuing tradition of the church. As a matter of history the Catholic position is 
that worship leads to doctrine and the Protestant position is that doctrine that is scriptural, 
leads to worship and dogma.  
 
The third part of the book surveys the questions posed by the church and human 
contexts in which the vision is to be expressed. The four chapters of this part 
correspond to the four notes of the creed: unity, holiness, catholicity and apostolicity. The 
Christian worship is seen to be the context, which attains and expresses unity in doctrine 
and life. Liturgical vision is seen as an attempt to return to the original vision through an 
intimate relationship between God and the world. Worship is also seen to be the context 
for the various views on culture throughout history. In worship the limitations, strengths, 
variety and unity of culture is given a place in God’s purpose for culture. The twelfth 
chapter deals with ethical and doctrinal incidences of worship. Liturgy has a missionary 
role to play in transforming the world. 
 
First Part 
Substantial Matters 
The issue to be discussed in this part is God in terms of “image of God”: The biblical and 
traditional view of humanity made in the image of God is expressed in a relationship. 
This relationship is not symmetrical but of Creator and creature. Outside this relationship 
humanity will cease to exist, while God transcends the relationship. This relationship, 
between Creator and creature, is the relationship of worship. In so far as faith is adequate 
to its object (God), God will be revealed (Wainwright 1980:16). 
 
In biblical exegesis and traditional hermeneutics there are three main forms for 
understanding humanity being made in the image of God. These are interwoven into 
Christian worship. a. Communion with God. God made humanity sufficiently like 
himself for humanity to have communion with him. Iraneus made a valuable doctrinal 
distinction between image and likeness. Image expresses the ontological or structural 
communion between God and humanity, while likeness refers to the moral similarity that 
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humanity could obtain as it lives in communion with God. The communion of God and 
humanity includes the initial and fundamental capacity, the aided progress in time, and 
the final and ethical realisation. 
 
The eschatological goal of humanity’s vocation is in glorifying God. Glory in biblical and 
liturgical vocabulary is a loaded word19. It describes God’s character and reputation. On 
earth it is the sign of God being active and as humanity changes into his likeness he is 
glorified. God will be glorified when humanity is finally transformed in the final 
resurrection. The transformation of human character to God’s character is experienced as 
the enjoyment of God. Humanity feeds from God. 
 
It is in their life as a whole (inward and outward, inner awareness and active presence in 
the world) that humanity has the God-given capacity for communion with the Creator. It 
is the Word that links the two. The Greek word “logos” expresses being and engaging the 
person. A brief examination of the use of language in worship will help us understand the 
communion. Three examples illustrate this. The first example is universe of discourse: 
the shared world beliefs, ideas and experiences that enable words and phrases to convey 
intended meaning. Christian worshippers share common history and purpose (against 
sin). By divine grace human words become the vehicle between God and humanity. 
Through the scripture and with the aid of the preacher, the voice of God is heard in the 
present life. Through prayer the people’s voice is directed towards God. The language of 
worship brings to expression this shared world set up by God. 
 
The second example lies in language game. It is not scientific description, social 
language or theological discourse, but through the community’s conversation with God as 
Creator and creature. This game has its ontological rules. It includes technical “moves” of 
which its efficacy has been proved in past play and the present delight lie in the growing 
communion between God and humanity. The third example coincides with “dabar” in 
Hebrew. Gestures, actions and the use of natural and cultural objects express being and 
                                                          
19 For further discussion see Wainwright, G Eucharist and Eschatology, Epworth Press, London, 1978. 
Pp102-104. 
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engage the person. They serve as communicative signs. Rituals and sacraments for 
example are accompanied by verbal interpretation (Wainwright 1980:19-20).  
 
The communion with God is the primary locus of religious language. Theological 
language is secondary. Language of worship mediates the substance and without it 
theological talk does not exists. This secondary locus is important for sharing the primary 
experience and is therefore doxological. 
 
b. The earthly task 
The second strand of humanity in the image of God is explained by humanity’s 
relationship with the rest of creation. Moving away from the implication of the first 
creation story (humanity’s dominion over creation), theologians now use the second 
creation story, which implies that humanity must till the earth (Gen.2: 15). The rest of 
creation becomes the scene and instrument of humanity’s growth into communion with 
God. As the instrument, God’s creation is good and is received with thanksgiving. It 
conveys divine blessing and allows people to respond with thanksgiving. As the scene 
creation becomes the new heaven and new earth. 
 
In the sacraments, the material creation becomes the means by which God conveys our 
natural life and life of salvation in his Kingdom. The proper response of humanity is with 
thanksgiving. When humanity till the earth as divine, they perform a function on behalf 
of God, when they give thanks to God, they perform the priestly function on behalf of 
creation. 
 
Work becomes prayer in worship and in the same way prayer should inform our daily 
work. The saying “to work is to pray” is of equal significance as “to pray is to work”. 
This comes together in the context of worship. Successful work results in a product. 
Through work, humanity helps share the Kingdom and is shaped into the persons God 
wants them to be, in his likeness. 
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Just as work is a model for the relationship between God and creation in the 
accomplishment of its destiny, so is rest. Wainwright explains the dialectic between work 
and rest by means of play. Closely related to play is the artistic creativity as a participant 
in the creative activity of God. Vestments, stained glass and sacred pictures are important 
in worship. Ascesis as a link to worship is another expression of the relationship between 
God and creation. The body is the means of work, but in a Christian sense it is not above 
human existence. The body and creation have spiritual value by which the human beings 
may grow into communion with God, e.g. fasting and prayer must go together 
(Wainwright 1980:27-29).  
 
c. Social being 
Humanity created in the image of God is social. This is expressed through love between 
humanity and can be related to worship in: (1) Baptism whereby new brothers and sisters 
are acquired forms the basis for that love. (2) Love feast or Agape in which all is invited 
to the meal, including the poor. (3) Peace in Eucharist: in cultural appropriate forms 
among the whole congregation. (4) Communion itself: when the meal characteristic of 
the communion is kept, the Eucharist has a better chance of serving as a paradigm for 
social ethics in Christian community and the relation between the Christian community 
and natural and human resources. 
 
So far the emphasis has been on the similarity between God and humanity in, the call to 
communion, the task of humanity to administer the earth and to imitate the loving Father. 
Now we shall look at the distinction between God and humanity. God transcends creation 
but God reveals himself in precise and personal ways by grace, despite him being 
invisible. God wishes to share his glory.  The firstborn Son and last Adam. Jesus is the 
token of the true and saving destiny in communion with God. Taking the two natures of 
Jesus, the divine is the image of the invisible God and the human the eschatological 
Adam. An example of image Christology is found in the icon, which occupies a place in 
worship of the Orthodox Church. The icon is in Ninian Smart’s phrase a 
“phenomenological focus”20. People bow, kiss, and light candles in adoration. As a 
                                                          
20 Smart, N, The concept of worship, Macmillan, London, 1972, Pp6-10. 
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“nominal focus” of worship, the icon represents Christ in such a way that he is present. 
On a third level, as Christ is the image of God, God is present. This process of the icon, 
Christ and God leads from Christology to soteriology. Worshippers are transformed in 
the likeness of God. 2Cor.3.18 and Col.3: 10 are biblical examples. The Stations of the 
Cross in worship is ritual recognising humanity following Christ as a means of self-
surrender (Wainwright 1980:15-25). 
 
Second Part 
The issue in the second part of the book to be discussed is Lex Orandi, Lex Credendi. 
After a brief description of the historical development of the debate on Lex Orandi and 
Lex Credendi, and an account of the early usage of the term, Wainwright discusses four 
questions of importance.  
 
a. What gives the church’s worship any authority to carry matters of doctrine? The way 
in which the Orthodox and Lutheran view worship suggests that God is the ultimate 
authority in matters of doctrine. Worship is initiated by God’s act in Christ through the 
Spirit (Orthodox).  Worship is God’s service to humanity before it is the service of 
humanity to God (Lutheran). Because the service is the place where God is made known 
to humanity, humanity’s response is a vehicle of his self-communication. Worship shapes 
doctrine. This needs further qualification especially in light of the varying liturgies. Three 
independent tests are possible. Firstly, that of origins. Liturgies take its origins from Jesus 
and his mission of the Kingdom, the historical origination of the post-Easter church, The 
New Testament writings and its interpretation for the early church and succeeding 
generations. Secondly the universality of the liturgical elements. The greater the 
universality, the greater the influence will be. Even institutions where certain liturgical 
practices are abandoned (infant baptism) will influence doctrine (or doctrinal issues). 
Those individuals who abandon baptism weakens Augustine’s prove for his doctrine of 
original sin or in a positive sense the practise of baptism on profession of faith calls 
attention to the place of repentance, faith and personal commitment to God’s communion 
with humanity. Thirdly, the holiness of life or ethical component of holiness derived from 
liturgy. Although more than one type of relationship between liturgy and ethics exists, a 
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liturgical practise which relate to holiness of life (ethics) makes a loaded claim as a 
source for doctrine. Any link between liturgy and immoral behaviour, decision-making or 
character would disqualify the liturgy as a source of doctrine. 
 
b. What is the relationship between the doctrinal authority carried by worship and other 
instances of doctrinal authority in the church? The relation of the scripture to worship is 
such that scripture as the best witness to Jesus Christ as person and his mission is 
interpreted in the context of the worship of the church. The texts themselves are 
doxologically shaped and in this reciprocal process supply a norm for liturgy and 
doctrine. 
 
With regard to the relation between magisterium and worship, the former becomes the 
“middle service” of scripture or worship and doctrine. The task of the magisterium is to 
put cultural changes and the evaluating and translating of worship into doctrine. Because 
the magisterium is part of the worshipping community, the members can only exercise 
this authority according to what the nature of things and liturgical norms require of them. 
 
c. What is the role of worship in relation to the development of doctrine?  It influences 
doctrine. For example the threefold pattern of baptism contribute to the shaping of the 
doctrine of The Trinity. But magisterium influence has been brought to bear on the 
liturgy in order to establish a developing or developed doctrine. The reverse question is 
whether liturgy or magisterium can undo a developing doctrine. 
 
d. Is the worship practise of the church equally authoritative throughout? Doctrinal 
conclusions derived from worship must be open for revision because any particular 
feature of worship in terms of the complex of influences can only be approximate 
(Wainwright 1980:242-250). 
 
Lex Credendi: Wainwright deals with Lex Credendi in very much the same way as with 
Lex Orandi. After a historical analysis, he uses Bonhoeffer, Prenter and McIntyre’s 
Christologies to prove that dogma influence worship. Apart from the fact that dogma, 
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expressed in creeds, is a central part of worship and belief, it also influences the 
experience of God revealed in Christ as a person. As Christ is present in worship, we can 
enquire of him. By understanding Christ’s presence (through doctrinal formulations), we 
understand him as a person. 
 
Wainwright illustrates the principle of Lex Orandi, Lex Credendi (a principle central to 
his discussion on worship, doctrine and life) by showing how the deep structures of the 
church’s worship may yield to the dogmatic content of eschatological beliefs 
(Wainwright 1989:366-368). 
 
In the St. Basil’s treatise “On the Holy Spirit” thanks and prayers are addressed in the 
Holy Spirit through Christ to God the Father. This corresponds to the fact that God’s love 
reaches us through Christ in the Holy Spirit. This kind of exchange of love between God 
and worshippers according to the Trinitarian formulation introduces the worshippers to a 
communion with God. 
 
Worship and the Eucharist in particular are where this communion takes place. The 
Eucharist is also about the “not yet” and participation of the worshippers in the kingdom 
(or feast as it is described). The Eucharist viewed from this perspective has the following 
significance: ecclesiologically it enacts the communion of the saints, the departed is 
commemorated and new friendships are anticipated; the early church learnt its perfection 
in community and finally life is lived in witness in preparation of “the end”.  
With regard to Lex Orandi and Lex Credendi, Wainwright concludes that there is room 
left for error in both liturgical and theological formulations (Wainwright 1980:282-283).                    
          
Third Part 
The issue in this part of the book to be discussed is ethics. In this section we find the 
climax of our inquiry in terms of with the relationship between the Public and the 
Christian story for moral formation. The values and vision as celebrated in worship do 
not always correspond with the character, decision-making, reason, principles and 
conduct of the worshippers. This is the result of a gap that has developed between the two 
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because of changes caused by various variables. Wainwright suggests that the gap is 
never too big to separate the secular and sacred completely, for the Christian community 
can never outgrow the value of love, as this is so integral to the character and vision of 
God and subsequently indispensable for humanity’s advancement into God’s image. The 
gap is not because of a result in the Christian’s advancement beyond ideals as celebrated 
in liturgy and scripture, but in the practical ethical failures. Such shortfall raises the 
question of the sincerity (presupposition of ethics) and effectiveness of worship (ethical 
consequences). 
 
Sincerity 
The problem of sincerity and effectiveness is interrelated. Using the Old Testament ritual 
of sacrifice, Wainwright suggests that God rejected any sacrifice (ritual) if it is not 
accompanied with (love). The kiss of peace as part of the Eucharist is a good 
demonstration of the sacrifice (ritual) being accompanied by the worshipper’s spirit 
(intention). 
 
Effectiveness 
This does not depend on the worthiness of the minister or the autonomous effort of the 
recipient but an active engagement on the part of the worshipper. As far as the worship 
fail to bear fruit in the worshipper, the worshipper’s failure to engage in an encounter 
with God is to blame. For example that in baptism we die with Christ, the old is 
destroyed and the new is taken on. 
 
Liturgy and ethics from the point of Sacred and Secular. Wainwright rejects the idea 
that the Christian life is already one of eschatological existence. He maintains that a 
difference between sacred and secular exists because the divine is only to be realised in 
heaven and the final Kingdom. He explains this by “eschatological reserve, 
eschatological hope and eschatological gift”21. 
 
                                                          
21 See Wainwright, G, Eucharist and Eschatology. Epworth press: London, 1978 and Wainwright, G, 
Doxology: A systematic theology: Worship, doctrine and life, 1980, Pp.405-406.  
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Eschatological reserve 
Humanity is still on its way to the Kingdom. As long as this world exists, filled with sin, 
distorted in character and inappropriate conduct, behaviour needs adjustment, as the total 
vision of God is not yet captured. We need worship to capture vision, re-adjust behaviour 
and to make appropriate moral decisions. The liturgy (supplying symbols to test the 
vision and behaviour) is sacred compared to the things “outside the temple” as well as in 
anticipation of the “age to come”. The distinction between sacred and secular is necessary 
because “in this world” some things can be brought “into the temple” to be transformed 
through for example confession of sin. The eschatological hope is for the dissolution of 
the distinction between sacred and secular. Then there will be no “temple” or “this 
world” because “this world” will be God’s Kingdom. Sacraments will cease because their 
anticipatory character will give way for the fulfillment of the Kingdom of God. Worship 
is the gift and opportunity for new life in anticipation of the final Kingdom. On 
acceptance of the gift, the worshipper is transformed and grows into the image of God. 
Absolute separation between sacred and secular is impossible. The sacraments as rites 
serve as a paradigm for appropriate human conduct and character for a divine God. 
 
Distorted relations between Sacred and Secular 
Three examples are mentioned with regard to the sacred. Firstly, in ideological 
sacralisation from the perspective of speculative theory the transformation model of 
Trans-substantiation assumes the goal of transubstantiation to reduce the reality of 
creature. The second example comes from comparative ecclessiology. Not only Orthodox 
churches, but others as well, use the notion of sacredness to escape their political 
responsibility in this world. Thirdly, the sociological structure of the church undermines 
the value of the work of lay Christians. 
 
The same three examples apply to ideological secularisation. In the first instance, the rise 
of Protestantism with the emphasis on calling has resulted in the impoverishment of 
ritual. Secondly, political activism can lead to the abandonment of the two dimensions of 
Kingdom: grace and ultimacy. Without the help of God, any freedom in this world and 
any achievement will come to an end or be of no significance compared to what the 
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liturgy celebrates. Finally, the relative autonomy of created order should not claim 
absolute autonomy less it leads to atheism. 
 
Liturgy as the symbolic focus for all our service of God 
This is a two-way movement, from liturgy to life and from life to liturgy. The 
worship/liturgy helps us find our center of gravity and nature in God. Christ’s saving 
work is seen in the world and the sacraments in worship sharpen the vision of the divine 
presence in the world. The movement from morality to prayer, especially in the age of 
secularisation, is an advantage. In an age of secularism the starting point should be the 
concrete situation of human relationships, where moral existence is the mutual obligation 
to recognise, relate, and respond to the other person as also an inviolable and creative 
center of knowing, loving, deciding and acting. From a Christian perspective human 
otherness derives from the ultimate we call God. Moral response to the other should 
expand into worship (prayer), lest we fall prey to adulterous humanism. Moving from 
concrete human relationships to prayer helps us treat the other as being made in the 
image of God. 
 
Wainwright demonstrates this two-way movement by using a specific ritual 
(Eucharist) 
He gives this article an interesting heading “Eucharist and/as Ethics”22. Using a play with 
words he shows the danger of using Eucharist as Ethics or Ethics as Eucharist. In order to 
avoid the threat of confusing the two (Eucharist and Ethics and Eucharist as Ethics) to the 
advantage of the one to the other Wainwright sets out to discuss this movement as a two-
way process. 
 
The first part of the discussion is “Eucharist as Ethics, Ethics as Eucharist”. The 
Christological foundation for Eucharist as Ethics is found in John 4:32-34 (Jesus says: 
“my meat is to do the will of him who sent me, and to accomplish his work”). Partaking 
in the Eucharist is to do the works of God. 
                                                          
22 This article is an address delivered before a largely Lutheran audience at Valparaiso University. In 
Worship, 62 No2, March 1988. This was later published in Liturgy Vol. 201, No 216. 
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 Emphasis is put on the Lutheran point of view of the worship as the creature’s primary 
obligation towards the Creator. Idolatry is then identified with covetousness: worship of 
the creature is ultimately the worship of the self, the heart turned in upon the self. 
Worship of the Creator is the first and last conviction of appropriate human being: 
“Man’s chief end is to glorify God, and enjoy him forever" (Westminster shorter 
catechism). 
 
In the “sacrifice of the praise” as the Eucharist was to become known, the emphasis is not 
so much on praise as it is on the offering of the self in Christ. St. John Chrysostom writes 
the following: “God does not need anything of ours, but we stand in need of all things 
from God. The thanksgiving itself adds nothing to God, but it brings us closer to God”23. 
Worship is doing the will of God. 
 
Ethics as Eucharist 
“Sacrifices and offering thou has not desired… I have come to do the will of God” 
(Hebrews 10:5-10). “Our incorporation into Christ takes us up into prayer and self-
offering of Jesus, so that our words and acts are lifted before God. Since that happens 
solely by the grace of God, our ethics can only be Eucharistic”24. 
 
Eucharist is at the heart of ethics. Christian behaviour is set in a liturgical context and 
interpreted in liturgical terms. “To do good and to distribute, forget not, for with such 
sacrifices God is pleased” (Hebrews 13:16). This point is taken up in Cranmer’s Book of 
Common Prayer (1552/1662). After the reception of God’s gift in the Holy Communion 
the following is said,  
 
O Lord and heavenly Father, we thy humble servants entirely desire thy fatherly 
goodness mercifully to accept this sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving…and here 
                                                          
23Homily 25:3 on Matthew p 57. 
24 Worship 62, No2, March 1988.p125. 
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we offer and present unto Thee, O Lord ourselves, our souls and bodies, to be an 
honourable, holy and lively sacrifice unto Thee… 
 
Having located the Eucharist at the heart of Ethics and Ethics at the heart of the Eucharist 
we now formulate the positive relation between the two in their distinctness, Ethics and 
Eucharist and Eucharist and Ethics. 
 
Ethics and Eucharist 
Wainwright suggests that we come to the Eucharist from our daily life with anguish and 
confidence, repentance and resolve, intercession and thanksgiving. Firstly we come with 
anguish: Although the forms and degrees of existential anxiety vary from time, place, 
culture and circumstances, despair and death are never far removed from fallen humanity. 
The thread of nuclear destruction and collapse of society set the mood for the society. 
Humanity is powerless against itself, but we have a house where the Lord dwells. 
Secondly, we come with confidence. In Christ Christians have confidence that God cares 
for them and await his final manifestation. Thirdly we come in repentance for we know 
that we ourselves are part of the threat against ourselves. Fourthly we come with resolve, 
hoping for “time for amendment of life” (The book of common prayers). Fifthly through 
intercession we co-operate with God for God’s will to be done. The sixth attitude is 
thanksgiving for God’s creation and his salvation work. 
 
Eucharist and Ethics 
The kingdom of God is not food and drink but righteousness, peace and joy in the Holy 
Spirit (Romans 14:17). The context of St. Paul’s remark is that he rebukes those who “for 
the sake of food, destroy the work of God” yet the kingdom of God is pictured as a feast. 
We could paraphrase the apostle’s remark to capture the biblical teaching concerning the 
messianic banquet, in saying that the kingdom of God is food and drink in so far as eating 
and drinking express justice, peace and joy in the Holy Spirit.  
 
The Eucharistic liturgy makes use of food and drink as a medium of communion with 
God and fellow human beings. The way in which people use food and drink is a test of 
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the way in which they live before God and amongst themselves. Since the Eucharist is 
representative of all meals, and all food and drink is representative of the totality of 
human life, the sacrament should be celebrated as showing the kingdom of God to be 
food and drink on condition that it embodies justice, peace and joy in the Holy Spirit25. It 
embodies justice because all people are equally welcomed and all share in the fruits of 
the kingdom, peace because reconciled people is at peace with God and one another, joy 
because the Holy Spirit gives a taste of that “sober inebriation”. 
 
Having learnt and experienced this in the Eucharist, the church is committed to everyday 
witness in word and deed in the world. In ethical terms the Eucharistic paradigm point in 
the right direction: it sets the context within which difficult decisions are made and 
conduct is formed. The Eucharist does not only provide paradigms, but also gives the 
power to perform tasks. The power of the Holy Spirit is given to sustain our doxological 
living in the world. 
 
Wainwright concludes that the church occupies a mediating place and role between God 
and the world, and the world and God. The missionary task of the church is to proclaim 
God’s gospel to the world. On the other hand the church represents the world before God 
in worship. Part of the witness of the church (Christians) is its conduct in the world. The 
liturgy brings the evangelistic and ethical offering to a symbolic focus. This Wainwright 
discusses under five sub-headings, reconciliation, evangelism, ethics, intercession and 
kingdom26.            
 
Illustrations of movement from liturgy to life: Freedom and service 
Baptism leads to freedom. Christian freedom is not a license for the “flesh”. Christian 
service is not the forced labour of slavery, but the free co-operation of sons and 
daughters. To be children of God presupposes certain attitudes and behaviour. This 
includes service towards God and fellow humans, as we are set free from ourselves. 
 
                                                          
25 Worship 62, No2, March 1988, p135. 
26 For a detailed discussion see Wainwright, G, The Ecumenical Monement. Crisis and Opportunity for the 
church, W, B, Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, 1983, Pp134-149. 
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Baptism is the sacrament of all this, gathering the process into a single eschatological 
sign, as it anticipates the ultimate Kingdom. The symbolic focus of our baptism is the 
liturgy. In worship God addresses and sets us free for service in the world. 
 
It is worthwhile mentioning a few practical rituals associated with baptism to further 
illustrate baptism as the sacrament for freedom and service. The sign of the cross with oil 
in the patristic period was to mark the person for God just as slaves were marked for their 
owner. In the Byzantine practice the candidate turns to the West, a place of darkness, to 
renounce evil and then face to the east, towards the light. Personal transformation is 
expressed in the change of clothing signifying the new life (righteousness) with God as 
the old is abandoned. Baptism in the one spirit signifies part of one body or family. All 
discrimination is removed, there is no Jew, Gentile, male or female (Gal.3: 27f). By 
baptism one is called to the royal priesthood. The post-baptismal procession to the altar is 
an entrance into the Kingdom. Ethically this means responsibility for the rest of creation 
of which the Christian is a partner. 
 
Illustrations of movement from life to liturgy: Liberty, equality and fraternity 
Unless the contradictions in the world are illuminated, that is, the end of rivalry between 
the individual and society, the threefold ideal will never be achieved. Societies oppress 
the individual who is dependent on other individuals and the society at large. The 
individual self is not without contradictions. 
 
Liberty, equality, and fraternity express the ideal of a community in which individualism 
and collectivism is transcended. On the basis of their equal dignity, human beings have 
their freedom recognised by fellows and in turn recognise the bond between them in 
fraternal solidarity. But how is the ideal related to the actual? A facile optimism 
expresses historical closure of the gap even though technical progress does not 
correspond with moral progress. A nihilistic despair does not do justice to the positive 
possibilities of humanity. A moderate attitude might view the ideal as a utopia that 
motivates human effort. If the utopia is not illusory, it must be guaranteed by a divine 
transcendence. The Christian tradition preaches such a God, who sets values (liberty, 
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equality and fraternity), for humanity that aids them to achieve it. The Christian faith 
even explains the gap between ideal and reality by its realistic recognition of sin. 
 
A brief description of the political realm, in which this threefold ideal takes place, will 
follow. The role of rulers and kings (in both Christian and Non-Christian societies) is to 
perform their duty “godly and quiet”. The government should “punish the wicked and 
vice” and maintain “true religion and virtue”. They ought to commend those who do 
right, preserve order in the fallen world, and regulate society when it fails in its vocation. 
They should, by their own policy and manner of government, promote the values of 
God’s Kingdom and human salvation. Failing to do this, God’s law will turn against them 
and bring them to repentance. 
 
Liberty: Freedom and worship continued to be a characteristic of the people whom God 
commanded “let my people go” to celebrate a feast to the Lord (Exod.5: 1, 3:18 and 
8:21). Because humanity is an intellectual being freedom is both political and belief. A 
test for political liberty is freedom of belief and worship, even where this amounts to 
social criticism. 
 
Equality: the ground for equality amongst human beings is their love for the God who 
creates, redeems and sanctifies. The liturgy becomes the sacred locus where equality is 
expressed and experienced. The Eucharist is another opportunity. 
 
Fraternity: negative tendencies of humanity need to be overcome. Energy spent on hatred 
and revenge should be transformed. The liturgy is the place for forgiveness of sin, 
intercession for other, peace, etc. 
 
Justice and peace: Christian understanding of peace includes justice and it is the duty of 
civil government to sustain justice. Worldly justice must approximate divine justice. This 
raises the question of whether the Christian can engage in force to bring about justice 
where it does not prevail? Light may be shed on this by the liturgy. Unlike 
anthropologists and sociologists who usually emphasise the stabilising consequence of 
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ritual (and so legitimise existing political orders), the Christian liturgy recognises that this 
world is under the rule of the divine and thus open for correction. Solidarity is shown 
with those rulers who foster the values of the Kingdom, but not in revolutionary action 
towards anarchy and threat27. 
          
Evaluation 
It must be said from the outset that Wainwright’s book Doxology: A systematic 
theology, the praise of God in worship, doctrine and life is not intended to be an essay 
on ethics, whether secular or Christian. It is a work on Doxology or worship and 
should be seen as just that. However this work of Wainwright has valuable contributions 
to make to the subject of the relationship between the Christian story and the Public story 
for moral formation.  
 
However, Wainwright draws from liturgical theologians and ethicists, and also makes his 
own contribution. The structure of his book is that of systematic theology and the content 
is drawn from the liturgy. This is not a criticism of his work but a description of the 
important work that he has done in the subject of inquiry. 
 
Wainwright makes three important contributions to our topic of discussion 
His first valuable contribution is his discussion of the “Image of God” demonstrating the 
importance of community for moral formation. He attempts to explain how humanity 
discovers itself by discovering God in worship. In ethical terms I would refer to this 
notion as “ethics of character in community”.  
 
The first chapter of the book outlines the image relationship between Creator and human 
creature. In accomplishing the threefold vocation (personal communion with God, 
administering of the earth and to live in communion) humanity grows into the moral and 
spiritual likeness of God. Showing both similarity and differences between Creator and 
creature, Wainwright contributes to the notion of “ethics of character in community”. 
                                                          
27 Geoffrey Wainwright, Doxology: A Systematic Theology, The praise of God in worship, doctrine and 
life, Epworth Press, London, 1980, Pp415-431.  
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Although he does not align himself explicitly with this way of doing ethics, Wainwright 
does suggest strongly that the Christian vision be formed in community, in a worshipping 
community. The vision is reflected upon in worship and witnessed to and evangelised in 
the human community. 
 
The three-fold calling of humanity suggests that not only is the vision transmitted in 
community, the vision itself is community. Humanity is in communion with God and the 
rest of creation. The social nature of humanity is reflected in worship (baptism, agape, 
peace and Eucharist). 
 
Wainwright suggests that worship (The Christian story) relate to ethics (the Public story) 
in so far as both are necessary for praising God. This relationship takes shape in the 
liturgy. The Christian comes into the worship service to capture the vision and is 
transformed to witness before God and the world. In “Eucharist and/as Ethics” 
Wainwright concludes that we cannot deny that there are ethical dimensions to liturgy 
since humans are involved in liturgy. In the same way there are liturgical dimensions to 
ethics since ethics is not merely to do with duty, choices or appropriate conduct, but 
thankful responses to God28. 
 
Wainwright concludes that the true function of both liturgy and ethics is to embody the 
values of the kingdom that is salvation: liberty, love, justice, peace, and joy in the Holy 
Spirit. In worship these values are demonstrated in symbolic form through rituals (e.g. we 
are reconciled to God and one another when we gather together around the Lord’s table, 
or in baptism we are set free). In moral practise these values find expression “in the 
world”. In so far as the match is made, God’s kingdom is coming29. In this sense 
Wainwright’s approach contributes to the eschatological perspective that has been 
rediscovered in biblical studies and theology. 
 
                                                          
28 Wainwright, G in Worship, 1988. p128. 
29 Wainwright, G in Worship Vol. 53, No, Nov.79, Pp499-500. 
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This eschatological approach is not a victim of the Marxist critique, of unconcern with 
this worldly happiness. Instead it clarifies the church’s commitment to an everyday 
witness in word and deed,  
 
Which will give the opportunity for all the material resources of creation and all 
occasions of human contact to become the medium of that communion with God 
and among human beings, which is marked by justice, peace and joy in the Holy 
Ghost. And in which the kingdom of God consists (Wainwright 1980:148).   
 
His second valuable contribution is his section on worship and its ethical presuppositions 
and consequences. This section I refer to as the inter-actionist process of sacred and 
secular. 
 
In his writings Wainwright relies mainly on non-theological sources rather than on the 
liturgical tradition or experience of the churches. He defines worship largely in terms 
closely related to sociology and anthropology, and the acts of worship in terms related to 
the writing of Ninian Smart30 on the philosophy of religion. He states:  
 
It may be wondered how my worship, doctrine and life relate to the six 
dimensions which Ninian Smart introduced into the consideration of religion and 
whose use has become widespread: the ritual, the mythological, the doctrinal, the 
ethical, the social, and the experiential dimension (Wainwright 1980:9). 
 
This is evident in the definition of worship by Wainwright, “Christian worship is seen to 
give ritual expression to the eschatological tension which marks the Church on the way to 
the achievement of God’s purpose” (Wainwright 1980:6), or “as the point of 
concentration at which the whole of the Christian life comes to ritual focus” (Wainwright 
1980:8). Worship keeps a sense of Christian values alive in a community, and serves as 
an effective vehicle to transmit the Christian vision. 
 
                                                          
30 The Religious experience of Mankind. Scribner, London, 1971. 
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This way of defining worship has two implications. It neglects liturgical terms and it is 
described in light of doctrine. The first implication is that the anthropological and 
sociological approach suggests that worship have a strong ethical flavour at the expense 
of important liturgical theology. Wainwright describes the place of worship in the life of 
a community as the people bringing their entire existence so that it may be gathered in 
praise. The community departs with a renewed vision and sense of Christian values. The 
neglect of the notion of mystery and the relation of ritual to the acts of Christ could 
explain the lack of use and explanation of important terms such as memorial, sacrament, 
mystery, symbol, icon, mimesis and action. Memorial for example is only treated in the 
writing of the Eucharist, and there he (Wainwright) subscribes to a “low” explanation.         
 
The second implication for worship lies in the structure of the book, Doxology: A 
Systematic Theology: The Praise of God in Worship, Doctrine and Life. Although this 
work needs to be commended for the ecumenical approach, the structure of the book 
suggests that Wainwright opted for the Protestant principle when relating worship and 
ethics. In opting for the Protestant principle, Wainwright presents doctrinal principles 
(part one) before the liturgical tradition (part two). He discusses worship and Christian 
truth in light of doctrines. In doing so he gives second order language of doctrine a 
definite priority over first order language of worship in establishing the truth. 
Consequently doctrine exercises more control over worship than does worship over 
doctrine, even though Wainwright recognises that worship is the locus for doctrine and 
life. 
 
Language and Doctrine 
Wainwright discusses first order language or poetry in relation to creeds. The 
contribution of poetry is put in its ability “…to enlarge and enhance our experience and 
understanding: the poems which live on do so precisely in virtue of this capacity which 
originates in the poet’s primary and fresh experience and understanding” (Wainwright 
1980:194). The importance of experience for a successful interpretation of revealed truth 
makes poetic language an integral part of the endeavour. Poetry then sustains the 
experience, but it is up to doctrine to allow us to explicate the truth. 
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 Wainwright would say that there is no way that poetic language can express meaning in 
ways that doctrine is unable too. He rejects Maurice Wiles’ suggestion that it is possible 
to say one thing in doctrine and another in poetry (Wainwright 1980:157). However, if 
poetry enlarges and enhances our experience and understanding, then it may well express 
a meaning beyond what doctrine can say. It would then also be possible to entertain a 
hermeneutical reflection that leads to doctrine from an analysis of the truth as expressed 
in first order language.   
 
Wainwright is consistent in his description of the contribution that language makes to the 
understanding of worship. Worship language, he says, “mediates the substance on which 
the theologians reflect" (Wainwright 1980:21). This is done by passing a given universe 
of discourse, by the community’s conversation with God through language games, and by 
engaging the whole person in communicative signs such as words, gestures, movement 
and material objects. Wainwright further provides only external criteria to judge the truth 
of liturgical language. These include the test of origins, the test of universality, the ethical 
test and the test of reception (Wainwright 1980:240). Although these criteria are 
necessary, it is not comprehensive. To find out what liturgical language is expressing, it 
is necessary to reflect upon both experience and expressions. A hermeneutical reflection 
upon the images and symbols of worship seems a necessity. Wainwright’s description of 
worship and worship language falls short of such a hermeneutical reflection, because 
speaking of a substance being mediated, avoids the question of how one passes from first 
order language of worship to the second order language of doctrine. 
 
While Wainwright makes a major contribution regarding worship, his description 
and location of worship in the relationship of worship, doctrine and life suggests 
some weaknesses. In the preface of Doxology: A Systematic theology, in Praise of God 
in Worship, doctrine and life, he suggests that this work should be seen as a theology 
done from the perspective of worship or as a theology of worship. While he makes a 
valuable contribution in the second part of the book, by giving a lengthy treatment of the 
influence of worship on the canon and lex orandi, lex credendi, he does seem to give 
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priority to doctrine. His usage of anthropological and sociological terms to describe 
worship, his treatment of second order language over first order language, and the 
treatment of doctrinal issues as source for worship, leaves his approach open for 
criticism.           
 
Other Christian theologians (like Willimon31 and Smith32) who uses the same controlling 
principle, worship, doctrine and life, differ significantly from Wainwright in this regard. 
In the structure of their work they give minimal attention to doctrine. Both give worship 
priority over belief. Willimon for example spends one chapter on believing, praying and 
acting, while the rest of the work describes the acts of worship and their relationship with 
ethics. To this effect Willimon concludes,  
 
The liturgy, as a primary source of Christian belief, vision, history, and laws, 
preaching, prayer - in short, the substance of our faith - is the primary safeguard 
against the Christian vision’s subversion by other mutant or opposing visions. The 
primary place in which the majority of Christians come into contact with a creed, 
or the Decalogue, or the stories, or prayers or scripture of the church is the 
church’s liturgy. The continuing context for the Christian’s emotional, effectual 
engagement with the truth of his faith is in Sunday worship (Willimon 1982:87). 
 
Willimon and Smith give great importance to first order language. First order language 
expresses the Truth through which character is formulated. Symbols, rituals, and rites are 
significant for the formulation of character. In rituals and rites the worshippers learn their 
identity through habitual actions. Habits are essential means by which belief (doctrine) 
and behaviour is informed and engendered. The liturgy is the focus for all this. Willimon 
and Smith use the notion of “narrative” to explain this. Like Stanley Hauerwas, with 
whom Willimon works very closely, they prioritise first order language, or narrative.  
 
                                                          
31 In The service of God: How worship and ethics are related, Abingdon Press, Nashville, 1983. 
32 In Where two or three are gathered: Liturgy and the moral life, Pilgrim Press: Ohio, 1995.  
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Some may think that emphasis on narrative, as the primary grammar of Christian 
belief is a theological mistake. Surely we can talk about God in a more 
fundamental: manner than through stories - e.g., through doctrine. Doctrinally we 
affirm that God is our creator and/or redeemer, or that God’s essential nature is 
that of a Trinitarian relationship. But such emphasis ignores the fact that such 
“doctrines” are themselves a story, or perhaps better, the outline of the story. 
Claims such as “God is creator” are simply shorthand ways of reminding us that 
we believe we are participants in a much more elaborate story, of which God is 
the author. Doctrines, therefore, are not the upshot of the stories; they are not the 
meaning or heart of the stories. Rather they are tools (sometimes even misleading 
tools), meant to help us tell the story better. Because the Christian story is an 
enacted story, liturgy is probably a much more important resource than are 
doctrines or creeds for helping us to hear, tell and live the story of God (Hauerwas 
1983:25-26). 
 
Worship and Morality 
By putting emphasis on worship as the locus for ethics, the controlling principle, worship, 
doctrine and life, makes less use of laws and freedom. It thus moves away from the 
traditional way of doing ethics. The shift is from an emphasis on individual decision 
making to the idea of community. Again Wainwright does not necessarily align himself 
explicitly with this way of doing ethics. He does suggest strongly that the Christian vision 
be formed in the worshipping community. The vision is reflected upon in worship and 
witnessed in the human community. Smith and Willimon are more explicit in their 
alignment with the importance of community in doing ethics. They stand in the tradition 
with other Christian ethicists that reject the traditional way of doing ethics, in favour of 
community.  
 
Ethics as critique of worship 
Those who follow the controlling principle of worship, doctrine and life, define ethics in 
less abstract terms. They define ethics in more practical terms and are able to view 
decisions and principles not only for their origins. They also view principles and 
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decisions for what they are doing for the person who is deciding and what they tell us 
about who that person is. The question that is asked is not “what ought I to do” but 
“whom ought I to be”. Theologians then use terms such as life, work, and morality 
interchangeably. Their concern is the long-term formation of the person and not just fixed 
principles. Wainwright refers to the third dimension in his approach as “life”, Willimon 
refers to “moral life”, while Smith refers to “morality”. These terms are not used 
exclusively but interchangeably when dealing with worship, doctrine and life.    
 
Unlike moral philosophy, Christian morality has a community nature. The community 
nature of worship and the worshipper as a social being are two fundamental components 
when defining morality. Tradition/history becomes important for both worship and the 
moral formation of the person. The word used for history is story. It is the community 
nature of worship and the social nature of the person that suggest that ethics influences 
worship. Ethics is not only about individual decision-making and acting, but it is the 
long-term formation of a person and all the components that have a bearing on the 
person. The person stands in a tradition, is cultivated and participates in a story. The 
person is not only formed in community, but becomes part of that community. The 
truthful narrative becomes the narrative of the person. Because persons are involved in 
the liturgy, there are ethical dimensions to the liturgy. 
 
Ethics is both a consequence and presupposition of liturgy 
Character is formed in liturgy through participation in the story or the worship of God. 
Willimon refers to character as; “…that disposition of the moral self acquired through 
gradual growth and a host of forces and influences acting upon the self, as well as 
directions shaped by the self in its affections and actions” (Wainwright 1980:28). For 
Christians the context for character formation is worship. Wainwright, Willimon and 
Smith hold to this view and are consistent in their approach. Ethics also presupposes 
liturgy. Worshippers come from the world into the community. For Christians, moral 
response to creation, expand into worship. This movement, from concrete human 
relationships to worship, helps us view creation as the image of God. Whereas 
Wainwright uses his ecumenical expertise to emphasise this second movement, from 
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ethics to worship, Willimon and Smith do not view it as significant in their approach in 
terms of the relationship between The Christian story and The Public story.   
 
In explaining his version of the Christian gospel, Wainwright suggests that the 
theologian, as an individual being, draws on the worship of the Christian community and 
is duty bound to contribute to it. The task of the theologian lies in doctrine, expressing the 
Christian vision in a coherent and intellectual way. This vision is tested in life.  
 
The theologian’s intellectual task calls him to measure up the vision and the 
application in order to propose to the Christian community the most effective 
ways of allowing its vision to illuminate and transform reality to the advantage of 
all humanity (Wainwright 1980:4).  
 
Wainwright illustrates this by showing how specific values (such as liberty, fraternity, 
equality, justice and peace) can come to realisation in Christian liturgy. 
 
Wainwright differs with Smith and Willimon in so far as he emphasises the good conduct 
of the person as the test for sincere and effective worship. The conduct and decisions of 
the person determines whether worship, and more so belief, is in need of change. Using 
belief as a basis for ethics, he aligns himself more with moral philosophy’s approach to 
ethics than Smith and Willimon. The latter (Smith and Willimon) make a complete break 
from the individualism and rationalism that is the basis of moral philosophy. For Smith 
and Willimon “character formation in community” and not principle is the basis for 
Christian morality. The test for worship is not right action or right decision, but the 
formation of character.    
 
The third valuable section is on Lex Orandi, Lex Credendi on which Wainwright puts 
considerable stress in his book. Wainwright presents this by way of implied meanings of 
some of his conclusions. Putting this differently, he does not define certain terms 
explicitly, but depends on the implicit meaning. The way that Lex Orandi, Lex Credendi 
is presented in the book illustrates his consistent assumptions of implied meaning. If we 
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conclude that Wainwright deliberately opted for the doctrinal principle (the Trinitarian 
formulation) to be presented before the liturgical tradition (second part of the book), then 
we can deduce that Wainwright opted for the Protestant principle that doctrine control 
worship. It is in light of doctrine that he discusses the formulation of Christian truth in the 
liturgy. This gives the second order language of doctrine a definitive priority over first 
order language of worship for discovering truth. 
 
Wainwright makes a considerable effort to show that Lex Orandi and Lex Credendi can 
be reversed. He does such an analysis to show that as much as liturgy needs to restore its 
theological meaning, theology needs to restore its liturgical dimension. By implication 
Wainwright points out to both Catholic and Protestant that liturgy can be a source for 
doing theology, and doctrine a source for liturgy. Even those who argue that the verb 
statuat as in Lex supplicandi legem statuat credendi avoids the reversal of the saying will 
agree that it does not imply that doctrine cannot influence liturgy33. 
 
It is however important to note that according to the notion “Lex supplicandi legem 
statuat credendi” theology (doctrine) does not found worship. One cannot say that "Lex 
Orandi or Lex Supplicandi” founds the Lex credendi, and then add that the reverse is 
possible. The verb does not allow this. Doctrine contributes to worship/liturgy (through 
the theologian according to Wainwright), but in a different way that liturgy founds 
doctrine.      
 
Doctrine has no or minimal influence over The Christian story as it is part of worship and 
not necessarily the independent variable that shapes ethics. It plays a role in so far as it is 
part of worship. It is part of the rehearsing of The Christian story. This could be well 
                                                          
33 Glover illustrates this point well when after he evaluated the extent to which recent notions of Eucharistic 
sacrifice find expression. This is to be found within the four prayers of Rite A of the Alternative Service 
book of the Church of England. He concludes that it is clear there has been within the Church of England 
an attempt to consider the Eucharist in sacrificial terms without reasserting sixteenth –century divisions. 
Secondly, because no consensus has yet been possible on this issue, the Eucharistic liturgies of the 
Alternative Service Book 1980 reflect and implicitly accept reality of diversity. Thirdly, the theological 
strand in the ARCIC statement offers the most realistic way of uniting “Catholics” and “Evangelicals” in 
the Church of England.  Glover, D. Liturgy and Doctrine: Recent debate about Eucharist Sacrifice in The 
Church of England” in Bradshaw, P and Spinks, B Liturgy and Dialogue, University Press: Cambridge, 
1993, Pp51-67.     
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demonstrated with a more liturgical reflective theology that would allow the liturgy to 
speak with its own voice within its own context.  
 
Also by using ecumenical worship Mitchell concludes that Wainwright is able to use 
Catholic and Protestant, Eastern and Western, ancient and modern traditions and treats 
them as a coherent whole and not as isolated entities. This is made possible by his 
principle of organisation as extrinsic to the liturgies themselves and is derived from 
systematic theology and not liturgical acts34. This makes it possible to unify the liturgy 
into a single one for more effective liturgy that is able to connect the sacred and the 
secular.  
 
Conclusion 
As an ecumenical theologian Wainwright makes an attempt not to align himself with any 
one tradition. This is positive in the sense that he is able to explore the various 
relationships as well as draw from these various positions. He does this primarily by 
drawing examples from liturgical rites in the East and West, Catholic and Protestant 
traditions. 
 
On the negative side Wainwright’s attempt to show the relationship between The 
Christian story and The Public story lacked consistency. It becomes doubtful whether his 
“controlling principle” is consistent throughout his work. At times he seems to suggest 
that worship is life and vice versa, and at other times that worship is separated from life. 
This is evident in both his illustrations of the movement from life to liturgy and liturgy to 
life. This limitation could be attributed to Wainwright’s ecumenical approach. 
 
There is no consistency between those who use the controlling principle of worship, 
doctrine and life, with regard to the relationship between the two stories. The reason for 
this is the difference in emphasis on the different components of this controlling 
principle. For example Wainwright suggests that we look at worship from belief, where 
as belief is generally regarded as important only as far as it is part of worship. Also 
                                                          
34 Mitchell, L L Response: Liturgy and Theology in Worship 57, No4, July, 1983. Pp324/5. 
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because Wainwright’s work is not on ethics, but systematics, he does not provide 
extensive descriptions of ethics and important terms for a discussion of our subject of 
inquiry. His contribution to the influence of The Public story on The Christian story lies 
in the examples he provides for such a possibility. These examples have a scriptural base, 
and are consistent with the Protestant approach.  
  
Stanley Hauerwas on the other hand uses the Christian story in a more consistent way for 
moral formation. He interprets the Christian story in such a way that it becomes the 
community in which moral formation takes place. He is more critical of the Public story 
than Wainwright and gives socialisation a greater influence on moral formation than laws 
and rules. It is to Hauerwas' use of the Christian story for moral formation that I turn to in 
the next chapter.    
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Chapter Four 
Stanley Hauerwas: The Christian community and moral formation 
Introduction 
Ethics of character in community 
Distinguished ethicists such as James Gustafson and Stanley Hauerwas responded to 
contemporary ethics with an ethic of character in community. Contemporary ethics 
occupies itself with laws and principles. Themes of moral law and situation ethics serve 
as well known examples. According to Hauerwas both approaches are simplistic in their 
emphasis on individualism, intuitiveness, command-obedience, situation, principles, 
choice and decision. They neglect self, as a social being, the role of the community in the 
formation of the self and the long-term development of the self. When ethics considers 
the communal aspect of the moral self then a relationship between the Public story and 
Christian story can be appreciated. Hauerwas’ distinctive contribution to Christian ethical 
reflection lies in his idea of virtue and character. In his earlier writings he defines the task 
of Christian ethics as follows: 
 
Once ethics is focused on the nature and moral determination of the self, vision 
and virtue again become morally significant categories. We are as we come to see 
and as that seeing becomes enduring in our intentionality. We do not come to see, 
however, just by looking but by training our vision through the metaphors and 
symbols that constitute central convictions. How we come to see therefore is a 
function of how we come to be since our seeing necessarily is determined by how 
our basic images are embodied by the self…i.e., in our character. Christian ethics 
is the conceptual discipline that analyses and imaginatively tests the images most 
appropriate to score the Christian life in accordance with the central conviction 
that the world has been redeemed by the work and person of Christ (Hauerwas 
1974:2). 
 
This is further developed in his work that followed in 1975. These writings contain the 
main features of his thought, namely virtue, character and moral training. These (virtue, 
character and moral training) are imperative for Christian ethics and not law or decision-
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making. At this point in his writing law or decision making is given a minimal role in 
ethics and later on (since his writings of Character and Community) given almost no role, 
as he argues for an ethic of character in community. As he concluded,  
 
Christians have not been called to do just the right, to serve the law, though doing 
the right and observing the law are not irrelevant to being good. Rather for 
Christians the moral life, at least scriptural, is seen as a journey through life 
sustained by fidelity to the cross of Christ, which brings a fulfillment no law can 
ever embody (Hauerwas 1983:31).  
 
Christian character is formed over a period of time and unlike the relativism of 
existentialism and situationism, or the abstract ethics of natural law, it takes in 
consideration the dynamism in the formation of moral life. From the point of view of 
doxology humanity is created in the image of God, because of sin humanity is separated 
from God. Through communion with God humanity shares God’s divine vision, the 
image of God. From the point of view of ethics, humanity reflects God’s image by taking 
on God’s character. For the Christian this process happens through communal worship.  
 
In this chapter I will: 1. give an overview of Hauerwas’s personal biography, 2. give an 
overview of his three overlapping components of Christian ethics, namely, character, 
narrative and community, discussing them in relation to a. freedom and b. sin, and 3. 
evaluate his “ethics of character in community”, pointing out the major contributions he 
makes to our subject of inquiry as well as his unrealistic interpretation of the Christian 
story and idealistic community. 
 
1. Personal Details 
Stanley Hauerwas was born in 1940, in the state of Texas in The United States of 
America. Hauerwas achieved his B.A. degree at the Southwestern University, his B.D. 
degree, M.A., and Ph.D. at Yale Graduate School. His distinguished academic career 
includes two years of teaching at the Lutheran Augustana College (Rock Island, Illinois) 
and fourteen years at the Catholic University of Notre Dame. He is currently attached to 
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the Methodist Duke School at the Duke University in Durham. His contribution to series, 
“New Studies in Christian Ethics”35 must be amongst his most influential work in 
Europe. The editorial board of this series further includes; R.L.Clark. Antony, O.Dyson, 
Robin W.Lovin and Robin Gill as the General editor. The aim of this series is twofold: 
firstly, to engage with secular moral debate on the highest possible intellectual level, and 
secondly, to show that Christian ethics can make a distinctive contribution to this debate. 
These are two aims that Hauerwas has successfully upheld through his “character in 
community”, and his ability in keeping the tensions between theology and Christian 
ethics and Philosophy and Christian ethics. 
                                                          
 
Hauerwas' concern has been with the importance of virtue and character within the 
church and is associated with narrative theology. He promotes pacifism and non-
violence. He is also an opponent of nationalism and particular American patriotism. 
 
Some of Hauerwas's important work includes his Gifford lectures at St. Andrews in 
Scotland (2001), the Scottish Journal of Theology lectures in Aberdeen (1997), the 
formation of the Ekklesia project and Renewal movement. 
 
Influences on the thoughts of Hauerwas 
As with most influential scholars Hauerwas’s thoughts have remained consistent yet 
relevant for the changing times of the twentieth and twenty first century. This is partly 
because of the influence of a variety of scholars over a considerable period of time on 
Hauerwas. In the Introduction of a book entitled The Peaceable Kingdom, under the 
heading On what I owe to whom, Hauerwas lists and discusses the theologians and 
philosophers who influenced his work. The work of some of these scholars finds 
prominence in his work in the mid-eighties, some is still evident in his work of the late 
35 The books published under this series includes; Rights and Christian ethics by Kieran Cronin, Power and 
Christian ethics by James Mackey, Biblical interpretation and Christian ethics by Ian McDonald, Plurality 
and Christian ethics by Ian S.Markham, Sex, Gender and Christian ethics by Lisa Sowle Cahill, Moral 
action and Christian ethics by Jean Porter, The environment and Christian ethics by Michael S. Northcott, 
Health and Christian ethics by Alasdair V. Campbell, Feminism and Christian ethics by Susan F. Parsons, 
The market economy and Christian ethics by Peter Sedgewick, Responsibility and Christian ethics by 
William Scheiker, Justice and Christian ethics by E. Clinton Gardner, Moral philosophy and Christian 
ethics by David A. S.  Fergusson and Biology and Christian ethics by Stephen R. L. Clark. 
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eighties and others has maintained important in his latest work. Of those who influenced 
his work at the time he writes; “Those familiar with the intellectual currents in theology 
and philosophy over the last fifty years will rightly recognise that my position is far from 
original. I have learned and borrowed much from the Niebuhrs, Karl Barth, Paul Ramsey, 
James Gustafson, Fred Carney, John Howard Yoder, Alasdair MacIntyre, as well as many 
classical figures of the past such as Aristotle, Aquinas, Augustine, Calvin, Wesley and 
Edwards” (1983:xix). 
 
Amongst the scholars that influenced Hauerwas’s work, Alasdair MacIntyre is one of the 
most important36. Not only did MacIntyre influence Hauerwas but also the two saw some 
common ground in some of their writings in the early 80’s and especially in the year 
1983. Of MacIntyre’s most influential book, After Virtue, Hauerwas writes,  
 
A book composed of such bold, erudite, contentious, and global insights and 
claims could not be ignored. With his virtuoso performance MacIntyre has 
changed the agenda of contemporary philosophers and theologians by an almost 
violent redirection of their attention. At least for philosophers the virtues can no 
longer be ignored because MacIntyre can no longer be ignored37. 
 
They are both influential in the new paradigm shift of Christian ethics. Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s critique of contemporary philosophical ethics provided a constructive 
alternative that shows an appreciation of the significance of community with regard to 
both methodological and social ethical questions. 
 
                                                          
36 In two of the most valued theses written on the work of Hauerwas this can be further explored. Nico 
Koopman who divides the influences on Hauerwas’s work into two categories, namely Philosophy and 
Theology, names MacIntyre as the Philosopher who had the most influence on Hauerwas’s work. He 
mentions community as one of the areas of influence. Robert Vosloo on the other hand does not make this 
distinction so explicit. Alasdair MacIntyre, according to him, has the biggest influence on Hauerwas’s 
work, and especially his later work. For further discussion on the influence of MacIntyre on Hauerwas see: 
“Koopman’s “Dade of Deugde? Implikasies vir Suid-Afrikaanse Kerke van n Modern-Postmoderne debat 
oor die Moraliteit”, November 2000 and Vosloo’s “Verhaal en Moraal: n Kritiese ondersoek na die 
Narratiewe etiek van Stanley Hauerwas”, May 1994.       
37 Suffering presence: Theological Reflections on Medicine, The mentally handicapped and the church. 
Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1986. 
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Contemporary philosophical ethics was criticised for bringing the world into chaos and 
fragmentation. The chaos can be attributed to two characteristics: (1) the stress on 
freedom, autonomy, and choice as the essence of moral life, and (2) the attempt to secure 
a foundation for the moral life outside the contingencies of history and community. Moral 
philosophy describes the moral agent in the following way:  
 
To be a moral agent is, on this view, precisely to be able to stand back from any 
and every situation in which one is involved, from any and every characteristic 
that one may possess, and to pass judgement on it from a purely universal and 
abstract point of view that is totally detached from all social particularity. Anyone 
and everyone can thus be a moral agent, since it is in the self and not in social 
roles or practices that moral agency has to be located (MacIntyre 1983:30).         
 
This new approach challenged moral philosophy with the notion of “character formation 
in community”. Doing ethics in this way requires from us to regard community and 
history/tradition as primary. It is not freedom, law, quandaries and right, as used by moral 
philosophy that makes Christian ethics distinctive. Hauerwas claims that,  
 
As Christians we believe we not only need a community, but a community of a 
particular kind to live well morally. We need a people who are capable of being 
faithful to a way of life, even when that way of life may be in conflict with what 
passes as “morality” in the larger society. Christians are a people who have 
learned that belief in God requires that we learn to look upon ourselves as 
creatures rather than as creators. This necessarily creates division between us and 
others who persist in the pretentious assumption that we can and should be 
morally autonomous. Of course Christians are as prone to such pretensions as 
non-Christians are. What distinguishes them is a willingness to belong to a 
community, which embodies the stories, the rituals, and others committed to 
worshipping God. Such a community, we believe, must challenge our prideful 
pretensions as well as provide the skills for the humility necessary for becoming 
not just good, but holy (Hauerwas 1983:35). 
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 Unlike moral philosophy, this approach takes community and tradition seriously in doing 
ethics. The community is the church and the history is the narrative of God’s dealings 
with creation. 
 
The writings of Hauerwas have a consistent developed from a formal, philosophical style 
to a less formal, narrative one. Of Yoder’s influence he writes; “His emphasis on the 
significance of Jesus’ whole life that is, his teachings as well as his death and resurrection 
provided me with the means to make my account of character and virtue less formal” 
(Hauerwas 1983: xxiv). 
 
Another of his influence, which can be said of MacIntyre, too, is his conviction that there 
was something distorting about the ahistorical character of modern ethics. Of this 
conviction, which Hauerwas shares, he writes; “Philosophical advances in epistemology 
and the philosophy of science, as well as my developing theological convictions, 
convinced me that theology (and ethics) did not need an ahistorical “foundation” 
(Hauerwas1983:xxiv).     
 
Hauerwas was able to theologise the work of MacIntyre through his influence by John 
Howard Yoder. In this regard he writes, “Yoder’s account of the church fits almost 
exactly the kind of community I was beginning to think was required by an ethic of 
virtue” (Hauerwas 1983: xxiv). 
 
With regard to the unusual combination of the influence of both MacIntyre and Yoder on 
his work Hauerwas writes; “It is a sign of the unusual times in which we live that I can be 
influenced at once by Alasdair MacIntyre and John Howard Yoder without feeling a deep 
sense of contradiction” (Hauerwas 1992:3). 
 
A continuing influence on both his style and theological (and ethical) thinking is his 
personal friend and colleague William H. Willimon. In an article entitled; “Embarrassed 
by God’s Presence", they claim the following;  
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 Before we met each other, each of us was often told what he was saying and 
writing sounded like the work of the other. We were also told that this 
commonality sounded like something new and not easily characterised in terms of 
recent theological options. As fate would have it, we now find ourselves at the 
same institution. Since arriving at Duke, we have tried to make clear to ourselves 
what, if anything, is ‘new’ about us. This article is our attempt to articulate what 
we have discovered we share, and how that discovery positions us vis-à-vis the 
church and recent theology (Hauerwas 1985:98). 
 
In a provocative book “Resident Aliens”38 and a follow-up on that, “Where Resident 
Aliens Live”39 they give a clear description of the community in which morality must be 
formed. These publications have received strong criticism from theologians and those in 
other sciences. I will return to these criticisms later. 
 
2. Character, Narrative and Community 
These are Hauerwas’s three components for Christian ethics. Although there is an 
indication that one or other of the three components seem to dominate during certain 
periods, even chronologically, all components form a central part of Hauerwas’s 
Christian ethics. Three components need to be treated as a unit to reflect a more accurate 
part of Hauerwas’s approach to Christian ethics. 
 
In his earlier writings Hauerwas placed more emphasis on character, but narrative and 
community were important for character formation: 
 
Appeals to agency as a characteristic of the self cannot in principle guarantee our 
‘freedom’. All determination, since our very ability to know what we have done 
and to claim our behaviour as our own is dependent on the descriptions we learn. 
There is no contradiction between claims of agency and our sociality, since the 
                                                          
38 A Provocative Christian assessment of culture and ministry for people who know that something is 
wrong. Abingdon Press, Nashville, 1989.  
39 Exercises for Christian practise, Abingdon Press, Nashville, 1996.  
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extent and power of any agency depends exactly on the adequacy of the 
descriptions we learn from our communities. Our 'freedom' therefore, is 
dependent on our being initiated into a truthful narrative, as in fact it is the 
resource from which we derive the power to ‘have character’ at all. Put simply, 
our ability to ‘have character’ does not require the positing of a transcendental 
freedom, rather it demands a recognition of the narrative nature of our existence. 
The fundamental category for ensuring agency, therefore, is not freedom but 
narrative (Hauerwas 1983:43). 
 
a. Character and freedom 
The first comprehensive attempt by Hauerwas to define ethics of character was 
made in 197440. In this work he approaches this ethic from a philosophical point 
of view. In Character and the Christian life: A Study in Theological Ethics41, he 
turns to a theological definition of character. He starts off the argument with an 
overview of theological and philosophical issues respectively. Hauerwas provides 
us with a well thought through answer under the heading “Character and 
Freedom”. Freedom is usually associated with decisions and actions. To be free is 
to have a choice. But freedom based on choice says nothing about the factors, the 
situation or those factors beyond one’s control. To break through such limitations, 
Hauerwas suggests that we look at the self as an agent. What it means to be a self 
is to act on the world. Agency includes a sense of responsibility for what one 
does. To speak of an agent is to speak in the first person; the self is therefore not 
something deeper than the agent, but the agent self.  
 
Agent is also compatible with the notion of character. Character is not about choices we 
make or actions we take, but rather the form our agency takes through belief and 
intentions. Character is not something that is a surface for a deeper reality, the self. It is 
the self. 
                                                          
40 Stanley Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue, Fides Publishers, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, 1974, Pp.48-
67. In this essay he clarifies the meaning of character, its nature in relation to the self and its moral 
significance. 
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 Such a description of the self (as character) describes behaviour not in terms of causation, 
but as intentional and purposive behaviour. The language of agent implies that behaviour 
cannot be satisfactorily analysed in terms of inanimate behaviour that is describing it 
(behaviour) in terms of random causation. “Although such descriptions cannot be shown 
in principle to be false, what we see is that, exactly to the extent that they are intelligible, 
they all implicitly employ purposive and intentional categories “(Hauerwas 1983:42). To 
be an agent in this regard is to place all action within an ongoing history and community 
of language users. One is not an agent because one can make something happen, but 
because when something happens, it can be made personal through my power of attention 
and intention. The “causation” proper to agents and actions is not “cause and effect”, but 
the agent’s power of description of ourselves. 
 
Action is not something I cause as though it was external to the self, but it belongs to the 
self as far as the self is able to “fit” it into his ongoing story. The power as an agent is 
therefore relative to my descriptive ability. That ability is a social skill because we learn 
to appropriate the narratives of the communities. We also note that the power of 
description provided by the narrative is not only to be understood solely as an intellectual 
skill. Description, whether verbal or not, is a matter of habit. 
 
What then is freedom? Viewed from this perspective, freedom is carried by a 
community that sustains us in the “habits of self possession”- not the least of which is 
learning to depend on and trust in others. Freedom is not about self-awareness, but about 
the kind of habits acquired that are occasionally brought to awareness.     
 
Agency in principle does not guarantee our freedom from all determination since our 
ability to know our behaviour and actions and claim it as our own is dependent on the 
descriptions we learn. Since the power of an agency depends on the description learnt 
from the community, there is no contradiction between agency and solidarity. Freedom is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
41 Stanley Hauerwas, Character and Christian Life: A study in Theological Ethics: Trinity University Press, 
San Antonio, 1975. 
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dependent on the initiation into a truthful narrative, as it is the resource from which we 
derive the ability to have character. Freedom is not a state of absolute control over our 
lives but a reminder that we can claim our lives by growing into a truthful narrative.     
 
Such skills are not just intellectual but also moral. To face life truthfully requires trust 
and courage. For if we are free, we must learn to look at our actions and behaviour 
without illusion and deception.  
 
So the formation of courage is even greater than the power of choice. As 
we must be trained to face our destiny of death, not with denial, but with 
hope. Short of such courage no amount of transcendental freedom or 
fundamental option can provide the necessary basis for our ability to make 
our live our own (Hauerwas 1983:44).  
 
b. Character and Sin 
To understand what it means to be a sinner, the context of freedom formed by a story that 
helps us live our live as a gift, is appropriate. Sin is the attempt to go beyond our powers 
as creatures (this does not exclude the doing of wrong, prohibited and unacceptable 
behaviour). Sin is shown in pride and sensuality, but fundamentally in the form of self-
deception (Hauerwas 1983:46). 
 
Sin then is the extent to which we think we have inherited the power to claim or 
determine our lives and our character as personal achievement. In other words, sin is the 
assumption that we have created the history through which we acquire and possess our 
character. Sin is the form our character takes as a result of the perception that we will be 
nobody if we loose control of our lives. 
 
The need for control becomes the basis for our sinful actions. Since our “control” and 
“power” is built on an insufficient basis (violence), we use inappropriate actions (force) 
to maintain the illusion that we are in control. Any idea, person or object that threatens 
the unity of the self, achieved by us must be manipulated or eliminated. Such ideas, 
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persons or objects are seen as an implicit challenge to our deceptions and we are fearful 
of them, thus the need to create or have an enemy (Hauerwas 1983:47). 
 
Such fear makes us resistant to the teaching of the gospel for we cannot accept that the 
self might be formed without fear for the other. Such formation of the self, without fear 
for the other, is only possible if we receive our true self from God. The unity of the self 
and the knowledge of God are correlated. Such unity is an achievement and comes about 
as we work to locate ourselves in God’s story. This is not an easy achievement as we 
resist such a location because of the fear of losing control of ourselves, and therefore our 
sinfulness. 
 
Sin consists in our allowing of our character to be formed by “our story”, that we must do 
everything (pride) or nothing (sloth). The forms of pride and sloth are so numerous that 
we can use a bit of both in the complex stories that become “our stories”. As we look 
back on our lives our sins are more likely something we discover than something we did 
(Hauerwas 1983:48).  
 
It is only by making God’s story our story that we gain the freedom necessary to make 
our life our own. Only then can the self learn to accept itself (body, psychological 
condition, distrust of other and itself) as itself, as part of her story. The acceptance of the 
self as a sinner is made possible only because it is an acceptance of God’s acceptance. 
The self is able to see it as a sinner and still go on. 
 
Narrative 
Christian character is formed through narrative. Hauerwas claims that the nature of 
Christian ethics takes the form of a story or a set of stories in one story or tradition that in 
turn forms a community. Christians do not respond so much to rules or laws as they do to 
the narrative that tells of God’s dealing with creation. The narrative character of ethics is 
because we come to communion with God. Through the narrative of Israel and Christ, we 
understand the world and ourselves (Hauerwas 1983:24). 
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Since Christians do not understand the world, the self and God as independent entities, it 
is accidental that knowledge of God, the world and the self seem to have similar 
epistemological status. Each appears as a strange object since it seems that our 
knowledge of one is dependent on the other. To know God requires a rethinking of how 
and what we know about the self and the world. To know the self one cannot but make 
claims about the kind of world the self lives in. The narrative through history is the 
display where this “interdependence” finds meaning. To know the self truthfully is to 
know the self in relation to God. We know ourselves when we place our story in God’s 
story. Hauerwas’ contention is that the narrative is neither incidental nor accidental to 
Christian belief. There is no more efficient way of talking about God than in narrative 
(Hauerwas 1983:25). The narrative character of our knowledge about God, the self and 
the world is a reality-making claim that the creation and our existence in it are God’s 
creation. The whole of creation is but contingent realities. 
 
Narrative is not of secondary importance for our knowledge of God. There is no point 
that needs to be discovered. The narrative is the point. Narratives cannot be substituted 
someday in the future with some other account. On the contrary, narratives are necessary 
to understand those aspects, which admit no further explanation - God, the self and the 
world. 
 
The basis for the theological claim that we participate in God’s life is that we place our 
story in his story. God includes us in God’s life. God is grace, not that grace stands above 
history, but it is God’s choice to be a Lord whose kingdom is extended by our obedience 
through which we formulate a history befitting us as God’s creatures. The way of being 
obedient is to accept our existence and that of the world as a gift.  
 
In summing up narrative as theologically central to the explanation of Christian 
existence, Hauerwas makes three points of importance. Firstly, narrative shows the 
existence of the self and the world as creatures - as contingent beings. Narratives are 
“epistemical”, fundamental for our knowledge of God and ourselves, since we know 
ourselves only in God’s life. Secondly, narrative is the characteristic form of our 
 134 
awareness of us as historical beings that must give an account of the purposeful relation 
between temporary discrete realities. We are thus joined with other selves, with a 
community in order to sustain growth in a living tradition. The self is subordinate to the 
group and not vice-versa. For we discover the self through a “community’s narrated 
tradition” (Hauerwas 1983:28). The ethics are connected to a qualifier, - narrative -, and 
thus communal context. Thirdly, God has revealed God-self narratively in the history of 
Israel and the life of Jesus Christ. While much of scripture does not take a narrative 
literary form, the Gospels does. However scripture do tell the story of the covenant with 
Israel and the life of Jesus Christ and the history of the church. 
 
a. Narrative and Freedom    
When we view the narrative character of God’s action and our life as revealing reality, 
then Christian ethics is not so much about laws and commandments but about a helpful 
resource to envision the world to be free. This resource (Christian ethics) is formed by a 
definite, specific story and if we find that the world is not as the story suggests, then we 
have reason not to worship the God as described by that story. In other words, Christian 
ethics primarily helps us to see. We can only act according to the world we see and we 
can only see properly as we are trained to see. We must develop skills through initiation 
into that community that lives faithfully to the story of God. As sinners we do not desire 
to see truthfully, and so we need to be transformed in order to see truthfully.  
 
We see the world through narrative. If we see the world through our unchanged story, 
and not in God’s story, then we will see a distorted world. Not only will we see a world 
in which our morality is distorted, or we are sinful, but one that is in rebellion. The 
Christian story trains us to see that we act as if this world is not God’s creation, which is 
the fundamental sin. So when we act, our actions have far-reaching consequences since 
we distort our own nature and that of the world. Sin then implies a claim about human 
behaviour, and the way we see things. To see the world as God’s world and so to respond 
appropriately, as creation, we need a transformed story. We must learn to see and speak 
in the story, in the language of God’s kingdom. Christian conviction is about a narrative, 
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a language that requires transformation of the self, in order for the self to be truthful, and 
to see. Freedom is achieved when our sinful narrative is transformed. 
 
The question that such an ethic asks is not “what ought I to do?” or “what rule ought I to 
obey?” but “what ought I to be?”. 
 
b. Narrative and Sin 
Sin is so fundamental that Christians must be taught to recognise it as well as to see 
themselves as sinners. Sin is not some universal tendency or general human condition, 
but deception of the self about the reality of the world and God. The true identity of the 
self is recovered, as the self is located in God’s life as revealed in the life, death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ. When we recognise ourselves as sinners of this nature, we 
shall receive redemption with the assurance that our view of ourselves as sinners will not 
destroy us.  
 
The Christian story exposes the fact that the self is a sinner. Without such a story, the fact 
and nature of sin of the self remains hidden in self-deception. The Christian narrative 
helps place the self as a creature of a gracious God and provides the  
 
…. skills to help me locate my sin as fundamentally infidelity and rebellion. As a 
creature I have been created for loyalty - loyalty to truth, to the love that moves 
the sun and the stars and yet is found on a cross - but I find myself serving any 
powers but the true one in the hope of being my own lord (Hauerwas 1983:31). 
 
This fundamental sin has been characterised in different ways in the Christian tradition. 
At one stage it was pride, then self-love, and infidelity, and now it is lust or sloth. No 
single term can explain the sin. For this reason we need stories from scripture and the 
church to recognise our sin. As narrative determined creatures we must learn to place our 
life in God’s life if we are to face our infidelity and rebellion against our creator. 
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To see us as sinners is not enough. We are called to be disciples, to do something about 
our sin. Our call is not only to be good, but also to take on the life made possible by 
God’s redemptive act on the cross. This means to place us in God’s history, to be part of 
God’s people. Redemption means to become part of God’s kingdom. The kingdom is of 
such a nature that we acquire a fitting character. Character is formed, by finding our lives 
in God’s ongoing journey with creation.  
 
Community 
a. Freedom and the presence of the other.  
It is the gift and the task of Christians to tell the story of God to those who do not know 
it. God’s story is both told and lived. The response to God’s story, by telling and living 
the story is a result of the story grasping our attention through another person. Freedom 
provided by this narrative comes only in the form of someone external to us, it comes in 
the presence of another. An agent is someone who has the capacity “….to be called from 
myself to another”. Our freedom is literally in the hands of others. Freedom is about 
trusting others to call my achievement into question (Hauerwas 1983:45).  
 
Hauerwas says that the Christian tradition holds us accountable, not to an abstract 
community, history or story, but to a body of people who has been formed by a story - 
that of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus.  
 
By learning to make his life our life we see we are free just to the extent that we 
learn to trust others and make ourselves available to be trusted by others. Such 
trust is possible because the story of his life, by the very way we learn it, requires 
that we recognise and accept the giftedness of our existence. I did not create 
myself but others have made what I am possible (Hauerwas 1983:46). 
 
Our dependence on others has the potential for freedom as well as for evil and distortion. 
God is not necessary for a “transcendental I” nor a correlate to such an “I”. Rather God is 
the ultimate whom we trust as the basis for our freedom. By becoming part of that people 
who tell and live the story of Jesus, we are initiated into that story through which we 
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learn the disciplines and virtues necessary to make our lives our own. To continue that 
story, Christ is our source of freedom. We are no self, no agent, no character, until we are 
that which God called us to be.       
 
Church as the locus for Christian ethics 
Hauerwas’s writings of 1980 and onwards repeatedly lays claim to the importance of 
community for Christian reflection. Hauerwas emphasised individual vision and character 
in his earlier writings, but later turns to the churches as the primary communities for 
Christian ethical reflection. He now describes Christian ethics as,  
 
The justification for calling this book social ethics is that I wish to show why any 
consideration for the truth of Christian convictions cannot be divorced from the 
kind of community the church is and should be…my primary interest is to 
challenge the church to regain a sense of the significance of the polity that derives 
from convictions peculiar to Christians…. (Hauerwas 1981:1-2) 
 
In his work The Peaceable Kingdom, published two years on, he makes a similar claim,  
 
Therefore we see that contained in the claim that there is no ethic without a 
qualifier…is a strong substantive assumption about the status and necessity of the 
church as the locus for Christian ethical reflection. It is from the church that 
Christian ethics draws its ethical substance and it is to the church that Christian 
ethical reflection is first addressed (Hauerwas 1983:47).  
 
Hauerwas uses some fundamental Christian/biblical themes in relation to what he means 
by the church as the community for Christian ethical socialisation. 
Church and Kingdom. The content of Christian ethics is about a kingdom. The kingdom 
sets the standard for the church and is much broader than the church. The church is not 
the kingdom, but merely a foretaste of the kingdom. It is in the church that the people are 
socialised, the story told, and so the kingdom made visible. The individual does not 
become sanctified on her or his own but through a sanctified people. 
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 The task of the church with regard to the kingdom is not to be the kingdom or to make 
the world the kingdom. Rather it is to be faithful to the kingdom by showing to the world 
what it means to be the community where people are socialised according to standards of 
the kingdom. The church does this through telling the story of God, Israel and the church. 
This is evident in the part of the creed whereby we affirm that we believe in the One holy 
Catholic, Apostolic church (Hauerwas 1983:47). 
 
Church as Servant community 
Using this biblical image of “servant community” Hauerwas shows how different the 
church is to the world, yet the social task of the church is not to abandon the world. The 
church is different in so far as it sets its own agenda (peace and truth) and does not follow 
that of the world (injustice and violence). The church is the community where the story of 
God and Israel is told enacted and heard. On the other hand the church is that contrasting 
model against which the world can measure its disunity and divisions for the world has 
no way of knowing it is world without the church pointing to the kingdom of God. 
 
Hauerwas acknowledges that the church is not always what it ought to be, a peaceable 
community, remembering and telling the story of God. The first task of the church then is 
to be the church and help the world understand itself as world. That world is God’s good 
world. In one respect the world is no different than the church - created by God - and in 
another sense the church is no different than the world - distorted and in rebellion.  
 
The church as servant community can never abandon the world completely, but must be a 
people with hope to sustain the world as well as itself.  
 
That is why as Christians we may not only find that people who are not Christians 
manifest God’s peace better than we ourselves do, but we must demand that they 
exist. It is to be hoped that such people may provide the convictions for our ability 
to co-operate with others for securing justice in the world. Such co-operation is 
not based on natural law, but that God’s kingdom is wide indeed. The church as 
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the servant community serves the world by giving it the means to see itself 
truthfully. The task of the church is to understand rather than doing (Hauerwas 
1983:101). 
 
The servant community is called not to withdrawal, but to be engaged in the form of 
witness to the kingdom and understanding of the world. This community finds it strength 
not in dominion, but in servanthood, engaging in the values of the kingdom. By doing 
this, the church reveals the insufficiency of the world’s strength based on coercion and 
falsehood. 
 
Church and the gifts of the Holy Spirit (faith, hope and love) 
The community that constitutes the church must be a people of virtue. This is necessary 
to remembering and telling the story of God. Although the church community is a graced 
community, it is also sustained by the traditional virtues of faith, hope and love.  
     
This does not mean that the virtues have the same meaning or derive from the same 
origins for Christians as for Non-Christians. For Christians what they hope in, what they 
have faith in and the kind of love they have, derive from the tradition/history/story that 
forms the community. The nature and meaning of the virtues is different precisely 
because the story of its origins is different. That is why Hauerwas claims that,  
 
For Christians are the community of a new age which must continue to exist in 
the old age. Because of their existence between the times, because they are a 
people on the way, they require, or perhaps better, make central, certain virtues 
that other communities do not (Hauerwas 1983:103). 
 
Hauerwas suggests for example that hope for the world means being in control whereas 
for the church it means to be out of control. The world plans and engages in coercion, the 
church as an eschatological people assume that God will use its faithfulness to make the 
kingdom a reality. 
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Church as sacrament and the holy people 
At this stage of Hauerwas’s writings he realises the potential of labeling the church as an 
idealised, invisible community. So he concludes that the church is known as a place 
where the sacraments are celebrated and people sanctified. It is made up of sacraments 
(baptism, Eucharist, preaching) and a holy people. Both constitute the church. 
 
The sacraments enact the story of Jesus Christ. They share the story with us and prepare 
us to tell the story. The rites of baptism and the Eucharist are not just “religious rites”, but 
through them we learn who we are. It is through these rites that we see the marks of 
God’s kingdom in the world. They set the standard. Prayers and preaching are as 
important for witness in the world. Through prayers and preaching we tell the story to 
those who are like us and those strangers to us. And we claim fully the story of God. 
Finally we are called to be holy people who know how to live. 
 
Church: An idealised community?  No later than the publication of Peaceable 
Kingdom has Hauerwas’ church become a community in sharp contrast to the world. 
Hauerwas condemns Christian ethicists for collaborating with modern philosophers on 
the discipline of ethics.  
In Revisions, Changing perspectives in Moral Philosophy, Hauerwas claims,  
 
I have tried to suggest why the development of Christian ethics during this 
century provided no significant alternative to the dominant modes of ethical 
reflection done by philosophers. To be sure there are aspects in the work of 
Rauschenbusch, the Niebuhrs, Ramsey and Gufstafson that stand in sharp contrast 
with the accepted mode of doing philosophical ethics. But it is simply the case 
that their work has failed to influence or even to be taken very seriously by others 
working in ethics in a non-theological context (Hauerwas and MacIntyre (eds) 
1983:33).  
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Instead of trying to translate theological convictions into terms acceptable to 
philosophers, Hauerwas suggests that Christian theologians contribute to ethics using the 
resources within the Christian tradition, and not to accommodate the secular ethos. 
 
This coupled with important shifts in his personal life and in the field of theology caused 
Hauerwas to emphasise the sharp contrast between church and world. The Christian 
community is made up of a community who lives faithful to a certain way of life, even if 
that way of life is in conflict with the larger society. Belief in God requires from 
Christians to learn to see themselves as creatures and not creators. This causes division 
between those who insist on moral autonomy and those of the Christian community. We 
see how the dichotomy between the church and the world has become sharp in Resident 
Aliens, as he warns against identifying the church with secularism (radicalism and 
socialism). “There are those who take the same path, hoping to update the church. To 
recover some of the scandal of Jesus by identifying the church with the newest secular 
solution: Marxism, Feminism, and The Sexual Revolution” (Hauerwas and Willimon 
(eds.) 1989:27). 
 
Hauerwas’ notion of the church is now that the church is so different from the world that 
the church community has become alien to the world. In the titles of the books that 
followed this idea is reflected. The church community reflects little continuation with the 
world and is completely separated from the world.        
 
b. Community and Sin 
Despite the claims of situationalists and existentialists that ethical conclusions are claims 
by autonomous, exclusively rational intuitive free agents, we come to ethical conclusions 
with a history as social beings out of a community. To do Christian ethics apart from the 
community that forms those ethics artificially separates the moral self (Willimon 
1983:29). 
 
Some people’s capacity is so limited by their distorted history, or by their untrue story, 
that they have lost the ability to form character. Put differently their lives are shaped by 
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so many different stories that their unity of character is necessary to order the amount of 
loyalties in their lives. This dependence on the self, or autonomy, is what the Christian 
tradition refers to as sin. It is the Christian conviction that no one is so determined that he 
or she lacks the ability to respond and become part of the story of God. This conviction is 
based not on the ability of the self, but on the desire of God for all to be part of a truthful 
story. 
 
Christians stand in a history, and is to become part of the community who forms the 
history. The Christian cannot be a self by itself, but needs the other to become a self. 
When the Christian respond to the gift given by God (to enter the story), the need of the 
other draws a response. It is the need of the other that makes freedom possible to the self. 
Through the need of the other the self is able to overcome the greatest hindrance to 
freedom, the own-self absorption. 
 
When the self allows the otherness of the other to challenge the self, character is 
enriched. This happens through the doing of the other. The self then acquires character to 
the extent that the self can trust others to stand over and against the self. It is from them 
that the self learn the story that gives my life a purpose and direction. 
 
The other is not only the initiator of the character of the self, but also sustains it. We 
share a history that is open. It is past, present and future. Those who stand in this tradition 
or this story are those who have gone before us as well as those with us. We learn to trust 
the other to be held accountable to them. For such a story to continue, the life of Jesus 
Christ is the source of our character. We are no selves until we are the selves whom God 
called us to be.                    
 
In one of his most recent works, With the grain of the universe, Hauerwas continues with 
his use of character, narrative and community when he puts witness in the centre of the 
Christian story. In opting to focus on Karl Bath's interpretation of natural theology as 
unintelligible when separated from the full doctrine of God, Hauerwas emphasises 
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Barth's claim that Christians must be witnesses to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit 
(Hauerwas 2002:206). 
 
He furthermore suggests that witness also help us discover who we are. Knowledge of the 
witness comes through the re-telling of the story of God' creation and redemption of 
humanity. 
 
If what Christians believe about God and the world could be known without 
witnesses, then we would have evidence that what Christians believe about God 
and the world is not true. All that is, all that is creation, is a witness to the One 
alone who is capable of moving the sun and the stars as well as our hearts. If the 
world, and we existed by necessity, then to witness, not story of creation, would 
be required. But God did not have to create, much less redeem. Creation and 
redemption constitute the story necessary for us to know who we are. Such 
knowledge comes only through the telling of this story (Hauerwas 2002:207). 
 
Analysing the work of the two prominent Gifford lecturers, William James and Reinhold 
Niebuhr, he criticises them for narrowing the context of willing to an agency that remains 
individuated. He states that;  
 
Shaped by the practices of American culture, James limited the context of willing 
to an agency that remains ultimately individuated and, thus, abstracted not only 
from the community of knowers but from the traditions, histories, and narratives 
out of which the community must work. Niebuhr, too, limited himself to an 
individuated agency abstracted from the contexts that make agency intelligible, 
and thus, like James, he failed to follow his own best commitments, though these 
were not so much pragmatic as theological (Hauerwas 2002:240). 
 
3. Evaluation of Hauerwas’s virtue ethics 
Hauerwas is one of the most influential North American ethicists. His influence goes 
beyond North America and the Western world. Amongst those in the disciplines of 
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Philosophy and Christian ethics, Stanley Hauerwas’ work is widely read and discussed. 
His major contributions are in the field of Christian ethics with the notion of “virtue 
ethics”. Narrative, community and character are terms that were given new status in the 
field of ethics. Stanley Hauerwas, unlike other theologians and philosophers who do 
ethics based on natural law, brought a fresh and authoritative contribution to ethics. This 
is through narrative, community and character. Not only was this a challenge within the 
field of philosophy or ethics, but also to the church communities and church going as 
well. 
 
Major contributions by Stanley Hauerwas in the field of ethics firstly include the 
identification of the inadequacies of ethics by natural law. Hauerwas claims that natural 
law has the following difficulties. Firstly it creates a distorted moral psychology as the 
description of an act is determined by an observer without any reference to the 
dispositions of the agent. This leads to an emphasis on judgement on action from an 
observer’s point of view that Catholic moralists claim they want to avoid. Secondly 
natural law does not adequately account for how theological convictions are a morality, 
i.e. that it is to form the self and community and describe the world. Thirdly it confuses 
the claim that Christian ethics is an ethic that can be recommended to anyone with the 
claim that we know the content of that ethic by looking at the human. Fourthly it fails to 
see the diverse or fragmented world with many moralities; instead it sees one with a 
universal ethic. Fifthly because of its strong continuity between church and world, it fails 
to provide the “distance” the church needs to be critical towards the world in order to 
recognise and deal with the challenges presented by the communities and violence of the 
world. Sixthly it ignores the narrative character of Christian convictions. Lastly it leads to 
coercion of those who disagree with one another (Hauerwas 1983:63). 
 
Hauerwas’ second major contribution flows directly from his critique of natural law. 
Instead of doing ethics from the perspective of natural law, he developed a Christian ethic 
from Christian convictions. Christians, like non-Christians, are prone to moral autonomy, 
but the fact that they belong, or are willing to belong to a community that emphasise the 
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ritual, story, and others committed to God, separates them from non-Christians. Therefore 
he suggests that,  
 
Theologians, therefore, have something significant to say about ethics. But they 
will not say it significantly if they try to disguise the fact that they think, write and 
speak out of a distinctive community. Their first task is not, as has been assumed 
by many working in Christian ethics and still under the spell of Christendom, to 
write as though Christian commitments make no difference. In the sense that they 
only underwrite what everyone already in principle know, but rather to show what 
those commitments make42.   
 
These convictions, he claims are enacted and retold in the church community. The church 
community is the place where Christians learn to form ethics, and to form character. The 
notion “character of community” is a definite Christian ethic and makes a unique 
contribution to the field of ethics. 
 
A third contribution is Hauerwas’ engagement in the triumph over autonomous decision 
making. For the last twenty and more years theologians and philosophers have engaged in 
the debate between individualism and community. Hauerwas followed in the footsteps of 
Alasdair MacIntyre and James Gustafson, and other distinguished philosophers and 
theologians, to bring about the indispensable phenomenon of community to ethics. From 
the early eighties Hauerwas’ writings have been dominated by the importance of 
community. By the late eighties his notion of community was so well defined that he 
drew many to read and discuss his work with great seriousness. Hauerwas called the 
community, “the church community”, although he admitted that other images exist for 
this gathering such as “body of Christ”, “the way” and “people of God”. This precise and 
definite reference to the community, the church, has drawn not only praise, but also, 
criticisms for its sharp contrast and separation from the world. 
 
                                                          
42 Stanley Hauerwas and Alasdair MacIntyre (eds.), Revisions: Changing perspectives in Moral 
Philosophy, University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1983. 
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Fourthly, Hauerwas’ narrative way of seeing ethics is used by marginalised groups such 
as feminists to challenge distortion of the truth and discrimination on the basis of gender. 
Although he warns against collaboration with disguised secular solutions such as 
Marxism, Feminism, and the Sexual revolution, narrative provides a way of 
understanding the world and seeing the world as God’s kingdom. Sharon Welch, 
“feminist and post-structuralist ethicist” agrees with Hauerwas when he says that, 
“indictment of the coercion impulse is present in our communities, present even in some 
of our work for social justice43. She continues to claim,   
 
I am critical of an ethics of control, the assumption that we can impose our 
version of justice, of truth, of goodness on other people…Also like Hauerwas, I 
claim that there is no tradition-free account of facts, of reason, no narrative-free 
way to see the world44. 
  
A narrative way of responding to limits, and so to otherness, is an alternative to coercion 
and violence that leads to control and oppression. 
 
Through narrative we recognise that our communities, and our individual identities, are 
shaped by the limits caused by a deep embedded fear of the other. We seek to destroy or 
control those who are different. Hauerwas claims; “To be human is to fear the other - the 
other colour, the other language, the other culture, the other sex. Through narrative this 
fear can be constrained. It does not have to lead to coercion and violence” (Hauerwas 
1983:146). 
 
The fifth importance of Hauerwas’ “character in community” is his contribution to the 
discussion of churchgoing. In the Western society and other parts of the world where 
churchgoing has declined significantly for the last few decades, the notion of community 
contributes to analysing, understanding and explaining this phenomenon. Especially 
                                                          
43 In Christian Experience Today, The Ladyrinth Press, Durham, N.C. 1988, and After Christendom, 
Abingdon Press, Nashville, 1991.   
44 Sharon Welch, Communitarian ethics after Hauerwas in Studies in Christian ethics. Vol.10,1997:46.  
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Hauerwas’ later writings on community contribute significantly as it challenges Christian 
ethics with community as its major context for moral formation.                        
 
The Christian story: An unrealistic story with an idealised community 
Ethical critique of liturgy 
Hauerwas’s strongest criticisms come from those who question his description of the 
Christian story with its church community. In the latter part of his writings he made a 
clear distinction between church and world. As his description of the church became 
exclusive, the continuation of church and world became hostile and the relationship 
between ethics and liturgy, The Public story and Christian story, a one way process 
without any suggestion that The Public story can shape The Christian story. The church is 
the foretaste of God’s kingdom and the world is condemned through liberalism. The 
church is the community where Christians are socialised through the truthful narrative, 
the world is all those who do not believe in God and adheres to the stories of the “liberal 
society”. In Resident Aliens the contrast becomes sharper,  
 
Life in the colony is not a settled affair. Subject to constant attacks upon and 
sedition against its most cherished virtues, which in the name of freedom and 
equality subjugates everyone...the Christian colony can be appreciated by its 
members as a challenge (Hauerwas 1989:51). 
 
The church is a community with a specific and different language than the world. “Again 
it is important to remember that no practise more determines the churches being than how 
we have learned to speak the church’s language” (Hauerwas and Willimon (eds) 
1996:58). What the church means by the word “world” is different than what society 
means. For Christians to understand the distinct language, the formulations of habits and 
practices in the community, is important. 
 
Another difference between church and world or liberal society is the specific ways in 
which these communities are formed. Hauerwas claims that “liberal societies” are formed 
through ideas and systems. There is an assumption that right belief shapes right action or 
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right choice. Those who follow this idea are not only non-Christians, but theologians as 
well, who think that a near accurate interpretation or systematic presentation of theology 
is the primary means of doing right. The church on the other hand is formed not primarily 
on ideas but by involvement in Christian communities. The church is less formed by 
“what we think”, than by “what is shaping our desires, our bodies”. Hauerwas concludes,  
 
I am convinced; moreover, that the only way to discover such practices is to 
describe what goes on in actual churches. Put quite simply, I want to ask if 
congregations can sustain a culture able to provide some resistance to the world 
that threatens to reduce Christianity to mere belief (Hauerwas 1998:160). 
 
This is a fundamental point by Hauerwas as it forces us to look at what forms the 
community, or what forms character. This is a unique contribution by virtue ethics to the 
question of the relationship between the church and the world, which is central to this 
essay. 
 
Another difference lies in the task of the church and that of the world. The task of the 
church (the first task) is to be the church. The task of the church is not to make the world 
more just but to be the church in order for the world to know what the world is. Miroslav 
Volf45 provides us with an explicit explanation when he says that the difference between 
the church and world is a self-difference. This does not mean a “weak” difference. The 
Christian difference is not one that is open to coercion. By that we do not mean that the 
world is made evil and has fallen. The world and church have both fallen and are 
redeemed by the cross. The difference is that this is recognised by the church and it 
attempts to live according to that knowledge. The world does not know this. Jesus has 
entrusted the salvation of the world to the church and not the world (Hauerwas 1996:53-
54). The church that Hauerwas talks about is an eschatological one, and so the task of the 
church is eschatological. The church’s task is to carry the history of God so that the world 
may know where it began, as a creation of God. 
 
                                                          
45 Miraslav Volf, Ex Auditu 10, 1994, Pp.15-30. 
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The first task of the church (to make the world see itself as the world) becomes more 
intelligible if we understand that you only act in the world that you can see and learn to 
say. To be the church is to submit to a certain language. This language is not a set of 
words, but a set of practices. These practices are done in the church through rites and 
rituals. Christians do not speak as the world speak, but speak as they are formed by habits 
learned in the church. The task of the world is to respond to the church and not only 
speak like the church, but to form habits/character in the church. The task of the world is 
to embrace the church, by making the church’s story the world’s story. 
 
Although Hauerwas develops a sharp contrast between church and world over a number 
of years, he does not seem to suggest that the church and world are two independent 
entities. Although the church community is made up of different people (those who 
adhere to the Christian story) than those of the world (those with a distorted story - liberal 
society), the world needs the church to recognise itself. The church needs to be faithful to 
the world for the world to be saved. However, the contrast between church community 
and world community is so sharp that it is almost impossible to identify a relationship 
between world and church save from coercion and violence.     
 
This sharp contrast between church and world has also drawn criticism from 
distinguished theologians such as David Ferguson46 and Robin Gill47. Their criticism of 
Hauerwas' church as non-existent or that it as a sect is easily identifiable in Hauerwas’ 
development of his church community in his later writings. What this means for the 
relationship between ethics and liturgy is that worship influences ethics because the 
church community is where the Christians are formed through a truthful story (through 
worship). But because Hauerwas’ church community is so far removed from 
society/world, it is impossible (according to his interpretation of the church community) 
for the society/ethics to influence the church community. 
 
                                                          
46 Liberalism, Community and Christian Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988.  
47 Churchgoing and Christian Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.   
 150 
Hauerwas’ church community, formed through socialisation, is an illusion, so far as he 
rejects the possibility that Christians spend most of their time in the secular community. 
Whether it is at the workplace, at social clubs, at home or educational institutions, these 
places have communities and are formed by stories. The participants are formed by the 
stories. They might be different communities with different stories, but the participants 
overlap. Hauerwas rejects this fact completely as for him the only truthful story and so 
the only community is the church community. 
 
Robin Gill successfully points out three distinct positions with regard to the relation 
between moral communities and postmodernism as adopted in both philosophy and 
theology48. The first argues that a legitimate community is only possible within cultural-
linguistic communities. The second recognises the fact that communities overlap and 
compete for primacy. The third position argues that moral values and virtues are formed 
in communities, but that certain moral “planks” apply across cultures. Hauerwas’ 
exclusivism seems to fit in the first position, whereas MacIntyre’s (whom Hauerwas calls 
his brother and whose work he uses extensively) seems to develop in the second or 
possibly the third direction. In the West where people belong to more than one 
community, and less to the church, as churchgoers, Hauerwas’ position is clearly 
unrealistic and contrary to the idea that virtues are formed in actual communities.       
 
The first position on moral communities leaves no room for interaction between church 
and world save from the church influencing the world through being the church, and so 
ethics has no influence over the worship. In the second and third positions there is at least 
interaction between communities, and so possible interaction between church and world. 
So interaction between The Public story and The Christian story with the one influencing 
the other is possible. 
 
In a sense Hauerwas’ church community based on similarity is exclusive and rejects 
diversity. He defines a church that has an exclusive story, and those belonging to such a 
church community are socialised into forming a distinguished character. Faithfulness to a 
                                                          
48 Moral Communities In a Post-modern Age, T and T Clark, Edinburgh, 1997, p.67f. 
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truthful narrative is imperative for such a community to exist and sustain itself. No other 
story or community is considered to be important for the forming of character. According 
to Hauerwas, character is formed by such a community and not cohesion and violence. 
What he does not consider is that similarity can cause violence and diversity growth. 
Learning from other narratives, histories and experiences of other communities, can be 
the way of guarding against cohesion and violence. 
 
Hauerwas needs to see the church as it is. At one point he recognises the shortcomings of 
the church community,  
 
The scandal of the disunity of the church is even more painful when we recognise 
this social task. For we who have been called to be the foretaste of the peaceable 
kingdom cannot, it seems, maintain unity among ourselves. And the divisions I 
speak of in the church are not just those based on doctrine, history or practices 
important as they are. No, the deep and most painful divisions afflicting the 
church are those based on class, race, and nationality that we have sinfully 
accused as written into the nature of things (Hauerwas 1983:100). 
Nowhere does he suggest that other stories can contribute to cohesion and character. 
 
Hauerwas intensifies similarity by rejecting the works of theologians such as Richard H 
Niebuhr whom he used extensively in his writings in the early stages of his virtue ethics. 
One can argue that it is precisely because Hauerwas rejected diversity in favour of 
similarity. Richard H Niebuhr’s49 idea of history as both internal and external must surely 
suggest that the stories of the society/world are important for the church community. 
 
Character formation based on community and narrative cannot reject the fact that The 
Public story influences The Christian story. The ethics of Feminism, Marxism and 
Ecology influence worship (liturgy). Not only the words in the liturgy have changed (a 
change which Hauerwas rejects outright), but the “language context” is influenced. These 
kinds of ethics influence stories, histories and so communities. Christians who do belong 
                                                          
49 Richard, H Niebuhr, Responsible Self, Macmillan Publishers, London, 1941. 
 152 
to such communities (secular communities) approach worship in the way that they have 
been socialised. This is not necessarily destructive, but constructive, as diversity is 
constructive. 
 
In a sense one’s criticism about the relationship between The Christian story and The 
Public story cannot be too harsh because Hauerwas does not use liturgy extensively. He 
does not claim to be a liturgist and therefore refers to this relationship more implicitly 
than explicitly. One can, however, imply that narrative and community, viewed from 
such an exclusive point of view can only be formed in worship/liturgy.  
 
Hauerwas gives a brief description of church going and its importance by citing his 
personal church attendance at a number of churches over the last decade (Hauerwas 
1998:160-164). His reason for leaving a number of churches he gives as, “…not only 
because the liturgy was so thin but because of the stupidity displayed in the sermon. I am 
a layman who happens to be a theologian - a dangerous combination” (Hauerwas 
1998:160). The church he “liked and joined” was in Chapel Hill. Chapel Hill is a 
university community, which means that the educational level of the church is higher 
than the one he attended before. It is interesting to note that somewhere else Hauerwas 
rejects any change in the words of the liturgy, as being significant, yet he claims the 
reason for leaving certain churches was the inadequacy of the liturgy. 
 
The means of telling and enacting a story can differ and be done in more than one way. 
Feminists have played an important role in reminding us of the exclusiveness of the 
liturgy and so the telling of the Christian story. What has started with inclusive language 
has given rise to women’s ordination and subsequently a more inclusive way of telling 
the Christian story. This more inclusive way of telling The Christian story is also a 
selective story. To this I will come later in the research. Hauerwas might agree that his 
academic level (and the community it represents) helped him in deciding his worship 
community and so the enactment of The Christian story. 
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The worship community is not the only community that shapes character or the self. The 
worship community is an important if not the most important community that forms 
Christian character or morality. This can only be fully understood and experienced if we 
realise that The Christian story enjoys a relationship with the Public story that is in 
interaction. 
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Chapter Five 
Robin Gill and Stephen Sykes: Moral communities and moral 
formation. 
Introduction  
Christian ethics as an academic discipline has taken tremendous strides in the Western 
world as well as the developing world. This has largely been because of the prophetic 
role of the church. The church as moral community is called upon to lead the debate on 
morality and right moral choices. The church has regained this role mainly through two 
ways. The one is the structural influence the church has despite the decline in church 
attendance in the Western world and secondly through the fairly new phenomenon in 
ethics, that of community. In Britain for example the church’s role is prophetic mainly 
because of its powerful structure and the position of the church hierarchy in the British 
political make-up. On the academic level the most influential theologians have stood their 
ground by overcoming individualism with communitarianism. The latter has particularly 
been influential as the phenomenon of plurality and globalization has become the context 
for moral and ethical practices and choices. 
 
The situation in South Africa is not very different. Plurality is becoming the context for 
moral debate. The constitution of the country spells this out very clearly;  (1) “When 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum- (a) must promote the values that 
underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law"50. Expression of 
such values is practiced based on universal principles. The implications for Christians are 
that they cannot express their convictions in public save from sustaining such a social 
order. It is often argued that explicit Christian language will offend other agents in a 
pluralistic society. And therefore Christians express their most fundamental values 
through democratic social processes. If this is the case then Christians do not only loose 
their prophetic role, but they also stand to loose their identity as church. In the name of 
                                                          
50 The South African constitution, 1996. 
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so-called plurality Christians in South Africa become just another community like any 
other that is sociologically defined.  
 
Section 15. (1) of the Bill of Rights reads as follows; “Everyone has the right to freedom 
of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion”. This section also supports plurality 
and globalization to be the context for an appropriate morality, ethical conduct and right 
choices. This section of the Bill of Rights further suggests that at least part of the South 
African society is fast becoming like their Western counterparts, a postmodern society. 
One of the pillars of postmodernism is the break away from one of the pillars of 
modernism, that of individualism. Community is the phenomena consisting of individuals 
with complimentary actions towards a common good. The Christian community is one of 
such communities with a story that forms morality. Unlike the democratic social process 
this story is one that socializes and not presents choices.                       
 
Whereas Hauerwas’s idea of “character in community” developed in an exclusive 
community, the Anglican notion of community is more inclusive. If Wainwright views 
the relationship of the Christian story and the Public story from an ecumenical 
perspective, Anglican theologians speak of the relationship from a specific tradition. 
 
Anglican theologians, especially Gill and Sykes, contribute significantly to the present 
inquiry into the relationship between The Public story and The Christian story. The 
strength of the Anglican contribution to the debate lies precisely in the weaknesses of the 
two perspectives discussed - that of Geoffrey Wainwright and Stanley Hauerwas. With 
regard to Wainwright we notice that his attempt of analyzing the relationship between the 
two stories lacks consistency. This lack of consistency is because of the overemphasis on 
ecumenism. Hauerwas on the other hand is so precise in his notion of the church as the 
community for character formation that the contrast between church and world suggests 
that only a hostile relationship can exist. Anglican theology has something important to 
contribute to this debate for it is more inclusive. Yet it has a distinctive identity.  
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I will substantiate these claims by evaluating the work of Robin Gill, prominent Christian 
ethicist, and Stephen Sykes who is influenced by Gill's work. They are both respected 
Anglican theologians who serve as both academics and in the church's official 
hierarchical structures. 
 
1. Robin Gill 
The inclusive nature of Anglican Theology is well presented by Robin Gill51, Michael 
Ramsey professor at the University of Kent at Canterbury and canon at Canterbury 
Cathedral. Anglican Theology is inclusive in its approach to Christian Theology (as 
pointed out by Stephen Sykes), and as illustrated by Robin Gill’s approach to other 
disciplines. Robin Gill is well qualified in his inter-disciplinary approach as he holds 
postgraduate degrees in both sociology and theology. His writings show that theology 
benefits as much from other disciplines as it influences other disciplines. This approach is 
different than that of Wainwright and Hauerwas who reject other disciplines or simply 
use it to dismiss the influence it has on theology and Christianity. The latter is evident in 
Hauerwas’ use of sociology. 
 
Apart from his inter-disciplinary approach Robin Gill uses empirical research with regard 
to the relationship between worship and moral formation. His use of empirical and 
statistical analysis in a broad spectrum of Christian communities contributes significantly 
to the community-orientated approach to moral formation. This approach (community 
oriented) has given new confidence to the church and especially to moral formation. The 
victory over individual decision-making (which has dominated philosophy and ethics) 
gave way for Christian ethicists to speak with new authority independent of philosophy. 
The new confidence contributed significantly to the debate about the relationship 
between the Public story and the Christian story in the form of virtue, community and 
                                                          
51 He has held distinguish positions as William Leech Professorial Fellow in Applied Theology at The 
University of Newcastle upon Tyne from 1988-1992, Senior Lecturer, Department of Christian Ethics and 
Practical theology, University of Edinburgh, Associate Dean, Faculty of Divinity, University of Edinburgh, 
1985-1988, He has also held a number of church appointments, including Theological consultant to the 
Lambeth Conference of Anglican Bishops 1997-1998, Honorary Canon 1992 until present and member of 
Archbishop of Canterbury's theological advisory group, Lambeth Palace 1988-1999. His teaching field 
includes, sociology of religion, Christian ethics, science of religion, theology and ethics and health care 
ethics.   
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character. Some ethicists (including Hauerwas and his colleague Willimon) developed 
the notion of community in an unrealistic phenomenon. Their sense of community (the 
church community) is difficult to identify safe from a hostile relationship with the world. 
Empirical research and statistical analysis refer to actual communities in which character 
is formed.  
 
Theology and other sciences 
The following provocative claim by Robin Gill sets him apart from many of his 
contemporaries,  
 
As a theologian, I believe that it is essential for theology to continue rigorous self-
criticism: theology is essentially a dynamic discipline in which concepts are tested 
afresh in each age and culture. In our own age and culture the social sciences 
should be playing a more important role, alongside philosophical and historical 
methods, in the dynamic process of discovery and re-discovery (Gill 1996:146).  
 
The relationship between theology and other social sciences is consistent with the break 
away of Christian ethicists from the philosophical view of autonomous decision-making. 
If theologians are able to use sciences other than theology, then they are able to move 
beyond the cognitive aspect, at which philosophers get stuck. This is the creative tension 
between faith and practise. 
 
Faith and practice (praxis theology) have got two basic features. Firstly, sociological 
techniques and theories can be used to arbitrate the validity of differing theological 
claims or particular interpretations of theological notions. Secondly, such an approach to 
theology would set out the social implications of particular theological positions in a 
systematic way. This is of particular significance to the influence that the rehearsal of the 
Christian story has on moral formation and vice versa. 
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How faith and practice are related 
Marxism and Marxist thinkers contributed significantly to this approach. Marxist thinkers 
suggest an alternative to the separation of ideas (as belonging to philosophy) and human 
behaviour (as belonging to social sciences). Ideas as ideas are rejected in favour of a 
synthesis between ideas and behaviour. This inseparable view of ideas and behaviour is 
consistent with the Christian perspective of faith and practise. For Christians, belief and 
faith statements are not simply cognitive or recitations of religious knowledge. They are 
commitments to its implementation and have their origins not as isolated statements, but 
in relation to society and the worship where it finds meaning.  
 
Faith is related to practice by means of the commitment made by those expressing the 
faith statement or creed. The faith statement is different to belief and practise because a 
faith statement has a commitment implicit within the statement. Belief in a philosophical 
sense does not include commitment as in the case of faith. The term “practice” is 
intentionally broad as it includes both intentional and unintentional modes of behaviour. 
Here we find that an inter-disciplinary approach is consistent with the break away from 
philosophy with regard to ethics. This approach is not hostile to other disciplines 
(including philosophy), but enjoys a mutually enriching relationship (Gill 1996:156). 
 
The inter-disciplinary approach of theology is significant for the relationship between 
worship and moral formation. It can be applied in the same way as in “faith and practice” 
as long as social sciences are viewed as a continuing partner and not a discontinued 
entity. Although neither worship nor moral formation are beliefs or faith statements, 
doctrines are statements of faith. This point is further given support as Wainwright 
suggests that a relationship between worship and moral formation can only be seen as one 
in which doctrine is made a partner. Doctrine however influences moral formation as 
long as it is part of worship. In this sense the inter-disciplinary approach is the same for 
the relationship between worship and moral formation.   
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Worship and Empirical Research 
In a response to Lindbeck’s52 cultural-linguistic theory, which presupposes that all 
communities are formed by scripture, Gill suggests that worship make a better case. In a 
society where people do not read the Bible simply because of lack of interest, worship 
remains a distinctive feature. Empirical research suggests that there is a link between 
worship and moral behaviour and moral attitudes. A number of surveys53 show that 
regular church going is correlated with moral standpoints.  
 
The European Value Systems have instructively suggested that regular church 
going be strongly correlated with unpaid voluntary work in the community. For 
example, the 1990 survey found that 27 percent of voluntary workers claimed to 
go to church at least once a week- a figure almost three times above the national 
church going rate. And in the 1981 survey attendance at religious services at least 
once a month was found to be the most significant variable-for once ahead of 
gender, age or social class-predicting whether someone is involved in voluntary 
work54. 
    
Empirical research supports the idea that community is not cognitive-oriented as 
philosophy’s liberal autonomy suggests. Gill suggests that the findings of the Princeton 
sociologist Robert Wuthnow on support groups in modern America are helpful. 
Wuthnow55 suggests that 40 per cent of the American population now belong to support 
groups. The following is evidence of the link between community and moral attitudes in 
this “individualistic society”. 
 
                                                          
52 The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Post-liberal Age, Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 
and SPCK, London, 1984. 
53 Robin Gill, Moral Communities, Exeter University Press, Exeter, 1992, Pp16-20. “For the European 
Value System see M. Abrams, D Gerard and N Timms (eds.), Values and Social change in Britain: stories 
in the contemporary values of Modern Society, MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1985, and N Timms, Family and 
Citizenship: Values in Contemporary Britain, Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1992”.     
54 Robin Gill, ‘Moral Communities and Christian Ethics’, in Studies in Christian Ethics, Vol.8, No1, 1995, 
p.9. 
55 Sharing the Journey: Support groups and America’s New quest for community, The Free Press, New 
York, 1994. 
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Whilst 77 per cent of those surveyed did work with the group to help someone 
inside the group’, 62 per cent also worked ‘with the group to help other people in 
need outside of the group. 56 per cent reported that as a result of belonging to the 
group they had become more interested in peace or social justice and 43 per cent 
had become involved in work in the community. 57 per cent of those in the 
groups also donated to other charitable organisations. Specifically church based 
group members reported that as a result of their membership they now took a 
more active part in other programs sponsored by their church (62 per cent) and 
had increased their giving to their church (50 per cent)56.                  
 
The results indicate that people are encouraged to help those outside their group as well 
as to play an active role in voluntary agencies. The mutual support and encouragement, 
instead of cognitive ability, encourage participation in the church and society. These 
results support the fact that worship form community that is not exclusive, but inclusive. 
A continuation between church and society exists that is consistent, mutual, creative, 
diverse, and yet realistic. 
 
Gill discusses two other levels of Christian ethics. They are legitimation and 
institutionalisation. The first refers to the indispensability of scripture for community. 
The latter refers to church bodies and its moral stances. In all of the three levels plurality 
is an important feature. To this he suggests an alternative in the form of individual 
prophet, uniform sect, inter-church movement and the values in tension of the church. 
While the first three can proclaim unified moral positions, they cannot expect to represent 
the whole of Christianity. The fourth position acknowledges that churches are divided on 
most moral issues, but maintaining a unity in diversity beyond them. Gill concludes with 
a clear description, which is also the stance of Anglican Theology, “On this approach 
(which I finally share myself) the most we can expect to have in common are biblically 
consonant values or virtues held in tension…”57. 
 
                                                          
56 Robin Gill, ‘Moral Communities and Christian Ethics’, Studies in Christian Ethics, Vol8, No1, 1995, 
p.10. 
57 ‘Moral Communities and Christian Ethics’, Studies in Christian Ethics, Vol.8, No1, 1995, p.13. 
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2. Stephen Sykes 
Sykes, known for his work in systematic theology and more precisely in doctrine, is 
without doubt one of the most influential Anglican scholars of recent times. His major 
contributions include the field of worship. This is particularly evident in his writing of 
The Identity of Christianity: Theologians and the Essence of Christianity from 
Schleiermacher to Barth.58 In this essay worship is a prominent feature and continues to 
be indispensable to theology and moral formation in his later writings. On the pastoral 
level his influence is considerable as he served the Church of England as vicar, canon and 
bishop of Ely.  
 
There are important points of contact between the writings of Hauerwas and Sykes. 
Narrative, community and character are prominent features of Sykes’ writings. With 
regard to narrative, his writings on doctrinal issues such as sacrifice and sacraments 
become almost synonymous with reference to it. In the same way community and 
worship are almost interchangeable concepts. Ethics is described as character rather than 
law or decision-making. In discussing the theology of sacrifice he concludes,  
 
But the concepts of sacrifice, of story and of character require each other. 
Sacrifice of Christ is told by means of the narrative of God’s response to human 
rebellion, and of Jesus’ self-oblation, the stories constitute event and character in 
intention, and provide the criterion for the human realization of the divine purpose 
in history. And the three concepts - sacrifice, story and character are located in 
worship (Sykes 1991:297). 
 
a. Narrative, doctrine and symbol 
Despite the point of contact between Hauerwas and Sykes with regard to narrative, 
community and character, Sykes points out the distinctiveness of the Anglican approach 
to these concepts. Narrative is important for the relationship between worship and moral 
formation. Whereas Hauerwas refers to the story of Israel, the birth, ministry, death and 
resurrection of Jesus as a truthful story, Sykes acknowledges the existence of more than 
                                                          
58 Stephen S Sykes, SPCK, London, 1984.   
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one story. He demonstrates this by discussing sacrifice as a doctrinal issue in relation to 
narrative. 
 
Sykes concludes that sacrifice in the Old and New Testament has both similarities and 
differences. Sacrifice in the New Testament is both an inheritance from the Old 
Testament, and has undergone transformation. The death of Christ for example is seen as 
a sacrifice (inherited from the Old Testament), but also as the ultimate sacrifice. The fact 
that Jesus is merely a sacrifice, a continuation of the Old Testament, is of concern as it 
de-personalizes his death. On the other hand, the fact that he is the sacrifice emphasizes 
the story by which he came to suffer that death. Implied in the story is that he accepted 
the consequences of his ministry, teaching and activities. This sacrifice is then one of 
self-offering.  
 
The way of speaking about Jesus’ death as the sacrifice is not one of suicide, but 
the particular narrative as recorded in the Gospels. This narrative needs further 
interpretation if we are to transform it for new roles in the Christian tradition 
(Sykes 1991:294). 
 
This narrative of Jesus’ death is not just one of self-offering. There is a larger context 
provided by Jesus’ Sonship in which this is set. A close analysis of the New Testament 
evidence suggests that there are two main narratives with two main characters, God and 
Jesus. These two narratives are neither independent of each other, nor are they 
assimilated. No New Testament scholar suggests the two as one. The one has to do with 
God appointing Jesus to deal with sin, the other with Jesus’ voluntary self-offering. 
 
How does Sykes explain the two different stories? He introduces the idea of symbols 
which both Wainwright and Hauerwas neglect. Of symbolism Sykes says the 
following,  
 
Symbolism is never precisely determinable. Its power lies in the breadth of its 
resonance, not in the clarity of its definition. A symbol establishes itself in a 
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system of communication and may in time respond to changes taking place in 
other places of the system. In the case of sacrifice, which is a symbolic means of 
communication with the divine there are considerable possibilities for 
interpretative development (Sykes 1991:294).  
 
Although two narratives exist, symbolism makes it possible for continuation. Yet 
distinction between the narratives of Jesus and that of God is visible. The potential of 
both narratives is present in the paradoxical ascription of Jesus as sacrificial victim and of 
high priest. This is best illustrated in the Epistle to the Hebrews.  Sykes warns us that the 
narratives occur in different contexts and the attempt to make it one exposes the texts to 
misinterpretation and “drawing the inference of suicide” (Sykes 1991:295).    
 
b. Worship, community and symbol 
It is difficult to state conclusively whether Sykes argues for the primacy or the 
normativeness of worship for theology. In an interesting interplay (Sykes 1991:282-283) 
between Ninian Smart’s 59 idea that religious experience is not only one dimension 
amongst many, but that it animates the other five, and Newman’s60 idea that theology is 
the fundamental and regulating principle of the Church system, he states both positions 
with equal respect and importance. Instead of suggesting a conclusive one way 
movement, Sykes attempts to remain inclusive in his approach. Of this relationship he 
says,  
 
Christianity originates in a transformation of Judaism. That is to say, it 
presupposes the existence and activities of the complex social organization known 
as Judaism. This social organization is not abolished by a revelatory legislative 
fiat; it is transformed from the inside by new conduct and example, supported by 
shifts of emphasis in fundamental mythology. It takes full advantage of the wide 
diversity and, to an extent, vacuity of religious ritual, to promote new freedoms. 
These freedoms both reflect and are supported by claimed new experiences…the 
                                                          
59 The Concept of Worship, Macmillan, London, 1972. 
60 The Via Media, (3rd edn.) Pickering, London, 1877. 
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new ways of being acting and thinking do not emerge in a single co-ordinate 
package. The documentary evidence reveals what one would expect, namely a 
movement in process of taking shape at different places and in a variety of ways 
(Sykes 1991:285).     
 
Worship understood from this perspective is the reality of the divine-human relationship. 
“The terms of this relationship are reconstructed by Jesus in a transformation of 
Judaism”. This kind of transformation changes the story told of God, but the change is in 
fact a changed interior reality (Sykes 1991:286). 
 
Is such worship communal or individual?  The claim that worship is a direct 
inheritance from the Jewish matrix out of which Christian worship developed might 
suggest that Christian worship is solitary or individual. Sykes makes it clear that although 
Jewish worship has a tradition of individualism, which springs from the emphasis of the 
heart, Christian worship has transformed that form of worship into communal worship. 
The secret self is never totally separated from a social context. Solitary worship is 
connected to the community in two ways. Firstly by the mere fact that solitary prayer is a 
practice enjoyed by all the members of the community (Matt. 5:1), secondly, the aim of 
solitary prayer is to bring about the Kingdom of God upon the earth (Matt.6: 10). Solitary 
prayers can separate the self physically from the community, but not psychologically. 
Both look forward to and imply a community of belief, ethos or tradition. In this sense we 
speak of communal worship and not individual worship (Sykes 1991:267-278). 
 
The source of this community is worship. By worship we mean not only the recitation of 
liturgies, but also the offering of the self of which liturgical participation is the focus. For 
Anglicans and Christians from similar traditions the rites of baptism and Eucharist are 
principally concerned with belonging to the church. For those who are regarded as 
genuine members of the church, the Church is defined by baptism61. In this sense 
                                                          
61 In a new canon law, in process of being drafted, this fact is re-emphasised. Up and till recently 
confirmation was regarded as full membership into the Anglican Church. With the introduction of 
admission to first Holy Communion for children, this position has been reviewed. Although a new canon 
law has not been made publicly by the church authorities it is widely accepted as the churches new practise.    
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worship is related to the community by means of interplay between the external form, 
ritual, and the inwardness of worship. The relationship between the community and 
worship is not only a one way process but also one in which interplay takes place. In this 
case the external rites (baptism as the rite for entry into community) enjoy interplay with 
the inwardness of worship (the heart).    
 
The communal character of worship raises another complex but important issue for our 
investigation, namely the diverse acts of worship. Diversity of cultures, traditions and 
experiences make it practically impossible for the church to have one form of worship or 
one single liturgy. What is required for the unity of the church is a coherent set of 
liturgies from a single competent and recognized authority (Sykes 1984:284). 
 
Symbols 
Sykes draws attention toa neglected character namely symbols, to demonstrate the 
inclusiveness of worship and community. Of diversity, difference and continuation, he 
says,  
But common symbolic forms have a vital capacity to create unity, rather to set 
boundaries on the rage of diversity, and a Church, which sets store upon harmony 
and reconciliation will plainly not give unrestricted license to local idiosyncrasies 
(Sykes 1984:284). 
Religious symbols are characterized by their participation in the reality and open up a 
level of reality that is otherwise hidden from the community. The level of reality is the 
transcendent level, which is God. Other symbols are important for understanding and 
experiencing God in that divine-human relationship. Symbols understood in this sense 
make the interplay between internal and external possible and help the community to 
discover themselves, and their identity, through worship. The community is also able to 
contribute to worship in this kind of relationship. 
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 c. Character formation and symbol 
Like Hauerwas, Sykes also maintains that character is formed in community, and more 
specifically in the church community. Sykes concludes that, “…character is formed in the 
matrix which worship constitutes, where the natural human centers of self and society are 
challenged by the displacement provided by the divine forms” (Sykes 1991:297). How 
does Sykes come to this conclusion? He discusses character, as he does with narrative, in 
relation to sacrifice. 
Jesus’ sacrificial death as a self-offering is viewed as a consistent expression in time and 
place of both words and intentions. In other words demonstrated in Jesus’ history or story 
is a consistent desire of good conduct, words and deeds. Failure to maintain such 
consistency leads to hypocrisy. Hypocrisy is deception or misleading of others, the self or 
the community. 
Two features of the Old Testament development of sacrificial teaching are of help. These 
are (1) insistence on honest contrition and (2) genuine and obedient fulfillment of the 
terms of the covenant. Worship is genuine interior and exterior conformity to the divine 
will. Because the sacrifice of Christ is in line with his intention, words and deeds, the 
divine-human relationship entails an equally consistent interior and exterior conformity. 
Humans are to offer themselves in both body and soul. 
Sacrificial language about human behavior can be used carelessly which might result in 
legitimating “masochism, or ostentatious heroics, or manipulative forms of blackmail”62. 
For Christians the sacrifice of Christ is a theological symbol, set in a specific context 
provided by doctrines of creation and the last things. Failure of sacrifice to provide the 
“hoped-for key” to problems such as social ethics lies, in the failure of theologians to 
locate the doctrine in its relevant context. 
                                                          
62 For a detailed discussion see Gilley’s Perase’s sacrifice; Christ and Cuchuulain crucified and risen in 
the Easter Rising, 218-234 and Loades’, Eucharistic sacrifice: the problem of how to use a liturgical 
metaphor, with special reference to Simone Weil, Pp247-261 in Stephen W Sykes, Sacrifice and 
Redemption: Durham Essays in Theology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991. 
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That the human situation requires nothing less than the self-oblation of the Son of 
God provides an emphatic negation of romantic or optimistic theories of human 
self-offering. That this offering was offered voluntarily, in the human form, is 
likewise the deathblow to masochistic or pessimistic theories of human self-
offering. The criterion of the divine self-offering, as expounded in the narrative 
and teaching of the Son of God, commits one who belongs in it to a searching 
exploration of his or her own motives and deeds (Sykes 1991:296).           
 
Two remarkable examples can be traced in the New Testament that illustrates this 
criterion; one applies to self-understanding and the other to social activity. In Romans 3: 
21-25 Paul expands the principle of salvation apart from the law. The death of Christ 
entails our death to law and his resurrection our resurrection to new life. The rising to 
new life is no easy matter since it involves a struggle between a principle of flesh and the 
inmost self (Romans7: 22). It is the quality of the narratives of Christ’s death which 
expose the wretchedness of the divided human condition. This demonstrates a remarkable 
example of self-offering and the complexity of human motivation. 
 
In the second instance Paul uses the sacrificial death of Christ to rectify the Corinthian 
church on their divisions with regard to table fellowship. The Corinthians assumed that 
participation in the Christian fellowship was equivalent to sincerity and truth and evil and 
malice is foreign to the community. Paul, however, observes that the divisions amongst 
them at the Lord’s Supper disqualify them as being part of the Lord’s Supper. The new 
covenantal relationship in the body and blood of Christ consists of a proclamation in 
word and deed of the sacrificial death. Such a proclamation does not take place if the 
church is socially divided (Sykes 1991:296-297). 
      
Participation in the Lord’s Supper, which is participation in the sacrificial death of Christ, 
requires a particular quality of human self-offering. Social relations are included in this 
requirement. The divisions of class, race and status are put to death. Participation in the 
fellowship meal does not mean obedience to laws (as illustrated by Paul), but formation 
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of character. Divisions that are caused by selfish autonomy are overcome by communal 
character formation. Being part of the Lord’s Supper is not about selfish, autonomous 
goals, but about community based motives.   
 
With regard to character, Sykes concludes, “Character is the arena in which inherited 
social conventions and selfish individual motivation struggle with the will for the good. 
To actualize the character of Christ in history is the supreme vocation of the Christian 
church” (Sykes 1991:297). 
 
The concepts of narrative, community and character need each other if we are to explore 
the relationship between the Christian story and the Public story. Narrative, community 
and character on its own cannot adequately account for this relationship. The three 
concepts have a particular role in the relationship. However this role is not independent 
of the inter-dependence of the three. Only if we acknowledge and apply the three 
concepts as inter-dependent entities can we find an intelligible relationship. 
 
Sykes breaks away from Hauerwas at the point of liberalism.  Hauerwas speaks strongly 
against liberal society and liberalism, as he contrasts the church and the world. The 
church for him (Hauerwas) is the community where Christians are socialised, while the 
world is all those who do not belief in God and is formed by distorted stories of the 
liberal society. Marxism, Feminism and The Sexual Revolution are included in 
Hauerwas’ notion of liberalism. These are not regarded as contributing factors to the 
formation of community. This is consistent with the exclusive view of Hauerwas’ virtue 
ethics. 
 
Sykes does not reject liberalism and the contribution it makes to community. Consistent 
with his inclusive view of Christianity, he suggests that liberalism needs a more critical 
approach for it to be appreciated for its contribution to worship and ethics. Whereas 
Hauerwas approaches the concept of liberalism from the common way of it being a 
construct to dismiss or reject certain beliefs or doctrines, Sykes appreciates a closer 
examination of the concept and its meaning. 
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 In a moderate attempt to clear such misconceptions held by Hauerwas and others, Sykes 
points out the weaknesses of dismissing liberalism. Rigid and narrow presentations of 
liberalism raise complex questions. One example is illustrated in this quote,  
 
Liberalism is the culmination of a development that goes back to the Hebrew 
prophets, the teachings of the pre-Socratic philosophers, and the Sermon on the 
Mount, from all of which there emerged a sense of the importance of human 
individuality, a liberation of the individual from the complete subservience to the 
group, and a relaxation of the tight hold of custom, law and authority63.  
 
This suggests that we accepted the sayings of Jesus such as; “You have heard what our 
forefathers were, but what I tell you is this…” (Matthew 5: 33-34) as suggesting 
relaxation of authority. In the same way the definition suggests the existence of forms of 
group-consciousness, which do not amount to complete subordination. Boundaries are 
erected without any clear indication of where and how. 
 
Related to the liberation of the individual is the Christian doctrine for the sacredness of 
each individual human being, while it opposes worldly success and material abundance 
which is the demand for individual success. Critics of liberalism tell a different story as a 
response from Professor Bhikhu Parekh against liberalism’s collusion with colonialist 
intolerance suggests. He depicts non-liberal societies in positive terms as,  
 
Those bound together by familial, kinship, religious and other ties do not see 
themselves as independent and self contained ontological units involved in 
specific kinds of relationships with others, but rather as bearers of overlapping 
selves whose identities are constituted by and incapable of being defined in 
isolation from these relationships. Individual and self are distinct and their 
boundaries do not coincide, so that naturally distinct individuals may and do share 
their selves in common64. 
                                                          
63 Liberalism, Encyclopaedia Britannia, 1977, 10:846. 
64 B Pareth, "Superior People", in Times literary supplement, 25 February 1994, No 4743, p.12. 
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 What can be gathered from this is that the Christian religion has its “feet” in both 
liberalism and what appears to be its alternative. We cannot therefore reject liberalism or 
liberal society outright or simply embrace it uncritically. It is just the ambiguity of the 
term that suggests this, but Christians cannot reject or accept sources of authority as they 
appeared and are appearing in history. Biblical criticism and Feminism are just two of 
such examples, (the latter is rejected by Hauerwas). Biblical criticism is not a 
homogeneous movement that is based on the anti-dogmatic principle. New theories, 
authorship, date and historical veracity cannot simply be rejected on principle. These 
need to be considered and weighed against various evidences. We cannot simply resort to 
answers of the earlier generations. In the same way Feminism is not necessarily contrary 
to Christian theology. The new theories suggested by those who oppose long-standing 
traditions of oppression and exclusivism need to be considered and studied. 
 
What does this say about liberal societies and liberal theory’s relationship with the church 
community? Most church communities are not exclusively members of one community. 
In many liberal societies where the church exists people are members of both the church 
and liberal community. It is more of a weakness to reject liberalism and liberal societies 
than to consider it carefully, evaluating it intelligibly, and approach it with an open mind. 
To reject liberalism might be to reject part of the church community as well as historical 
evidence important for the Christian story. 
 
Evaluation 
I have attempted to show interplay between the Christian story and the Public story is the 
best way for moral formation by presenting an Anglican view. The Public story is 
characterized by three assumptions. Based on these three assumptions a ”free society” 
can emerge. Firstly, there is the belief that the free and transcendent activity of reason is a 
unique expression of our uniqueness as human beings.  Through reason human dignity is 
realized and affirmed, and objective truth discovered. Reason then is able “to draw us out 
of the particular into the universal, out of the mundane into the ultimate, out of the 
contingent into the free, and out of the bodily into the spiritual”. Theologically this means 
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that God was also approached and known. In the search for truth, universal principles of 
judgement, for freedom and spiritual awareness are expressions of faith that such things 
are possible. While these are positions taken by some liberal theologians, empirical 
research shows that in liberal societies there have been a drastic decline in church 
attendance. While other religions such as Islam and Judaism, has shown some increase in 
its practices; they do not compare to the drastic decline in church attendance in the 
Western world. In the developing world this is becoming a fast growing phenomenon. 
This decline is mainly because of advanced democracy since The Enlightenment.  
 
An inclusive approach to the Christian story and the Public story rejects the idea that 
individual rationality on its own is sufficient for moral formation. This is a loaded claim 
and is open to some misinterpretation. Viewed from an inclusive perspective it also does 
not agree with Hauerwas’s idea that the church community alone, and not individual 
rationality, forms morality. An inclusive approach to morality warns against rejecting 
individual rationality as unimportant for morality. This inclusive approach dismisses the 
definition of the self as exclusively shaped by its social attachments and situation prior to 
any choices it makes (as claimed by Michael Sandel65). It also rejects the self as 
exclusively having common good that is more than a concatenation of individual ones (as 
claimed by Charles Taylor66). 
 
The Christian story that Gill puts forward suggests that reason alone cannot form 
appropriate moral formation for a religious society under democratic rule. The 
importance of the interaction of faith and practice or ideas and behavior makes a good 
case for the interplay between the two stories. For Christians, faith statements, like for 
example the Nicene Creed, are not only about belief but practice as well. In other words 
faith statements are not only cognitive, but also commitments in relation to society and 
the structures of society.  
 
 
                                                          
65 ‘The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self’, in Communitarianism and Individualism, (eds.) 
Shlomo vineri and Avner De-Shalit, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.19.  
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About this tension Gill says, 
 
Pointing out the importance of moral communities in fashioning and sustaining 
values in our society need not become an excuse for irrationality. It is rather a 
claim that individual, isolated rationality is quite simply, in it, an insufficient 
resource for a profound morality. Moral communities without the critique of 
rationality can become tyrannical, arbitrary and perhaps even demonic. But 
atomised rationality without moral communities seems incapable (despite many 
attempts) of fashioning and sustaining goodness beyond self-interest (1989:64-
65). 
 
The second assumption is that through reason universal principles are discovered for 
decision making and action. One expression of these principles is the positing of natural 
rights that are believed to inhere in the fundamental structures of human existence itself. 
Once discovered, they provide the framework for moral considerations and the 
justification for moral behavior. A second expression is the well-known Kantian 
demonstration of the moral law within human life, formulated as a desire to do what I 
ought to do under universal law and without contradiction. This moral law finds 
expression in the notion; “To treat other persons as ends in itself, and not means to an 
end”. A Christian expression in this regard would be the command; “to love others as 
yourself”.   
 
Roman Catholic moral law (before Vatican 11), the Protestant Biblical ethics, Joseph 
Fletcher’s Situation ethics or Lehmann’s Contextualization are Christian responses to 
ethics based on principles and laws. They have all aligned themselves with the obeying 
commands and laws, even if it is in new circumstances. With the increase of pluralism 
and globalization Christian ethicists found a new way of doing ethics. The Philosopher, 
Alasdair MacIntyre, broke away from this traditional way of doing ethics. Christian 
theologians such as James Gustafson and Stanley Hauerwas embraced his communitarian 
                                                                                                                                                                             
66 ‘Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate’ in Liberalism and the Moral Life, Nancy L 
Rosenblum (ed.) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), Pp167-168.  
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nature. Christian theologians have particularly welcomed Hauerwas’s “community, 
narrative and character” approach. Despite this valuable contribution, Hauerwas is very 
exclusive in his description of community and narrative. The Anglican perspective is 
more inclusive in both community and narrative. The Anglican response to universal 
laws is that morality is not just about obeying laws alone, but it is about habits, which are 
formed in community. Instead of obedience to universal laws, narrative forms character. 
Aristotle first noted that, “The soul of the listener must have been conditioned by habits 
to the right kinds of likes and dislikes, just as land must be cultivated before it is able to 
foster seed”67. Ethics then is a long-term formation of the moral.  
 
The inclusive approach of Anglican Theology means a less hostile relationship between 
world and church and ultimately between the Christian story and the Public story. 
Worship forms moral behaviour. From an inclusive perspective this is easy to see because 
of the openness on the part of the moral behaviour. People are socialised in community 
and in the worshipping community in particular. The importance of worship has been 
well demonstrated by both theologians. Because the community is inclusive, and at the 
very least in continuation with other communities, it remains central to worship and 
character formation. 
 
The third assumption is that of the individual human being. Freedom from established 
structures and patterns, which the Enlightenment encouraged, brought with it decision 
making by the individual moral agent. Individuals become centers of freedom through 
their individual consciences, which evaluate alternatives and possibilities. From a 
Protestant point of view this means personal responsibility before God. Theologically this 
is expressed through the belief that each person is challenged through the Word, sermons 
and worship. Examining the heart and mind, persons are challenged to respond. 
 
The Anglican perspective aligns itself heavily with the new way of doing ethics. Ethics is 
done in community. The individual cannot stand outside of tradition, structures or social 
influences. Through a story or stories individuals form part of a community in which 
                                                          
67 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated Martin Ostwald, Bobbs-Merrill Co., New York, 1962. 
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morality is formed. From an Anglican perspective the Christian story and the Public story 
interplay and morality is formed.    
 
Anglican Theology brings a significant contribution to any discussion about the 
relationship between the Public story and the Christian story. This contribution lies in the 
inclusive approach. This inclusiveness has largely to do with the continuation between 
the church and the world, between worship and ethics, The Public story and The 
Christian story. Anglican Theology is well represented by both distinguished theologians 
who keep their “feet” in both church and world. Both Sykes and Gill are influential 
theologians who take seriously the link between academic and practical, knowing and 
doing. As teachers of theology their teaching is grounded in worship. Sykes’ view of 
Christian growth through conflicts and Gill’s inter-disciplinary approach well represents 
Anglican Theology and the Anglican view of “unity in diversity”. 
 
In the same way liberal communities are constant in relationship with the church 
community. Almost all the members of the church are part of other communities, be it in 
the family, the workplace, social clubs, political groups or the nation. One very important 
tension needs consideration to substantiate such a claim. This tension exists between 
liberalism and communitarianism. 
 
The rise of community ethics in the Western world has become a major theological 
debate. Since the writings of MacIntyre the traditional way of doing ethics, a discipline 
concerned primarily with individual decision-making, has been challenged by ethics with 
a community basis. Christian ethicists, such as Stanley Hauerwas, developed the 
community to mean the church community. This exclusive claim of the idea of 
community by certain Christian ethicists has drawn mixed responses from both Christian 
ethicists and philosophers. The Anglican views, represented by Sykes and Gill, are one 
such response. The inclusive approach challenges the rejection of liberal societies and 
liberal ideas by Hauerwas and others. 
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It is interesting to note that both theologians have one foot in praxis (in some form of 
practical ministry) and the other in the academic field (in a university setting). This is 
consistent with the inclusive approach of Christian moral formation which is that of 
understanding ethics with reference to the practices or community without rejecting the 
ideas of the individual atomist completely. In this way the Anglican approach seeks to 
keep the tension between praxis and ideas in a positive way. The two theologians (Sykes 
and Gill) write out of experience and are in a good position to make a positive 
contribution to our topic. 
 
It also challenges MacIntyre’s emphasis on practise, community and tradition. Another 
misconception it challenges is the total rejection of communitarianism. Although most 
Christian ethicists are cautious to align themselves totally with communitarianism, this 
new way of doing ethics is regarded as vindication for Christian ethicists against the 
traditional way of doing ethics, which has dominated the academic world for decades. 
Communitarian ethics has broken new ground in the field of ethics.     
       
David Ferguson68 points out that a convergence of what was taken to be exclusive 
positions are possible. He concludes that some recent liberal theories have responded to 
communitarian criticisms by arguing that the real issue at stake is not that of 
metaphysical individualism but that of state neutrality. In a society that consists of 
different moral communities and conceptions of the good life, the state must take a 
detached position to ensure that citizens make their own choices. Within such a society 
some moral consensus is necessary. Such a position is political rather than metaphysical, 
and is pursued by both Christian ethicists and philosophers that regard plurality as 
important for defining moral communities. The reality of democracy and cosmopolitan 
cities strengthens the case of this position. The variety of goods sought within modern 
cosmopolitan societies requires that citizens be granted the space within which they can 
pursue their choice. This space is achieved through the interplay between the Christian 
story and the Public story. 
 
                                                          
68 Studies in Christian ethics, Vol.10, No.1, T and T Clark, Edinburgh, 1997, Pp32-48. 
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Other liberal conjoiners to communitarianism have conceded that the self cannot be 
understood apart from its social roles and attachments. A fulfilled life is one in which the 
self is committed to goods that are social in nature. The self is not reduced to community, 
but the self is to choose which roles and which communities it wants to be part of. The 
liberal idea is not to reject all social roles, but to provide the space within which the self 
can exercise rationality and choice in order to revise, endorse or reject commitments. 
 
Ferguson further suggests that,  
It is clear, moreover, that this tradition can only manifest its rationality through 
encounter and confrontation with rivals. This seems to require the condition of a 
polity in which different traditions are tolerated and brought together in dialogue. 
The progress of reason thus requires the peaceful co-existence of rival traditions, 
which can debate and argue their most fundamental differences (Ferguson 
1997:40).     
  
In pluralistic societies this is a fundamental phenomenon. If for example, in the Western 
societies, the church is hostile to rational encounter and confrontation with secular 
societies, the church will reject part of the community in which moral values are 
sustained. Robin Gill suggests those three possible relationships between communities 
and postmodernism exists. The first is that of Hauerwas's idea of the church as the 
community in which morality is formed. The second one suggests that churchgoers 
belong to different communities. They belong to both secular and religious communities. 
The third position accepts the general position that moral values and virtues are shaped, 
sustained and carried in community but adds that there are certain “planks” that apply 
across cultures. 
 
With regard to the first idea of community, that held by Hauerwas, it is unrealistic and 
premature in its description of how socialisation informs and sustains values and virtues. 
More seriously, it neglects the role that ethics plays as critique of worship, by neglecting 
Marxism, Feminism and Liberation theology. This form of communitariasm is oppressive 
as it suppresses dissidents. It selects one community, the church community, and argues 
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that its tradition, history, practices, texts, story and values are to be learnt and 
appropriated. Only under these conditions can a virtuous life be lived.  
 
The second position, that communities overlap, puts forward a better case for the 
convergence of liberalism and communitarianism. Such a position must take seriously 
some of the central values of liberalism, that of pluralism and openness to change. 
Despite the overlapping of communities, identity is important for serious dialogue 
between communities. The Anglican view of the relationship between The Public story 
and The Christian story falls well within this second position. Its distinct identity is not a 
barrier for constructive dialogue. On the contrary it substantiates inclusiveness. A distinct 
identity provides the platform for honest dialogue. Sykes suggests rightly that identity do 
not necessarily means exclusivity or coercion. He views the identity of Anglicanism and 
Christianity as a tool for keeping conflicts in creative tension. According to Sykes, 
identity includes self-criticism and openness to change. To this effect he defines Christian 
identity, “…not as a state but as a process, a process more over, which entails the 
restlessness of a dialectic, impelled by criticism” (Sykes 1984:285). 
 
The context for keeping conflict in creative tension is worship. Liberal communities need 
not be rejected without serious and open dialogue.   
    
With regard to the third position it could be argued that the same “planks” (that of 
autonomous rational thought and decision-making) that liberalism use is also to be found 
in communitarianism. Although many communitarian ethicists do not align themselves 
with such an approach, the inter-disciplinary approach of Anglican theologians (notably 
Gill) demonstrates the importance of rationality for communiarianism. Although 
Anglicanism falls within the second approach, it has one foot in the third approach, as the 
social science is becoming more important for Christian theologians who use sociology 
extensively. Such theologians also recognise that any meaningful dialogue with secular 
academics will demand the use of social science. In these way ideas, views and practices 
are not rejected merely because they are liberal or secular. As Ferguson argues, 
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Liberalism need not be identified with the Enlightenment project of justifying 
morality in terms, which avoid the particularity of metaphysical and religious 
commitments. It should be seen not so much as a philosophical viewpoint but as a 
movement, which was borne out of religious warfare in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. The peacefulness of the civil order could only be secured 
by getting aside religious differences. A moral consensus was sought which made 
no explicit appeal to any one tradition. It was within this context that the 
Enlightenment project emerged in the writings of Hume, Kant and Mill. The 
context itself deserves greater recognition (Ferguson 1997:41).     
      
An inclusive approach as advocated by Anglicanism takes community serious in the 
formation and sustaining of virtues and morals. The community is not defined as narrow 
as those who refer to the church community as the only moral community. It defines 
community as inclusive and open to conflicts. It views community as a dynamic 
phenomenon that engages in other communities. It also takes serious the fact that the 
community is not static but changes and that contexts and ideas develop. The Anglican 
approach recognises the community as being in constant dialogue with other 
communities and ideas.   
 
A relationship between The Public story and The Christian story from a one directional 
way (that is when either The Christian or The Public stories only form morality) has 
serious weaknesses. This has been demonstrated in the previous chapter on Stanley 
Hauerwas (virtue, character and community). This chapter attempts to take seriously the 
weaknesses of the former approach and formulate an approach that overcome the 
weaknesses by suggesting that moral formation takes place in the context of a 
relationship between The Public story and The Christian story. Ethics in essence refer to 
both ethical formation through universal principles, individualism, law and rationality 
(The Public story) as well as community and socialization (The Christian story). The 
Christian story as represented by Hauerwas rejects liberalism and liberal virtues, while 
The Public story emphasize that which is rejected by The Christian story. The topic of 
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this chapter is to show broadly that interplay between the two stories is the most 
appropriate contribution for moral formation of a society under democratic rule. 
 
The Anglican perspective does not reject liberalism, although The Christian community 
is the primary community for moral formation. The Christian community is not hostile to 
other communities and in some cases is in continuation with liberal communities or 
secular communities. 
 
This approach has makes significant contributions towards our topic of discussion as 
pointed out in his chapter. Apart from the criticisms that have been raised, one final point 
of critique must be raised. How does the Anglican perspective respond to moral 
formation in a South African society under democratic rule? In the next chapter I turn to a 
South African Anglican theologian who is a world-renowned public figure.  
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Chapter Six 
 
Desmond Tutu: Ubuntu and moral formation 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters five positions on the question of the research have been 
researched. In the first two positions William Johnson Everett and Rosemary Radford 
Ruether places the emphasis for moral formation on the Public story. The third and fourth 
positions, Geoffrey Wainwright and Stanley Hauerwas, emphasise the Christian story for 
moral formation. The fifth position, the Anglican view, represented by Robin Gill and 
Stephen Sykes, tries to keep the balance by emphasising a closer relationship between the 
Public story and the Christian story for moral formation. Of all five positions there is a lot 
that we can use for the moral formation of a South African society under democratic rule. 
What is lacking in the five positions is firstly the consistency to keep the relation between 
the Public story and the Christian story. A second problem is the exclusiveness of the 
community or the opposing position of the community and the individual that is used for 
moral formation. A third problem is their emphasis on the individual or community and 
subsequent lack of the role of God in moral formation. 
 
These three, an interplay nature of the relationship between the Christian story and the 
Public story, an inclusive community and the role of God, which are not emphasised in a 
creative way in the five positions, are important for a South African society which is 
largely Christian and under democratic rule. It is these important factors that Desmond 
Tutu uses in his writings and in his personal life. It is also these three factors that I find 
imperative for moral formation and which, according to my assessment of the five 
positions, must be considered for the moral formation of people in the present South 
African context.  
 
Other great South African theologians like Beyers Naude, Augustine Shutte and John 
DeGruchy have made significant contributions to the worldwide paradigm shift of the 
twentieth century. Beyers Naude although not known for his academic achievements  has 
demonstrated through his life that The Public story and The Christian story has interplay 
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in the moral formation of society. Augustine Shutte has made significant contributions in 
his recent writings on an ethic for a new South Africa. DeGruchy on the other hand is 
known for his extensive contributions in the academic field. De Gruchy provides a 
creative formulation of a theology for the interplay of the two stories. This theological 
formulation can be a critique of Desmond Tutu’s approach, but it can also be used to 
enhance the approach of Tutu.  
 
In this chapter I attempt to show that Tutu's Ubuntu Theology is the best way for moral 
formation because Tutu uses both stories in a way which show their interplay in his 
theology and moral formation. Ubuntu Theology makes use of communitarianism and of 
democracy as a social policy for moral formation. Tutu's Ubuntu also describes a 
community that is inclusive of race, gender, status and the non-human community. The 
community is also the context for the moral formation of the individual. Tutu's Ubuntu 
theology also places emphasis on the role of God in the community and not so much on 
the individual for moral formation. I find that this position having commonalities with the 
other positions, but including the three factors, is most appropriate and best suited for 
moral formation for the South African society under democratic rule. Tutu's Ubuntu 
theology goes beyond the positions of Everett, Ruether, Wainwright, Hauerwas and Gill. 
However he draws from both the Public story and the Christian story for moral 
formation. Finally I will present the theology for a just democratic world order of de 
Gruchy.   
 
Desmond Tutu has demonstrated this healthy tension in his calling as deacon, priest and 
bishop. He is also activist, politician and anti Apartheid campaigner, as well theologian 
and academic. I found that Tutu's Ubuntu theology is best suited for moral formation for 
a South African context because he manages to keep the balance between praxis and 
theory, community and the individual, and secular and sacred.  
    
To demonstrate Tutu's Ubuntu theology I will give a brief biography of Archbishop 
Emeritus Desmond Mpilo Tutu, a description of community as found in Ubuntu, and 
discuss the role of God in moral formation. 
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 1. Tutu: Priest and Politician 
Tutu represents a range of theological and moral thought. He can be categorised as a 
practical theologian, a liberation theologian or even, to a lesser extend, a Christian 
ethicist. On top of these different theological thoughts, Tutu draws from a range of 
sources for his moral claims. As a priest he is firmly grounded in The Christian story and 
as a politician he draws from The Public story. This diversity of sources and thoughts has 
made Tutu one of the most respected public figures of his time around the world.  
 
Tutu was born in Makoeteng, Klerksdorp in 1931 to a schoolteacher and domestic 
worker. Allen describes this town as,  
 
…a town founded by white settlers in the nineteenth century, it is a peaceful spot, 
flat but near a rocky koppie, or small hill, covered by bushes and trees where the 
children of the black township played.... Seventy-five years after Tutu's birth, 
however, there was nothing else to show that a black community had once lived at 
Makoeteng. Klerksdorp's location, as whites called it, was too close to town for 
their comfort. In the decade after the formal policy of Apartheid was adopted in 
1948, after the Tutus had left, its people were uprooted at gunpoint and moved six 
kilometres (four miles) away. In its place, the town council established a white 
suburb and named it Neserhof after a local family. In 2006, the area around the 
Tutu home…was a golfcourse - golf having been associated in South Africa with 
the white privilege (Allen 1996:9-10).  
 
After finishing school he became a teacher against his wishes and taught at Johannesburg 
Bantu High School and Munsieville High School for two short spells. After his marriage 
to Leah he trained for the ordained ministry in The Anglican Communion and was 
ordained deacon and then priest in 1961. This change of careers was to some extent in 
protest against the introduction of Bantu education in 1958, although to a greater extent 
in obedience to the call of God.  
Allen writes that, 
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 "The Bantu teacher", Verwoerd had told government, "must be integrated as an 
active agent in the….development of the Bantu community. He must learn not to 
feel above the community, with a consequent desire to become integrated into the 
life of the European community". Verwoerd proposed to save money by replacing 
male junior teachers with women earning less, and the unashamedly promoted 
discriminatory pay scales: "The salaries which European teachers enjoy are no 
way a fit or permissible criterion for the salaries of Bantu teachers. "After 
discussions with Leah; Desmond decided: "I just felt I couldn't be part of this…I 
said to myself, sorry, I'm not going to be a calloborator in this nefarious 
scheme…" Desmond and Leah finalised their decision during the summer 
holidays at the end of 1955 school year. Trevor Huddlestone wrote a 
recommendation for Desmond in a letter to Redvers Rouse, the Archdeacon of 
Johannesburg, on January 1956 (Allen 2006:61). 
 
Tutu did his post graduate studies at King’s College, London where he also served a 
curacy in The Church of England. Following his return to South Africa he taught at The 
Federal Theological Seminary and served as Chaplain to various universities.   
 
Tutu's parish ministry was extended to St. Mary's Cathedral in Johannesburg. It was upon 
his appointment to this office that Tutu's ministry became a public affair. At the time of 
his appointment as Dean of St. Mary's cathedral, Tutu was living in England and had to 
apply to the government to take the residence of The Dean in the white suburb of 
Houghton. Allen states that Tutu "categorically rejected being treated as an "honorary 
white", he said: "I do not want to apologise for my blackness". It was not apparent at the 
time, but he had begun one of the most extensive, high pressured, prominent public 
ministries of any church leader of his generation" (Allen 2006:145). 
 
He was then elected as Bishop of Lesotho in 1975. In the wake of the 1976 uprising Tutu 
became The General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches, which he held 
from 1978-1985. It was during this period that Tutu published his first comprehensive 
work. In the introduction John Ebster notes that his ministry was towards a democratic 
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South African society. He says that; "If the West wishes to see a democracy in South 
Africa, it must use the ample means at its disposal to answer Tutu's call" (Tutu 1982:22). 
 
De Gruchy also makes the same point that democracy and Christianity are not hostile in 
its relationship. In defining democracy he states that as a system democracy is referred to 
as constitutional principles and procedures, symbols and convictions which have become 
an essential part of genuine democracy. The democratic vision which form the other side 
of the coin refer to that hope for a society in which all people are equal, just and free. Part 
of the vision is to respect differences, to let social responsibility prevail and the gap 
between rich and poor overcome. Of the vision De Gruchy says, “….its origins is not so 
much in ancient Athens, the symbolic birth place of the democratic system, as in the 
message of the ancient prophets of Israel, and especially in their messianic hope for a 
society in which the reign of God’s shalom would become a reality” (1995:7).   
  
As General Secretary Tutu was committed to the ideals of the World Council of Churches 
which was to upheld justice and reconciliation, social responsibilities and ecumenism, as 
well as non-racialism. He also used his travels as General Secretary to inform people in 
many parts of the world about the extent to which human rights is abused and anti 
democratic policies enforced on people through Apartheid policies. In 1984 Tutu's efforts 
was acknowledged by being awarded the highest order in world-the Nobel Peace Price. 
 
In 1985 Tutu became bishop of Johannesburg and in 1986 Archbishop of Cape Town 
becoming the first black Archbishop of Cape Town in the history of The World-wide 
Anglican Communion. In 1987 he became President of the All Africa Council of 
Churches and Fellow of King's College London. It was during this period that Tutu 
became preoccupied with the need to reconcile people from all races in South Africa.  
 
Allen rightly states that,  
In 1987, in a series of presentations to an Anglican Church consultation, Desmond 
Tutu spelled out his vision for reconciliation in South Africa. In words similar to 
those addressed to the Eloff Commission five years previously, he likened the 
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country under apartheid to the depiction of the world in the book of Genesis after 
the fall of Adam and Eve: a place in which harmony had been shattered by the 
effects of sin-alienation, disharmony, and separation. The church's calling was to 
work for the fulfilment of God's vision of, "a new heaven and a new earth," in 
which "the wolf dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid 
(Allen 2006:341).      
 
He led the country through a difficult period when he served as the chairman of The 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission after the first democratic elections. He has since 
been awarded many awards and honorary degrees by distinguished universities and 
institutions. 
 
Tutu does not separate politics from spirituality. He has seen his political involvement as 
his way of serving God. Apartheid was an unjust system that denied South Africans their 
God given freedom. Both black and white South Africans needed to be freed from an 
ideology that separated them from each other. 
 
Battle69 rightly argues that contrary to most black theologians the ideological starting 
point that blackness provides the primary identity, Tutu's Ubuntu model states that 
baptism into the church is one's primary identity. This identity, that of baptism, is 
important for it affirms that all people are made in the image of God. Therefor one should 
not be dehumanised on the grounds of one's colour or given superior status on the basis 
of colour (Battle 1997:174). 
 
Freedom in this regard is not based on the value of colour, but on the basis that God has 
created all of humanity as free persons irrespective of their colour or race. In his book, 
which he writes after his experiences of The Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
                                                          
69 Michael Battle is assistant professor of religion at the University of the South, Tennessee and former 
adjutant to Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Battle spent a year with Tutu at Bishopscourt, the residence of Tutu, 
and participated first hand in many activities with Tutu. Some of these included Eucharist regularly, church 
and diocesan events, The Christ Hani memorial service, The World Council of Churches, meeting with Dr 
Nelson Mandela, pastoral visitations to priests and congregants as well as recreational activities such as 
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hearings Tutu rightly states; "The Bible places human beings at the centre of the divine 
enterprise as creatures of infinite worth and dignity independent of our work, our ability, 
or our success. We are each created by God, like God, for God" (Tutu 2004:34).          
 
Tutu has always been involved in politics out of theological and spiritual conviction. 
When investigated by the Eloff Commission of the South African government as a 
subversive organisation, he responded that the church is peace loving, and an agent of 
reconciliation. Again as Archbishop, when he was accused of praising political parties for 
the atheistic ideologies and violent campaigns, he defended his positions by arguing that 
his political involvement is a "theological position derived from the church, which 
precedes Marxism and the African National Congress. The church teaches that each 
person is invested with infinite value, made in the image of God, instead of being valued 
through arbitrary biological attributes which Apartheid claims as defining criteria for 
personhood" (Battle: 1997:176-178). 
 
 Tutu is not just politician or priest in the narrow sense of the word. Tutu is a priest as 
priesthood is defined as servant of God and creation. Tutu shows a great conviction to 
serve God through his praise and worship. His theology also shows his conviction to 
serve humanity and be involved in the affairs of the state. These two poles are not 
opposite, but two that goes hand in hand. For Tutu serving God in South Africa means to 
free all South Africans from sinful laws of Apartheid.        
 
2. Tutu's Ubuntu Community 
The biography of Tutu signifies the kind of community that occupies his writings and 
ministry. The honours awarded to Tutu stretch over a diverse field. Both academic 
institutions and religious institutions to social institutions worldwide have awarded Tutu 
recognition of his quest to form a community that is more than just inclusive. 
 
In his first major book Tutu writes that his vision is, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
rugby and walking. At the end of his stay he published Reconciliation: The Ubuntu theology of Desmond 
Tutu, Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 1997:38-50.  
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…for a South Africa that is more open and more just; where people count and 
where they will have equal access to the good things of life, with equal 
opportunity to live, work and learn. I long for a South Africa where there will be 
equal and untrammelled access to the courts of the land, where detention without 
trial will be a thing of the hoary past, where banning and other such arbitrary acts 
will no longer be even so much as mentioned, and where the rule of law will hold 
sway in the fullest sense. In addition, all adults will participate fully in political 
decision making, and in other decisions which affect their lives. Consequently 
they will have the vote and be eligible for election to all public offices. This South 
Africa will have integrity of territory with a common citizenship, and all the rights 
and privileges that go with such a citizenship, belonging to all its inhabitants  
(Tutu 1982:101).  
 
As early as the eighties Tutu's theological and ethical formation is based on democratic 
principles such as rights, decision-making, the rule of law and reason. These principles 
must be understood and interpreted in the context of community. Tutu names such 
theological and ethical reflection Ubuntu. Ubuntu has a variety of interpretations amongst 
African scholars, but its meaning is basically translated as "a person's humanity is 
expressed in relationship with others". 
 
Battle, who served as Tutu's chaplain and spent a full year under the ministry and 
direction of Tutu, wrote one of the best theological books of the Ubuntu theology of 
Tutu. He best describes Ubuntu theology four aspects. Firstly, inter-dependence between 
people in an environment of vulnerability helps form true relationships in which the 
humanity of each other is developed through the other. Such inter-dependence does not 
foster unhealthy competition or racially defined humanity. Such inter-dependence 
motivates persons to participate on the basis of God creating humanity with uniqueness 
that develop each other's humanity. To this effect Battle concludes that Tutu,  
 
…stresses the Christian definition of relationship, as opposed to other social 
forms of communalism, to define Ubuntu. Influenced deeply by Anglican 
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spirituality, Tutu is able to overcome African philosophy's tendency to go to the 
opposite extreme of discounting individuals for the sake of community. For him, 
being properly related in a theological Ubuntu does not denigrate individuality. 
Instead it builds an interdependent community (Battle 1997:42).    
 
Secondly, Ubuntu theology recognises persons as distinctive in the community. Ubuntu 
theology recognises that persons are ends in themselves in the community. People exist in 
community to affirm, confirm and converse each other's humanity. In the context of 
South Africa people from different racial backgrounds do not have to define each other as 
superior in order to affirm their humanity, but they can nourish each other in their 
differences towards a greater and fuller humanity. Tutu, driven by his Anglican 
spirituality, concludes that ultimately personhood is formed through the church as the 
church witnesses to the world. The church provides an identity beyond racial divides 
(Battle 1997:44-45). 
 
Thirdly, Ubuntu theology integrates culture. The interaction in the community is human 
interaction and through this kind of interaction humanity is discovered. Such interaction 
transcends racial motivations because what is seen through the other is God's wonderful 
and distinctive creation of the other. Battle further concludes that; "The concept of 
Ubuntu demonstrates that persons are not defined by natural sets of properties but by the 
relationships between them and others. In the same way cultures combine to form a 
distinctive society" (1997:46-47). 
 
Fourthly, Ubuntu theology can overthrow Apartheid. Through a deep conscious 
contemplative spirituality, Tutu's ministry is characterised by a quest for a common 
humanity in which racial divides has no authority. Ubuntu seeks a humanity that is 
defined beyond the racial limitations of Apartheid. Ubuntu theology is about humanity 
discovering themselves in their relationship with God and each other (Battle 1998:49-50).    
 
This fourth characteristic has been the focus of Tutu's work as the chairman of The Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa.  
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 The greatest gift that the TRC has given to our people is a single history of what 
happened during the apartheid years in the area of serious human rights 
violations. Without the TRC there would undoubtedly have been roughly 
speaking two histories...a black history which would have been approximately the 
truth, because the victims know what happened to them, and... a white history 
which would have been based on fabricated denials…The TRC has put an end to 
these denials (Allen 2006:370). 
 
Tutu's role as priest has proved to be of significant importance to the success of the Truth 
and reconciliation commission. Allen, who served as director of communications for the 
Truth and reconciliation commission, attributes the success of the commission to Tutu 
when he observes,  
 
Could the TRC have worked without Desmond Tutu? Its members had to ask this 
question a year into their work, in January 1997, when Tutu was diagnosed with 
prostrate cancer. Pumla Gobodo-Madikezela, a member of the Human Rights 
Violations Committee, had already seen evidence that the symbolism of his 
presence was vital among victims-it "validated the pain they had suffered". To 
Antjie Krog, working as a journalist looking on, the TRC without Tutu was 
unthinkable: "Whatever others might play, it is Tutu who is the compass…It is he 
who finds the language for what us happening"…. And it was Boraine-the man 
who might have run the TRC himself-who at the end of its work judged that of all 
the commissioners, Tutu came closest to being indispensable: "I don't think the 
Commission could have survived without the presence and person and leadership 
of Desmond Tutu" (Allen 2006:370).    
 
In these it is clear that Tutu's community is not only inclusive but in creative tension with 
individuality. Ubuntu does not deny self-determination, but it comes through interaction 
with other persons. The ultimate aim of Ubuntu is to discover the true humanity of all 
persons and whatever denies such humanity is contrary to Ubuntu. Though, not alien to 
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African's view of community, the European view of community is somewhat different 
than that which is expressed through Ubuntu.  
 
Unlike the European mechanistic idea of community, a position that the five positions 
discussed hold, Ubuntu is not a collection of individuals or a way of controlling separate 
individuals. Ubuntu views community as each individual member seeing the community 
as themselves. The individual and the community are the same. The individual self-
depend on each other for life and does everything together.  
 
Tutu sums up Ubuntu community in one of his sermons as the first black Dean of St 
Mary's Cathedral in Johannesburg as follows, 
 
And so it was exciting to follow in the footsteps of stalwarts such as Deans 
Palmer, Trandolph and French-Breytagh and others who had established a 
scintillating tradition of worship, music, preaching and social witness. I will 
always have a lump in my throat when I think of the children at St Mary's; 
pointers to what can be if our society would but become sane and normal. Here 
were children of all races playing, praying and learning and even fighting 
together, almost uniquely in South Africa. And as I knelt in the Dean's stall at the 
super 9:30 High Mass with incense, bells and everything watching a multicultural 
crowd file up to the altar rails to be communicated, the one bread and the one cup 
by a mixed team of clergy and lay ministers, with a multiracial choir, servers and 
sidemen-all this in apartheid mad South Africa… (Tutu 1983:34).  
 
One of the symbols that became synonymous with Tutu's Ubuntu community is that of 
"the rainbow people of God". In this symbol Tutu acknowledges the differences amongst 
the various cultures and races in South Africa. These differences must be celebrated as 
differences that express our uniqueness before God and each other. It is not differences 
that separates us, but differences that unite us with God and each other. It is the 
uniqueness of each of the different cultural and racial groups that hold the South African 
community together and make us grow through our interaction with each other. 
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 On 9 May 1994, at the first democratically elected legislature, Tutu reminded the South 
African nation that racism, injustice, oppression, hatred, violence, freedom, 
reconciliation, forgiveness, peace and unity have replaced division. This transition that 
has been described as miraculous is summed up in the symbol of the rainbow people of 
God. Tutu rightly states that; "We of many cultures, languages and races are become one 
nation" (Tutu 1994:261).    
 
In this regard I find Tutu's Ubuntu theology more useful for moral formation than any of 
the other attempts discussed. Tutu's Ubuntu community puts the individual as important 
in so far as the individual contributes to the growth of the other persons. The individual is 
not an end in itself but is formed through its interaction with the other persons. 
 
The community is at the centre of the discovery of the self and freedom is found through 
interaction with the other. Freedom is not through rationalisation and adhering of laws, 
but through the conversations and interaction with each other. The community is not just 
the collection of individuals, but is the end, which gives meaning to the individuals. 
 
Ubuntu community is an open system in which persons interact with each other and grow 
and develop as persons. It is by no means a closed system in which persons become 
stagnant and individualistic. Tutu's Ubuntu is a unique way of expressing humanity in 
relationship with others in community. In the South African context both oppressor and 
oppressed, white and black, rich and poor, male and female, is part. In this community 
the humanity of people grow in the interaction that takes place.  
 
The understanding of Ubuntu also implies that community is not restricted to humans.  
Tutu does not restrict community to the human community as the five positions do. Tutu 
acknowledges the non-community as part of God' creation and so indispensable to the 
network interdependence. Community includes both humans and the non-human 
community that forms part of God' creator order. 
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Using the Biblical version of creation, Tutu reminds us that our relationship with the 
environment is sacred and has the nature of care and responsibility. To this effect he 
claims that, 
  
We are stewards of all of this, and so it is not to be involved in a passing fad to be 
concerned about the environment, about ecology. It is not just being politically 
correct to be green. The material universe has a high destiny. The dominion we 
were given in Genesis 1:26 was so that we should rule as God's viceroys, doing it 
as God would-caring, gently, not harshly and exploitatively, with a deep 
reverence, for all is ultimately holy ground and we should figuratively take off our 
shoes for it all has the potential to be "theophanic"-to reveal the divine (Tutu 
2004:28-29).     
 
Shutte suggests that persons see themselves as forces in the universe and not merely as 
physical bodies with the ability to think. When we see ourselves as forces we are life 
beyond our physical bodies and in relationship with other forces that is non-human. 
Persons see themselves not as the self as something private, but the self as outside the 
body, present and open to all. The self is in relationship with other forces, interacting in 
the environment (Shutte 2001:23-23).  
 
Battle agrees with the interdependence of humanity with the environment. He uses the 
concept of "seriti" to explain this interdependence. Seriti he observes is a "concept of 
personality, which identifies a life force that makes no distinction between body and 
soul". This concept interprets humanity in the Sotho-Tswana culture as irreducibly 
psychophysical. In such a cultural setting to attack the body is to attract the soul and its 
culture (Battle 1997:50). 
 
 
To this regard Battle concludes that Tutu's, 
  
 193 
Ubuntu, then, names the individual's connectedness to her or his community; 
seriti names the life force by which a community of persons is connected to each 
other. Both concepts assume that a person is intelligible only by being connected 
to social and natural environments. In this constant mutual interchange of 
personhood and community, seriti becomes indistinguishable from Ubuntu in that 
the unity of the life force depends on the individual's unity with the community 
(Battle 1997:51). 
 
3. Ubuntu, worship and the role of God in moral formation 
Tutu's writings are preoccupied with the role of God in moral formation. This is the third 
significant factor that Tutu's position contributes to the relationship between the Christian 
story and the Public story for moral formation for a South African society under 
democratic rule. 
 
Unlike the five positions discussed, Tutu attributes the role of God as indispensable to the 
formation of morality. The source of moral formation is God and the method is the 
worship and adoration of God. Moral formation takes place primarily in the worshipping 
community. In the worshipping community persons are reminded of their being in 
relation to God and the rest of creation and the potential of such a relationship. Acts of 
worship and in particular the Eucharist is a retelling of the ministry, death and 
resurrection of God revealed in the person of Jesus Christ.        
 
Tutu's Ubuntu community is like Hauerwas, Wainwright and Gill's communitarian 
approaches that make the worshipping community the context for moral formation.  
 
Tutu states for example that, “For me, it would be impossible to engage in the kind of 
public life I have had if this was not undergirded by the spiritual life. Our tradition is one 
where we have, as far as possible, a daily Eucharist and an extended time of quiet in 
meditation, and mid-day we have (again, the Anglo-catholic thing) to pause for the 
Angelus…. I belong in the Church and know that, however feeble my own prayers are, I 
am sustained by the fervour and the prayers and intercessions of all these people around 
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the world. There is this constant stream of worship and adoration and all I need to do is to 
jump into the stream of worship and float and be carried by the current of the worship 
and adoration of far holier people than me” (Battle 1997:89). 
 
Tutu, like most Christian Ethicists, views the worshipping community as a good model 
for moral formation. This has been part of his life and his moral stands and engagements 
have been formed in worship. 
 
In his enthronement charge as bishop of Johannesburg Tutu states the following, 
 
 I come as your Pastor of both black and white. I love you all very deeply. I am 
concerned for the agony and anguish of families where their sons are fighting on 
the border, fighting an unnecessary war to defend something I believe is utterly 
indefensible. The people of our country are not on the border. It is right here in 
our midst-it is apartheid, it is injustice and oppression. 
In inspired by our worship and adoration of God and so made sensitive to 
discover Jesus Christ among the poor, the hungry, the oppressed, I hope that you 
will speak out against what causes suffering and anguish to God's children just 
because they are black….70  
 
De Gruchy has another point of contact with Tutu with regard to the importance of 
worship for moral formation. About de Gruchy’s contribution, Dirkie Smit, well known 
South African theologian, rightly states, “it may be impossible to understand his wide-
ranging contributions to social transformation without appreciating their spiritual roots in 
Christian piety, prayer, and worship. The theme, however, runs through all his work, 
including recent publications on democracy and aesthetics”. Smit refers specifically to 
two major works of de Gruchy in which notions of seeing, vision and beauty are closely 
related with struggles for justice. These two comprehensive works are Christianity and 
Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) and Christianity, Art and 
                                                          
70 Sermon by Desmond Tutu when he was enthroned as Bishop of Johannesburg, 1985 
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Transformation: Theological Aesthetics in the Struggle for Justice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), (2002:271).     
 
The Anglican order of Service and the notion of seeing. 
For Anglicans as moral formation depends much on seeing in worship. Battle (1997:92-
112) uses some of the acts of worship of The Anglican order of service to show the 
connection between community and worship as it forms the morality of Tutu. The 
Greeting. "The Lord be with you" is a call for the congregation to turn to God. The 
congregation respond with "And also with you" in recognition that God is with the 
presider as well. Tutu claims to be in the presence of God means to form new 
relationships and be open to be formed through these new relationships. The collect for 
purity also directs the minds and hearts of the worshippers to God. Tutu claims that 
purification is necessary for true relationships to be built. In these kinds of relationships, 
Ubuntu relationships, what you aim for is not revenge but restoration of true 
relationships. 
 
The prayers of the people are the response of the worshippers to the presence of God. 
Through the prayers the worshippers offer themselves for service in the world. The 
prayers are petitions on behalf of the world and show the relationship that worshippers 
have with the world. Battle claims,  
Ever since the early church, Christians have sought to influence societal matters 
by integrating the life of prayer with the daily life of the individual and 
community. In prayer as the practise of the presence of God, the individual cannot 
help but pay attention to the needs of a community that believes it is different 
from the world. Christian intercession trains the individual to move beyond 
requests for individual benefit and into the dynamic of being properly related to 
God and neighbour (Battle 1997:99-100).         
 
Sharing the peace means reconciliation amongst the congregants. According to Tutu this 
peace as act of reconciliation flows over to the community in order to restore 
relationships. The sharing of the peace is also the introduction to The Eucharistic Feast. 
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This part of the worshipping service is also referred to as The Great Thanksgiving. For 
Anglicans this is the climax of all worship. It is the narrative that portrays the death and 
glorious resurrection of Jesus Christ. This is a way of assuring that Jesus Christ is with us 
and that we can participate in his life, death and resurrection. This thanksgiving makes us 
"Eucharistic people-those who cannot cease saying Thank you to God". For Tutu God is 
present in the world in every situation. In the dismissal (Go in peace to love and serve 
the world, in the name of Christ, Amen) the worshippers are reminded to go in the world 
and restore relationships. This is the connection between worship and active participation 
in the world. Worship do not stand alone, but has meaning in active participation in 
restoring relationships with God, humanity and the rest of creation. 
 
This is evident in Tutu's understanding of the role of the church. Tutu claims that the 
church's primary role is to worship and adore God. This worship and adoration is done in 
practical ways in the world. The church is in the world but not of the world. Secondly the 
church must be willing to wash the feet of the disciples through service of the people. It 
must be in solidarity with the poor and marginalised. Thirdly the church must be a 
suffering one which takes the cross seriously. It must be willing to die so that 
relationships can be restored (Tutu 1984:84-86).     
 
Worship as used in relationship with Ubuntu is important for moral formation because it 
acknowledges God as the centre of our humanity and because it is the essence of our 
vocation in the world. Worship keep before us the truthful community in which selves 
discover its unlimitness and its potential for growth. 
 
The liturgy of the Anglican tradition reflects the seeing of God and worship becomes 
interaction between what is seen and the responses of the participants. Smit further claims 
that, “In fact, it is in all probability the influence of the Reformed tradition, and 
particularly ‘the massive and incisive contribution of Karl Barth to ecclesiology’, albeit 
read through the lenses of Bonhoeffer’s ‘basic Barthian orientation to theology’ that led 
De Gruchy to these convictions” (2002:272).      
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Like Tutu, De Gruchy also makes God the centre of our seeing in worship. Well aware of 
the diversity in seeing amongst the South Africans, that leads to distortions of ethical 
truthfulness, De Gruchy claims that we must see things differently. To see things 
differently participants in worship hear what God speaks to them about.  Smith says that, 
“For De Gruchy, in hearing we also learn to see. Through sermons, we learn to see 
differently. This was how Calvin understood the function and the authority of the 
scriptures. They become the spectacles, the lens through which we can see……And it is 
primarily in the worship service where we listen to and hear God’s Word, which then 
helps us to see properly” (2002:273-274)      
 
De Gruchy, however, warns against the overemphasis of liturgy, of which Tutu is 
sometimes guilty. De Gruchy rightly claims that liturgy prevents the Gospel from taking 
hold when it merely reflects the society and its values. In this case Everett’s 
overemphasise of the symbols such as Jesus as “President” and “Covenant publicity” also 
needs careful analysis. 
 
“The Christian church betrays society when it is no longer the church and when it no 
longer worships as church. The Christian church betrays society when it merely becomes 
a mirror image, a reflection, of everyday life, of reality outside the place of worship, no 
longer informing social life from the ‘strange different’ perspective of the gospel. In fact, 
this self-critical reflection on the church’s actual form and life in the light of what the 
church should be, forms the heart of De Gruchy’s contextual theological reflection from 
the beginning…”. De Gruchy claims that this betrayal takes on many forms such as race, 
group or class, and replaces God who is beyond these human gods controlled by 
humanity (2002:283).     
 
The liturgy of the Anglican tradition of which Tutu draws extensively must take note of 
the potential betrayals and take the Gospel seriously. The liturgy must not only be in 
solidarity with society but be critical of its evils and false godliness.      
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Tutu's role that he gives to God in worship reflects his moral formation. Tutu's 
Ubuntu theology is closely aligned with the communitarian moral approach by which 
morality is formed in community. After careful empirical analysis of Tutu's moral 
themes, Johannes A. van der Ven71 concludes,  
 
The kind of morality that Tutu proposes is not typically the morality that has been 
popular in the West since The Enlightenment. He makes no plea whatsoever for 
procedural morality, contract morality, utilitarianistic morality, or 
consequentualistic morality. These are all too neutral, impartial or unbiased for 
him. He is concerned with the fate of the Blacks. His morality is entirely 
dominated by the biased option for the poor. Within this he develops a 
combination of classic themes from moral teleology and deontology. Teleology 
aims at the good life for all: the common good. Deontology unconditionally 
stresses duties and obligations that cannot be negotiated away. In connection with 
that, Tutu makes the necessary room for virtue ethics, by which he presents the 
human models of virtuous life, which are characterised by justice and strength, 
temperance and wisdom. He catches the whole in what is presently known as 
communitarianism: the morality of the community and of the community of the 
communities (Pieterse (1995:95). 
             
Tutu's Ubuntu or communitarian moral approach is similar to that of the publication of 
After Virtue by Alasdair MacIntyre and the subsequent ethics of Stanley Hauerwas and 
other communitarian ethicists. Yet Ubuntu is not exclusive or above the ethics of The 
Enlightenment. Tutu also appeals to the principles of democracy and the constitution to 
formulate his moral approach as shown in his earlier writings. 
 
Tutu is less critical of The Enlightenment Age and its ethical influences. Morality in 
essence is formed in community but the principles of The Enlightenment can be applied 
                                                          
71 He is full professor in practical theology and director of the Nijmegen Institute of Studies in Empirical 
Theology (NISET) at Nijmegen University in the Netherlands. Since 1995, he is the president of the 
International Academy of Practical Theology, Netherlands. 
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to enhance the formation of humanity. Again we find the creative tension between 
community and individual.  
 
Ubuntu, unlike communitarianism of Ruether, Hauerwas, Gill and others, Ubuntu goes 
beyond the typical co-hersion, co-option or commonness. Ubuntu morality has as its goal 
the fulfilling of the humanity of each person and moral people are those who grow 
personally through their interaction with other people72. 
 
Shutte rightly states that,  
 
The ethic of Ubuntu was developed in very different circumstances from 
contemporary South Africa, in the pre-scientific, pre-industrial Africa of the 
past…. Ubuntu is still alive in contemporary South Africa. It is not just an ideal 
ethic, like that of Plato's Republic or Thomas More's Utopia. It is actually alive as 
a spirit in people and ways of living, in families and organisations and enterprises 
of various kinds. 
 
The most powerful public manifestation of Ubuntu as a present vital force for 
humanity is the continuing dissipation of the spirit of apartheid. I am not referring 
to political events but to the process that underlies them. The continuing non-
violent revolution in South Africa would not be possible if those who for so long 
were oppressed by the apartheid system were not educated and practised in the 
ethic of Ubuntu. The real miracle we have witnessed is the survival of that spirit 
on such a scale. The extraordinary manifestations of forgiveness during the 
hearings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which must be something 
unique in human history, would not have been possible without it (Shutte 
2001:32-33).            
 
                                                          
72 Shutte gives a detailed discussion of the ethic of Ubuntu in Ubuntu: An ethic for a New South Africa, 
Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications, 2001: 30-33. 
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Tutu's morality is about the development of humanity and the possibilities of this kind of 
development. In both Ubuntu and Western morality there is a strong sense of the 
development of the individual. Ubuntu theology with a Ubuntu community suggests that 
morality, the development of the humanness of a person, take place in community. The 
Public story concludes that the development of the humanness of a person takes place 
through self-determination. His Ubuntu theology does not discard the individual's self-
determination. However self-determination takes place through interaction with other 
selves. 
 
Shutte concludes that:  
 
…it seems that the European idea of freedom and the African idea of community 
do, after all, have something in common, albeit something mysterious, namely the 
idea that human beings are unlimited in a certain way. Of course this unlimitness 
is expressed in different ways in African and in European thought. In African 
thought it shows itself in openness and inclusiveness, in self-transcendence. In 
European thought it shows itself in self-determination. But it is such an unusual 
idea that the fact that it occurs in both of them could be a sign that at a deep level 
their different insights into human nature are compatible, even complimentary, 
and can provide a solid foundation for an ethic (Shutte 2001:53-54).    
 
In a successful attempt to present a theology for a just democratic world order, De 
Gruchy finds contact with Tutu’s Ubuntu theology. Central to the establishment of a just 
democratic order is the ‘imago Dei’. De Gruchy contrasts the popular view of the imago 
Dei, as an ontological identity between God and humanity, to the biblical understanding 
of their relationship. De Gruchy further states that humanity is not like God in the sense 
that we possess the ability to reason or exercise our will, but rather that we are in a 
trusting and responsible relationship with God. In the same human beings are related to 
each other to be responsible for and to each other (1995:239).       
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The Trinitarian formula of God further supports the point when we discover that 
Christians believe God is truly one, yet truly three. God is equal divine persons but not 
the same. God is not made up of a homogeneous collectivity in which the individual 
looses itself. This understanding of God further implies that to be made in the image of 
God means that humanity is in relationship with each other. De Gruchy states, “It is 
universally true that life itself derives from, and is sustained by, people living in 
community, in groups and families. Human beings only find their true fulfilment in 
relationships, and not in pursuing selfish individual interests” (1995:242). 
 
De Gruchy further points out that The Hebrew prophetic tradition democratized the 
image of God by rejection the notion that king alone bears the divine image. According to 
this tradition every human who is created in the image of God bears the divine image. 
The imago Dei is essentially an egalitarian concept. This implies that every body 
irrespective of race, gender or religion has an unconditional dignity. This is the basis for a 
Christian doctrine of human rights (1995:242). 
 
Such an understanding of the relationship between God and humanity affirms equality 
and the role of differences serves the purposes of creation and redemption. The individual 
is not rejected, but the individual finds its identity and purpose in the community. 
Freedom becomes freedom for others and not freedom from others (1995:243).  
   
De Gruchy concludes that democracy in itself cannot produce freedom that is associated 
with responsibility. Responsibility for others is a spiritual virtue of redemptive love. 
Using the same narrative that Tutu uses extensively, the fall (Genesis 1 and 2), De 
Gruchy points out that because humans wanted to be like God society has fallen apart.   
 
Using the doctrine of original sin De Gruchy contrasts the will for power to the will to 
love.  The will for power which is obtained through rational control leads to alienation 
from God. This in turn leads to bondage of the will (Luther). The will to love on the other 
hand, which is obtained through being in the image of God, leads to relationships and 
responsible freedom. Christianity does not accept that human will to power or sin alone 
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determines human formation. Instead it points out the transformation of people to will to 
love. The doctrine of human original sin is always viewed with the doctrine of 
redemption (1995:246).         
 
Democracy in modernity tends to emphasise the will to power that lead to the static 
condition in which humans find themselves. The doctrine of redemption on the other 
hand makes transformation central to the human condition. Taken together, the doctrine 
of original sin and redemption, require participation in meaningful relationship. De 
Gruchy uses the Christian symbols of koinonia and ekklesia to show that the church is a 
sign of God’s justice of which relationships form an important part. (1995:248-256). 
 
Christian witness to political society, he claims is viewed from the sovereignty of people 
in relation to their accountability before God and to one another. This is possible when 
we relate the doctrine of the sovereignty of God to the doctrine of the Trinity. The power 
of God is not so much in omnipotence but in the cross experience of Jesus Christ and the 
redemptive activity of the Spirit. By doing this we find that the doctrine of the 
sovereignty of God is not to do with hierarchy, patriarchy or forms of authoritarian 
government. The doctrine of the sovereign triune God becomes the basis for a theological 
critique of authoritarian governments and providing a theological base for a democratic 
social order (1995:258). 
 
De Gruchy finally adds another doctrine in his theological rational for a just social 
democratic order. The doctrine of the common good he states is, “..a way of ensuring that 
the biblical injunction to ‘love one’s neighbour’ remains a challenge to personal 
responsibility for others, rather than the motto of a social welfare programme, but, at the 
time, that it finds expression in the development of just social structures” (1995:265). 
 
By drawing from the various doctrines De Gruchy points out a theology for a just 
democratic order. This theology is closely aligned with Tutu’s theology of Ubuntu. De 
Gruchy also uses the term Ubuntu in the same way that Tutu uses it.     
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Tutu's moral formation is mostly reflected in the value of reconciliation 
In the most recent literature73 of Tutu and those who wrote both biographical literature 
and theological literature has focussed on his role as an agent of reconciliation. His idea 
of reconciliation is modelled around the kind of family God created as told in the Genesis 
version. 
 
Tutu claims that in God' family everybody is an insider. That includes people from 
different colours, races, nationalities, sexuality's, denominations, religions or status. He 
claims that this is "the dream of God" and many prophets prophesy in this regard. He 
sites the examples of Martin Luther King JR. and Mahatma Gandhi. "King spoke of it 
from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial in 1963 when he dreamed of the day that the sons 
of former slaves and the sons of former slave owners in Georgia would be able "to sit 
together at the table of brotherhood". Gandhi wrote about it in 1929 when he stated that 
his goal was not just the brotherhood of Indian humanity but the "brotherhood of man". 
(Today they would have referred to daughters and sisterhood, too)" (Tutu 2004:20-21).     
 
The dream of God as demonstrated by both Martin Luther King Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi 
is more than the artificial equality that some of the former positions put forward. God' 
dream is about the human race being intertwined with each other as brothers and sisters. 
The human race is a family that defines persons more than equal entities. The human race 
is members of one family. 
 
In such a family the following characteristics are present. The first characteristic of God’ 
family is that family is a gift from God. We do not have a choice as to who are our 
brothers and sisters, but because God created us in God' image the whole human race is 
connected in some way. Tutu rightly states that persons are a gift to each other (Tutu 
2004:22). This aspect has been largely responsible for the relatively peaceful way in 
which the transition in South Africa took from a segregated, racial and oppressive society 
to a democratic society.   
                                                          
73 Battle, M Reconciliation: The Ubuntu theology of Desmond Tutu, Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 1997. 
Tutu, D No future without forgiveness, London: Rider, 1999. Tutu, D God has a dream, London: Rider, 
2004. Allen, J Rabble-Rouser for peace, London: Rider, 2006. 
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 The second characteristic is that disagreements are managed through respect and 
worthiness of the other. The unity of the family need not be threatened because of the 
differences, but through disagreements the family grows in their maturity towards God 
and each other. This kind of maturity comes about through love, care, and affirmation of 
the greater good in the other (Tutu 2004:22). 
 
The third characteristic is the willingness to share. Tutu draws from the early church's 
sharing of material and spiritual gifts amongst its members. "They all had things in 
common. When the one part suffered with it, when one part prospered, then the whole 
prospered with it. There was mutuality in the relationship in which all gave and all 
received…In a happy family you don't receive in proportion to your input. You receive in 
relation to your needs, the ones who make the least material contribution often being the 
ones who are most cared for-the young and the aged" (Tutu 2004:23). 
 
The fourth characteristic refers to the care and compassion members of the family have 
for each other. In this kind of community care and compassion for the other takes 
preference over personal gain. It is through care and compassion of the other that we 
discover our own abundance. We also discover our common humanity.  
 
For Tutu the perfect human family is God's dream for humanity. In the South African 
context with its diversity and complexities, it is God' dream for people to accept one 
another as brothers and sisters of one family. Tutu rightly says "…that we do belong 
together, that our destinies are bound up in one another's, that we can be free only 
together, that we can survive only together, that we can be human only together, then a 
glorious world would come into being where all of us lived harmoniously together as 
members of one family, the human family, God's family. In truth a transfiguration would 
take place. God's dream would become a reality" (Tutu 2004:23-24). 
 
God's dream of a human family, Tutu rightly states that; "…we will always need a 
process of forgiveness and reconciliation to deal with those unfortunate yet all too human 
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breaches in relationships. They are an inescapable characteristic of the human condition" 
(1999:221). Reconciliation Tutu states;  "…is to want to realize God's dream for 
humanity-when we will know that we are indeed members of one family, bound together 
in a delicate network of interdependence" (Tutu 1999:222). 
 
Reconciliation of God's family has, like God's family, four characteristics. Firstly the 
perpetrator needs to acknowledge the truth. If this truth has been falsified or if the 
conduct and intention of the perpetrator has been to distort the truth, then 
acknowledgement of it will inevitably lead to forgiveness and healing. Many South 
Africans have blamed ignorance or denial for the oppression of millions of South 
Africans. In Tutu's view they have refused to acknowledge that they are morally 
responsible individuals (Tutu 1999:217). 
 
Secondly acknowledging the truth leads to remorse. Remorse is about taking responsibly 
for an act of distortion of the truth. Tutu admits that; "This requires a fair measure of 
humility, especially when the victim is someone in a group that one's community had 
despised, as was often the case in South Africa when the perpetrators were government 
agents" (Tutu 1999:218-219). 
 
Thirdly reconciliation requires that we remember so that the same wrongs does not repeat 
it. Remembering is not for revenge but to deal with the wrongs in such a way that the root 
of the cause is illuminated and dealt with in a way that heal both perpetrator and victim. 
Remembering is also important in order to understand the circumstances and influences 
under which the wrongs were committed. 
 
Fourthly reconciliation means denying the right to punish the perpetrator with its own 
wrongs. The loss of this right is to liberate the victim and restore the humanity of the 
perpetrator. Tutu again draws from the Christian story when he states that; "Jesus did not 
wait until those who were nailing him to the cross had asked for forgiveness. He was 
ready, as they drove in the nails, to pray to His Father to forgive them and He even 
provided an excuse for what they were doing. If the victim could forgive only when the 
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culprit confessed, then the victim would be locked into the culprit's whim, locked into 
victimwood, whatever her own attitude or intention. That would be palpably unjust" 
(Tutu 1999:220). 
 
Conclusion 
By adding other South African voice to Tutu’s model one find points of contact and some 
weaknesses in Tutu’s approach. The use of liturgy and the broad use of democracy are 
two weaknesses in Tutu’s approach. 
 
However, this model of moral formation for a South African society under democratic 
rule, which Tutu presents, and which other theologians contributed too, is the most 
appropriate and best model. This research takes the other models discussed seriously and 
acknowledges the positive points they offer for moral formation for a South African 
society. I discovered that Tutu's model includes most of the strands of the five positions 
presented by William Johnson Everett, Rosemary Radford Ruether, Geoffrey 
Wainwright, Stanley Hauerwas and Robin Gill. However, Tutu includes the important 
points of the interplay between the two stories, Ubuntu community and the role of God 
for moral formation. These three points have a direct influence on moral formation for 
South Africans in a democratic society. The three points take seriously the many kinds of 
division amongst South Africans and the role that the church plays in forgiveness and 
reconciliation.   
 
The most unique contribution that Everett highlights in his position is that the new 
partner for ethics is politics. This is researched through careful analysis of Everett's 
development of his work from the mid-eighties. Everett's position takes a 
progression/regression from a major role that the Christian story has for moral formation 
to one in which the Christian story only plays a role in so far as it fosters the values of 
democracy. 
 
This progression/regression is well demonstrated by Everett's attempt to merge the sacred 
and the secular. He uses symbol at the center of moral formation. As he shifts from the 
 207 
symbols of sacrament, communion, vocation to covenant, one also notice the shift in the 
role of the Christian story for moral formation. Towards the end of his work he 
introduced the symbol God' federal republic. The shift to this symbol suggests that 
changes in worship must come about so that it, worship, reflects the democratic society 
and democratic values. 
 
Everett's model, and especially in his earlier stages, presents us with useful points. In his 
later and present stages his weakness becomes evident in the little consideration he gives 
for the community nature of the South African society, his uncritical use of covenant as a 
major symbol for moral formation, the limited role that worship can play in moral 
formation and the broad gap that developed between the Christian story and the Public 
story for moral formation. 
 
Rosemary Radford Ruether's position, like William Johnson Everett, has undergone 
major shifts. Also, like Everett, Radford Ruether tries to forge the Christian story and the 
Public. She does this through her alignment with two different paradigms of Feminism. 
In her earlier writings she emphasizes the liberal paradigm and then moves to the social-
constructionist paradigm. By keeping the gap between the two paradigms narrow, she 
ascribes a greater role to the Christian story for moral formation than Everett does. 
 
Radford Ruether's position argues that the Public story influences the Christian story 
through the interpretation of Christian feminists of ordination, authority, ministry, liturgy, 
doctrine, the Bible and christology. 
 
The weaknesses of Radford Ruether have to do with her selective way of using the 
Christian story. She uses the experiences of women to construct a narrative for moral 
formation. This results in a selective community.             
 
Geoffrey Wainwright's position is different from the former two positions because he 
uses the Christian story as the story for moral formation. His ecumenical approach draws 
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from a variety of Christian traditions to formulate a narrative that is based on the liturgy 
and particularly The Eucharist. 
 
His community is the worshipping community with the diversity of symbols and 
practices. Wainwright points out the importance of doctrine for moral formation if used 
in the context of the liturgy. 
 
Wainwright's position lacks consistency because he draws form so many traditions. He 
uses the Christian story for moral formation and at times uses the Public story. This 
inconsistency is also a result of his inconsistent use of his controlling principle. 
Wainwright does not provide extensive descriptions of ethics and important terms for our 
subject of inquiry. 
 
Like Wainwright, Stanley Hauerwas uses the Christian community for moral formation. 
Hauerwas moves furthest away from the Public story for moral formation as he discards 
the four characteristics of reason, individuality, decisions and universal principles. 
Hauerwas aligns himself with theologians and philosophers who use the communitarian 
nature of moral formation. 
 
Stanley Hauerwas is one of the most prominent Christian ethicists who has pointed out 
that freedom does not come about because of individual reason but in interaction between 
selves in the worshipping community. Hauerwas's approach is characterized by his use of 
community, worship, character and socialization. 
 
Moral formation takes part in the re-enactment of the story of Jesus' birth, ministry, death 
and resurrection. This story is retold in worship and the worshippers become part of the 
story through their participation. 
 
My major criticism against Hauerwas's approach is his almost unrealistic description of 
community. Hauerwas also distance himself from the Public story in such a way that 
interplay between the two for moral formation is almost impossible. By doing this he 
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neglects to use the strengths of the Public story for interplay between the two stories for 
moral formation. 
 
The fifth position relates to Robin Gill and Stephen Sykes’s attempt to use other sciences 
to relate the Christian story and the Public story for moral formation. In doing this Gill 
claims that more than one community exists and persons belong to more than one 
community at any given time. 
 
Gill agrees with Hauerwas that community is the context for moral formation and that the 
church community is important for moral formation. Sykes who supports Gill's position 
also claims that more than one narrative exists in the broader narrative of God. 
 
Such an inter-disciplinary approach acknowledges the valuable contribution and interplay 
between the two stories can make for moral formation of a society under democratic rule. 
The role of reason and the individual is regarded as important and worship has a 
prominent role. Unlike Wainwright, Gill also speaks from the specific Anglican tradition. 
 
Having considered the five positions, Tutu's Ubuntu theology for moral formation 
presents the best approach for moral formation of the South African society under 
democratic rule. He uses community, narrative, symbols and worship creatively to point 
out the interplay between the two stories for moral formation. 
 
His biographical details, Ubuntu community and the role of God for moral formation 
show his acknowledgement for the Public story and the Christian story. In doing this he 
does not discard the self, reason, universal, principles or laws for moral formation. This 
finds meaning in the community as the individual is not self-determining. 
 
Tutu points out the relativism of both African theology's attempt to make the community 
an absolute and Western theology's attempt to make the individual an absolute. He draws 
from the Genesis story of creation and the cross of Jesus Christ to point out how God 
gives meaning to humanity through his creation and redemption of God's family. 
 210 
 The symbol of God's family suggests that community is beyond human interaction but it 
includes the non-human family as well. In doing this Tutu has demonstrated that 
community is open and that any attempt to exclude people from community is untruthful. 
 
The value of forgiveness and reconciliation is a demonstration of the community as found 
in Ubuntu. Forgiveness and reconciliation makes it possible for someone to become part 
of God' community. These are also values that cross beyond secular boundaries. These 
are values that help the interplay between the two stories, as its focus is the restoring of 
broken relationships. 
 
Tutu's approach link the two stories so that the community is open and the history that 
bind generations, becomes one history. The one history binds the different race groups as 
brothers and sisters of God's family. Sin then is reflected in the structural and 
psychological separation of members of the community. Freedom is the interaction of 
members in the community on the basis of their common humanity. 
 
The worship and praise of God helps the community see themselves as agents of God' 
dream. They also see themselves for who they are in relation to other persons and God. 
The worship of God points the participants to the potential of who we ought to be. 
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